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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, COLONIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

by

© RICHARD W. STUBBS

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, COLONIAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

submitted by RICHARD W. STUBBS in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is individual political leadership during a counter-guerrilla campaign. The guerrilla war is the Malayan Emergency during the period 1948-1954. The individual leaders are two British colonial officials: Sir Henry Gurney, who was High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya from 1948 to 1951, and Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner from 1952-1954.

Based on past and present studies of leaders and leadership a definition of political leadership is posited. The analysis of the leadership of the two High Commissioners is based on the four major variables clustered in this definition. First, the elements of the general situation, including those trends in events over which the individual leader has little or no control are analysed. Second, the expectations of the various social groups in Malaya concerning the functions and behaviour of a political leader are discussed. The expectations each of the two High Commissioners brought to his task of governing Malaya are also analysed. Third, the organizational structures which surround the two leaders and which enable them to accumulate and order information as well as execute policies are examined. Finally, the nature of the patterns of communication between each of the two High Commissioners and the people of Malaya are considered. The communication content (or messages) and the communication channels (or means by which the messages were transferred) between the two leaders and the people of Malaya are detailed and analysed.

Two conclusions are drawn from this study. First the major variables which form the framework of analysis are of considerable significance to the leadership process. They provide an excellent means of analysing the relationship between a leader and non-leaders. Second, Sir Gerald Templer proved to be a more successful High Commissioner than Sir Henry Gurney. Gurney, hampered by the trends in the situation, an inefficient organization and poor communication facilities was able neither to develop policies with which there was widespread agreement nor to facilitate the resolution of problems as the people of Malaya expected. Templer, on the other hand, with the help of favourable changes in the situation, a reorganized and more efficient organizational structure and better communications was able both to live up to some of the more keenly felt expectations held by Malayans--particularly with regard to the Emergency situation--and to modify other expectations so that they coincided with what he could achieve. It is concluded that Sir Gerald Templer was a more effective leader than Sir Henry Gurney.

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The usual caveat concerning responsibility for the contents of an analysis is of particular importance in this case. Many of the people I have consulted have conflicting opinions about the subject of this study and I am sure none would agree with everything I have said. I therefore wish to emphasize that I alone am responsible for any errors in fact or judgement that may be found in the following pages.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this study is individual political leadership during a counter-guerrilla campaign. The individual leaders are two British High Commissioners, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer. The guerrilla war is the Malayan Emergency during the period 1948-1954.[1] An analytic framework for the study of political leadership will be the basis for the systematic accumulation, presentation and analysis of data. Hence, the object of the study is an increased understanding of political leadership, the Malayan Emergency and counter-guerrilla operations in general.

Although political leaders have long fascinated scholars, political scientists have been strangely reluctant to embark on theoretical studies of individual political leaders.[2] Hence, studies by political scientists of political leadership are limited. Moreover, the work done on political leadership during counter-insurgency campaigns is negligible. While students of counter-guerrilla warfare allude to its significance, there has been a general failure to assess the nature of the relationship between political leadership and the result of a counter-guerrilla campaign.[3]

And yet a prima facie case may be made for the assertion that political leadership is a highly significant factor at all levels of political activity. First, newspapers and radio and television news programmes not only detail at length the pronouncements and policies of various leaders but also assess their actions or lack of action.[4] The mass media has a distinct fondness for news of political leaders. This raises a second and related argument: people tend to personalize politics. The "selling of the leader" during elections and people's general willingness to identify with a particular individual during periods of political conflict attest to this phenomenon.[5] A third argument, which is closely linked to the importance of personalities in politics, concerns the general fascination with "charisma". Whether it be a social scientist (and this is perhaps the one aspect of individual political leadership that has received a fair amount of attention from students of political science) or a journalist who discusses this topic, all seem to concur that the role of the leader in political intercourse is crucial. Whether the authors who dissect "charisma" reject, modify or accept Weber's concept, there is general agreement that the individual political leader is of prime importance in a society.[6] Finally, it may be argued that in any crisis situation (and political life abounds with crises, not least of which are those caused by insurgency wars) the burden of stress induces people to look for strong decisive leadership. As one early social scientist has noted:

> We may say in short, it happens universally that leadership is intensified in times of emergency. War, conflict and adventure are its fertile soil. It grows directly with the need of concerted action, this point coming out time and again in questionnaire returns.[7]

While these arguments are not conclusive it would seem that individual political leadership is certainly worthy of more attention from political scientists.

The reason for employing the Malayan Emergency and particularly the period 1948-1954 as the case history is three-fold. First, although Malaya is often cited as an example of Government forces conclusively defeating communist guerrillas, during the initial stages of the Emergency in Malaya the communists enjoyed considerable success. The problems encountered by the Government and the slow but steady reversal of fortune, which meant that by the middle of 1954 the top communist leaders had been forced out of the country and guerrilla attacks were on the wane, provides an interesting background to the study of counter-guerrilla leadership. Second, descriptions, mostly by journalists, of the Emergency allude in a rather vague way to the differences in style between the two High Commissioners in question.[8] Sir Henry Gurney (1948-1951) the administrator, is contrasted with Sir Gerald Templer (1952-1954) the ex-soldier; the one efficient but retiring, the other expansive and domineering. This comparison provides an intriguing and compelling introduction to the two personalities involved. Third, there has been, as Harry Eckstein has noted, too little "direct processing of concrete experience in order to prepare it for theoretical contrivance."[9] This is certainly true of the Malayan Emergency. Lack of documentation cannot be given as the reason for this negligence. Annual Reports of the Malayan Government and the various departments are detailed and informative. Malaya enjoyed the services of a relatively large number of newspapers which recorded events from many different viewpoints. The Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council also provide interesting commentaries both on Government policies and on the desires of the various political and social groups represented. Moreover, the National Archives of the Federation of Malaya possess an excellent collection of private papers and party files which have scarcely been analysed in terms of the Emergency.

The case study approach is necessary because of the lack of systematic research into political leadership during guerrilla wars. As Bruce Russett argues, "all work on particular phenomena . . . begins with descriptive studies by those who are interested in a particular problem."[10] Case studies form the initial building blocks of systematic research, providing hypotheses about possible regularities and ordered data for testing hypotheses generated in other research activities. Thus, it should be noted that the research to be undertaken in this study is envisaged as a beginning rather than an end point in the process of theory building. By examining a neglected area of political activity--political leadership--and by presenting in a systematic manner data collected largely from primary sources on the Malayan Emergency, it is intended to advance the study of both political leadership and the Emergency.

The historical context of any case study is important. Hence, a brief sketch of the background to the Emergency would seem helpful at this point.

Since the British established themselves in the area early in the nineteenth century remarkable changes have taken place in the life of the Malayan peninsula. Economic expansion has been vigorous. British, and to a lesser extent Chinese capital combined with an immigrant Chinese and Indian labour force to develop the twin pillars of the Malayan economy, the tin mines and the rubber plantations. Chinese immigrants, attracted by the prospect of amassing some wealth and then returning to China, descended on Malaya in large numbers. Many immigrants, whose entry into the country was uncontrolled by the British until 1933, decided for one reason or another to stay and make Malaya their home. Similarly, though under more stringent Government control, a large number of Indians entered Malaya as labourers for the growing number of rubber estates. Although immigration was strictly curtailed during the 1930s the result of this influx of people was that by 1947 the Malays who are generally considered to be the original settlers of the area, represented less than 50 percent of the residents of Malaya. Of the 4,900,000 total population, 44 percent were Malay, 5.5 percent Malaysian aborigines, 38.5 percent Chinese, 10.5 percent Indian and 1.5 percent European and "Others".[11] Moreover, of all the major racial communities in Malaya, the Chinese, by virtue of their accumulation of wealth and dominance in commerce, were in control of the economy. The expansion of the economy and the influx of immigrants, therefore, were important factors in Malay life.

Political changes have been haphazard. Various treaties and agreements made by the British with the local elite had created, by the outbreak of World War Two, a rather odd patchwork of political authority. The Malayan peninsula was divided into the following: the three Straits Settlements, colonies of the British Crown run from Singapore; the Federated Malay States, where four Sultans, legally sovereign, allowed a British Advisor to administer their affairs based on guidelines laid down in Kuala Lumpur, the administrative capital of the region; and the Unfederated Malay States, the last states to sign agreements with the British Government, where British Advisors were accepted but whose rulers did not wish to join the Federation. This disparate group of states and colonies was united only in that the Malayan Civil Service, which administered the area, conformed to a uniform and distinctive bureaucratic standard.[12]

The Second World War acted as a catalyst on the political life of Malaya. First, the war had a striking effect on the (predominantly Chinese) Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.). Founded in 1930, the M.C.P. gradually expanded its activities during the following decade. The Second World War, however, changed their fortunes. The prospect of a Japanese invasion necessitated a communist alliance with the British authorities.[13] Thus, they received guerrilla warfare training and weapons from those who had formerly attempted to suppress them. Forced into the jungle to escape the brutal treatment of the Japanese occupation forces, the communists expanded their organization and engaged in limited attacks on the Japanese, gaining much experience and kudos in the process. Hence, at the end of World War Two, the M.C.P. emerged as a highly organized and respected political force.[14] The post-war chaos, which included a grave shortage of food and a sluggish economy, provided fertile ground for the communists. Working in both overt and covert groups, they exploited the grievances held by many sections of the population, particularly the Chinese and sought to advance their cause.

Second, World War Two forced the British Government to reassess its position in the Malayan peninsula. A special committee set up by Whitehall during the war made plans to rationalize the political situation by establishing one political unit.[15] Accordingly, late in 1945, Sir Harold MacMichael was sent out to Malaya to secure the agreement of the Sultans to the surrender of their sovereignty. The mission having been accomplished, the Malayan Union was proclaimed in 1946. Thus a single, centralized political structure was created and administered by the British-manned Malayan Civil Service from Kuala Lumpur.

Third, the Malays, many of whom had accustomed themselves to positions of some authority during the Japanese Occupation became increasingly aware of the value of their political privileges. Consequently, the Malay community and particularly the Malay elite were bitterly opposed to the new constitutional arrangements. A country-wide campaign was mounted against the provisions of the Malayan Union. The United Malay Nationalist Party (U.M.N.O.), which was specifically formed to fight the new constitution, poured scorn on the Sultans for surrendering the sovereignty of their states and for allowing themselves to be relegated to the status of colonies at a time when in Indonesia, Malay-speaking people were fighting for, and securing independence. The leaders of the U.M.N.O. also expressed the general discontent felt by Malays that the citizenship proposals, whereby all the inhabitants, Chinese and Indians as well as Malays, were to become citizens, would endanger the political position of the Malay community. Moreover, many British officials with extensive experience in Malaya were concerned about the new arrangement and added their voice to the call for the abolition of the Malayan Union. The uproar led to the Colonial Office reconsidering their activities, withdrawing their plans and, in February 1948, signing fresh treaties with the Sultans, by which all the states plus the two Straits Settlements, Penang and Malacca (but not Singapore), were brought together to form a Federation. Federal citizenship was severely restricted to comply with Malaya wishes.[16]

The years directly after the surrender of the Japanese were, therefore, characterized by considerable social, political and economic turmoil. Despite this however, the M.C.P. failed to gain the political recognition its leaders had hoped for. The strategy of "peaceful agitation" which was followed after the return of the British came under attack from within the party. A more aggressive policy was being advocated when the decision of the Asian Youth Conference (held in Calcutta during February 1948) to pursue more militant action, reached Malaya.[17] Therefore, in the spring of 1948, under a new leader, Chin Peng, the decision was made to enter the jungle and continue the struggle by force.[18] Military units largely recruited from former members of the predominantly Chinese communist Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army were established. Min Yuen (People's Movement) units were set up principally among the rural Chinese squatter-areas. Members of these units often remained at their jobs and in their homes thus providing the M.C.P. with a direct link to the "masses". Indeed, this organization became the chief channel of supply for the guerrilla units as well as the main proselytizing arm of the M.C.P. Raids were started on isolated rubber plantations and tin mines in an attempt to halt the economy. Terrorist tactics were used to coerce people, particularly members of the Chinese community, to cooperate with the M.C.P. and also to eliminate important Chinese Kuomintang sympathizers who were actively denouncing communism. By the summer of 1948 with the aid of terrorism, political education programmes, and the work of sympathetic followers, the jungle fringes became the domain of the M.C.P. guerrilla squads. Because of the lack of preparedness on the part of the Government, the M.C.P. was able to grasp the initiative and set the security forces on the defensive.

Although the M.C.P. change in strategy was not well thought out or coordinated it nevertheless caught the British Administration off guard. Senior officials in Kuala Lumpur were slow to appreciate the gravity of the situation. However, by June 1948, the terrorist activities of the M.C.P. had increased to such an extent that the Malayan Government was forced to take drastic action. On 16 June 1948, a State of Emergency was declared in parts of Perak and Johore. And on 18 June, the Emergency was extended to cover the whole of the Federation of Malaya. But the dissatisfaction that was felt within the Administration and the European business community over the way Sir Edward Gent, the High Commissioner, had handled the situation caused the Colonial Office to recall him for consultation. As the plane on which he was travelling approached London, it crashed, killing all aboard. So Malaya, torn by terrorism, and weakened by economic and social problems, required a new leader. This was the general situation that confronted first Sir Henry Gurney and later, after Gurney had been murdered by communist guerrillas, Sir Gerald Templer.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I

[1] The total duration of the Malayan Emergency was 1948-1960.

[2] Lewis J. Edinger notes the lack of interest in political leadership and examines some of the reasons in his article, "Political Science and Political Biography (I)," Journal of Politics 26 (May 1964): pp. 423-439. William A. Walsh has also bemoaned the lack of research on political leadership in "Toward Effective Typology Construction in the Study of Latin American Political Leadership," Comparative Politics 3 (January 1971): p. 272. Robert A. Packenham has observed that this neglect even extends to "the United States where political life is studied . . . intensely." See "Political Development Research" in Approaches to the Study of Political Science, ed. M. Haas and H.S. Kariel (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 182-183. Glenn D. Paige, ed., Political Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 5 notes the lack of attention the American Political Science Review has given to political leadership over the last half century. This, he argues, symbolizes the neglect of political leadership as a field of study.

[3] For instance, David Galula states that "resoluteness is a major factor in any conflict, but particularly so in revolutionary war . . . . Consequently, the role of the counter-insurgent leader is paramount." However, having said this, he fails to develop the point. See Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 26. See also N. Leites and C. Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 23-25; and Andrew M. Scott, Insurgency (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 119-121. The one major exception is James V. Downton Jr., Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process (New York: Free Press, 1973), where although the primary focus is "rebel" leadership, some discussion of "ruler" leadership is undertaken.

[4] See, for example, one author's inventory of stories referring to leaders in one issue of The New York Times, Paige, Political Leadership, pp. 3-4.

[5] There are numerous publications in all countries detailing the importance of personalities in politics. One interesting example concerning Canada is Gilbert R. Winham and Robert B. Cunningham, "Party Leader Images in the 1968 Federal Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science 3 (March 1970): pp. 37-55.

[6] See, for example, Ann Ruth Wilner, Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory (Centre of International Studies, Princeton: Princeton University, 1968); Robert R. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," in Daedalus 97 (Summer 1968); pp. 742-748; R. Bendix, "Reflections

on Charismatic Leadership," Asian Survey 7 (June 1967); pp. 341-352; K.J. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership," Political Studies 12 (October 1964): pp. 341-354.

[7] L.M. Terman, "A Preliminary Study of the Psychology and Pedagogy of Leadership," in Leadership, ed. C.A. Gibb (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Book, 1969), p. 73. This study was originally published in Journal of Genetic Psychology 11 (1904): pp. 413-51.

[8] Perhaps the best account by a journalist is Harry Miller, Jungle War in Malaya (London: Arthur Barker, 1972).

[9] Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 6.

[10] "International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation," in Approaches, ed. M. Haas and H. Kariel, p. 430.

[11] Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population by M.V. del Tufo (London: H.M.S.O., 1949), p. 40. For an account of the history of Chinese and Indian immigration see Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1948); and Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Immigration and Settlement 1786-1957 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[12] Analyses of the authority structure in the region from the time of British intervention up to the Second World War may be found in, amongst others, C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control (London: Oxford University Press, 1961); Rupert Emerson, Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York: Macmillan Company, 1937); C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1960); Sir Frank Swettenham, British Malaya (revised edition, London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).

[13] For an account of the activities of the M.C.P. guerrillas during the Japanese occupation, see F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London: Chatto and Windus, 1949).

[14] One observer makes the assessment that after the war the M.C.P. emerged "as probably the best organized and most experienced party in South-east Asia"; see Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 11.

[15] See F.S.V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East 1943-46 (London: H.M.S.O., 1956), Chapter 8; and A.J. Stockwell, "Colonial Planning During World War II: The Case of Malaya," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 2 (May 1974): pp. 333-351.

[16] For an interesting account of the preparation, inception and overthrow of the Malayan Union, see J. de V. Allen, The Malayan Union, Yale University Southeast Asian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). An account of the non-Malay reaction to the introduction of the Federation of Malaya Agreement may be found in Yeo Kim Wah, "Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya 1946-48," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4 (March 1973): pp. 31-51. It is interesting to note that by the criteria set out for citizenship under the Federation of Malaya Agreement 3.1 million people qualified automatically; of these 78 percent were Malay, 12 percent Chinese, and 7 percent Indian. See The Federation of Malaysia (London: H.M.S.O., 1963).

[17] Lawrence Sharkey, an Australian who conferred with M.C.P. leaders on his journey back from the Calcutta Conference, is generally thought to have passed on the decisions reached at the Conference. See Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 84; Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy 1945-1969 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1970), pp. 62-3; and J.H. Brimmel, Communism in South-east Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.210. Ruth McVey has argued that there is little evidence to suggest that the Conference alone was responsible for the decision to go into the jungle. The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project (New York: Cornell University, 1958), p. 24.

[18] For an interesting "discussion" of the M.C.P. decision see M.R. Stenson and G. de Cruz, The 1948 Communist Revolt in Malaya: A Note on Historical Sources and Interpretation and A Reply, Occasional Paper No. 9 (Institute of South-east Asian Studies, Singapore, November 1971). See also letter to the Editor from Gerald de Cruz, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1 (March 1970), p. 125; and Michael R. Stenson, Repression and Revolt: The Origins of the 1948 Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore, Papers in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 10 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1969).

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The study of political leaders is not new: it has a long and distinguished ancestry. There have always been historians and philosophers who have been ready to chronicle and assess the lives of heroes, living and dead. Indeed, attempts to single out leaders, enumerate their characteristics, prescribe courses of action and detail ideal modes of conduct have long been at the heart of analyses of man's activities. Yet there are limitations on the benefits accruing to a political scientist from previous endeavours. There has been a decided lack of continuity in the manner in which historians and philosophers have approached their tasks. Nor has it been the habit of historians or philosophers to explicate the concepts they use or the underlying framework by which they analyse their subject matter.[1] In recent decades, social scientists have delved into the problem of attempting to understand the dynamics of leadership. As the social sciences have expanded and developed, so studies of leadership have become more sophisticated. But in the social sciences research on leadership has largely been confined to the study of relatively unstructured small groups[2] or highly structured organizations.[3] Hence, the value of this research for the study of individual political leadership is somewhat limited.

However, certain developments in leadership studies do offer general guidelines for assembling a framework which will provide a basis for the systematic analysis of individual political leadership. Perhaps the major debate within the literature has concerned the relative importance for understanding leadership of the traits associated with leaders and the situation within which they operate. The search for traits, which characterized the study of leadership for so long, has over the last few decades given way to a recognition of the salience of the situation in which a leader operates. The propensity of political philosophers for searching the lives of great leaders in an attempt to elicit their common traits was shared by early social scientists. Some advocated the unitary trait approach which involved looking for the single factor that linked all leaders. Others attempted to compile a list of characteristics which were felt to be common to all who held positions of leadership.[4] This focus on a "constellation of traits" included lists of both "physical" and "emotional" factors and was based on the notion that a basic personality pattern exists for all leaders. But neither approach could surmount the problem of explaining why some people who were not leaders exhibited a number of so called "leadership characteristics" and why different cultures seemed to produce different types of leaders.[5] Hence, despite the relatively sophisticated techniques developed to explore the psychological dispositions of people, progress in the field of leadership theory was slow.

Gradually, however, a new dimension was introduced into analyses of leadership and became crystallized in the writings of such scholars as R.M. Stogdill, Alvin W. Gouldner, William O. Jenkins, Cecil A. Gibb, J.K. Hemphill, and Helen Hall Jennings.[6] This new dimension was the situation in which a leader worked. It is perhaps not surprising that social scientists should have turned to the setting or situation for an understanding of leadership. Among historians the merits of the Great Man theory, roughly equivalent to the trait approach, and the social forces theory, the counterpart to the setting or situation approach, had been debated for some considerable time.[7] That the interplay of the characteristics of the individual leader and the situation in which he found himself were important to his success or failure was beginning to be appreciated by historians. Parallel advances in theorizing about leadership were thus to be expected in the social sciences.

In a major review of the literature on leadership up to 1947 R.M. Stogdill commented that "it becomes clear that an adequate analysis of leadership involves not only a study of leaders but also of situation." He also noted the importance of analysing leadership as a "relation that exists between persons in a social situation."[8] "Leadership," argued Gibb, "resides not exclusively in the individual but in his functional relationship with other members of his group."[9] Since the general reassessment of leadership theory that occurred in the late 1940s, it has become generally recognized that leadership is not a concept that can be isolated and defined in terms of one individual but that it is dependent on the prevailing circumstances and the interplay of people's attitudes and actions. This shift of emphasis from traits to situation has not meant that the characteristics of leaders themselves have been or should be ignored, but that the characteristics of those who constitute the social context of the leadership process should also be evaluated. Thus, the synthesis of personality and situation has focused attention on the necessity of conceiving of leadership as a process which involves the interdependent roles of leader and non-leader.

Conceiving of leadership as involving interdependent roles was an important theoretical advance, for central to role theory is the concept of role expectations.[10] Gibb's comment that a leader "retains his status to the extent that he meets the expectations of other active group members"[11] has been echoed by many analysts of leadership. Commenting on political leadership, for instance, Daniel Katz has argued that:

> A leader's personal characteristics and values must fit the needs and aspirations of his following. Outstanding leaders often lose their supporters and drop out of sight--not because they have changed but because the pattern of wants and desires of their followers has.[12]

While circumstances can change specific anticipations, experimental research has proved helpful in delineating general categories of expectations and needs with regard to the exercise of leadership. Small group studies on the interaction of individuals assigned certain tasks have shown that leaders are expected to perform a dual function. Individuals within a group expect to be directed towards the completion of the instrumental task with which that group is confronted, while at the same time they expect the internal coherence and structure of the group to be maintained.[13] As a number of writers have pointed out, this dual leadership function parallels the distinction drawn by Bagehot between the "dignified" and "efficient" aspects of the British constitution.[14] The "dignified" aspect of the constitution is similar to the "integrative" or "expressive" function outlined by small group researchers. It details those symbolic acts which provide the focus of loyalty and emotional integration. The "efficient" aspect is similar to the "task" or "instrumental" functions of leadership. This part of the constitution concerns the mechanism by which the goals and tasks are defined, the ways of achieving these goals and accomplishing these tasks are assessed, and the group or part of the group organized for effective action. The link between Bagehot's conception of the workings of the British constitution and the conclusions of sociologists and psychologists concerning the functions of a leader gives an indication that the "integrative-task" distinction has validity at the state level as well as the small-group level.[15]

Role expectation raises the importance of leadership communication. Fagen has stated that "communication is basic to all social and political life",[16] while Pye has argued that "it is possible to analyse all social processes in terms of the structure, content and flow of communication."[17] If, as will be done in this study, leadership is envisaged as an interactional phenomena in which the individual leader relates in a particular way to the unit in which he operates--be it a small group or a large society--the crucial part played by communication becomes readily apparent. Communication is central to the relationship. Indeed, as E.P. Hollander points out, it is possible to conceive of the "leader as a communication source and to see behaviors or attributes as communications given off to an audience of recipients within a given social situation."[18] This relationship may also be seen as a reciprocal process with the political leader as receiver and certain groups and individuals as communication sources. The channels and content of this two-way communication process are therefore central to the understanding of any leader/non-leader relationship. A leader's effectiveness is constrained by the communication channels open to him, for as Pye notes "no leader can rise above the restrictions of the specific network to which he has access, and at the same time none can escape the consequences of being surrounded by a communication system."[19]

Leadership, then, involves an interaction process. But what is it that distinguishes political leadership from other forms of leadership? First, political leadership involves an organizational framework. The lack of congruity between small group leadership experiments and political leadership situations amply demonstrates the importance of this factor. It has proved to be virtually impossible to replicate in small group laboratories certain crucial variables that act as parameters in real world political situations.[20] Amongst the most important of these are size, types of problems posed, political socialization of the people involved, and the presence of institutional structures with historically rooted norms, values and goals. Political organization is the key factor for it simplifies the multiplication of problems caused by the size of the social unit, is influential in the process of political socialization by providing symbols for assimilating information and articulating desires, and provides a framework which facilitates the resolution of conflict. The fact that political leadership has a corporate character and functions in an institutional framework supplies a continuity to any political leadership position which cannot be ignored. Second, political leadership differs from other forms of leadership by virtue of the nature of the tasks involved. A political leader is expected to be concerned with the tasks associated with the change or resistance to change of group goals and the eventual attainment of these goals. Moreover, he is expected to involve himself in the allocation of the group's valued scarce resources and rewards.[21] In other words, he is expected to deal with what are generally considered by people within the group to be political problems.

How, then, should leadership, and in particular political leadership, be defined? The fact that leadership studies have been produced by scholars in many different disciplines has meant that there are nearly as many definitions of leadership as works written on the subject. For instance, V.J. Bentz, in an unpublished review, listed 130 definitions of leadership obtained in a sampling of the literature prior to 1949.[22] However, this plethora of definitions may be categorized under four broad headings. The first concerns definitions which centre on the characteristics of an individual and are associated with those who favour the "trait" approach to leadership studies. The problems surrounding the trait approach, therefore, also apply to the definitions in this category.[23] Under a second heading may be grouped those definitions which associate leadership solely with the occupation of a formal position. While this set of definitions has some advantages it does fail to take into account the dynamics of the interaction process. As an aid to delineating a framework for analysing leadership, therefore, the definitions which come under this heading are of limited use. A third category of definitions comes under the heading of "sociometric choice". These definitions depend on the ability of the members of a group to recognize leadership.[24] It is thought that a leader may be defined as one who is held in esteem by his fellows in a given group, or who is felt by the members of his group to exert most influence on them. The problem here is that, as Gibb points out, "the sociometric question asked or the nature of the sociometric criterion, makes a very considerable difference."[25] While the implications for the study of leadership which underly each of these three types of definitions should not be ignored, it must be emphasized that not one of them would seem to offer a definition which incorporates the major aspects of the leadership process.

More encouraging in this respect are those definitions which may be placed in a fourth broad category under the general heading of "leader behaviour". Studies which examine leader behaviour may be divided into two subcategories: those studies which concentrate on why leaders behave as they do[26] and those studies which focus on the way a leader behaves. This is an important analytic distinction for it eliminates some of the confusion in studying leadership and facilitates the recognition that it is the second sub-category--the way a leader behaves--that is most crucial to the relationship between leader and non-leader. Indeed, this sub-category encompasses the definitions posited by many of those social scientists currently studying leadership. These definitions tend to emphasize that leadership involves either the exercise of influence or the fulfilling of functions; both of which place a premium on analysing a leader's actions rather than the reasons for his actions.[27] The one drawback to many of these definitions is perhaps the lack of indication as to how the influence is exercised and the functions fulfilled.

Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, therefore, political leadership will be defined, for the purposes of this study, as:

> the process whereby in a given situation a person who occupies an organizational position within a specified unit, initiates and maintains communications between himself and others which facilitate, in accord with expectations, the change or resistance to change of the unit's goals, the attainment of these goals, and/or the distribution of the unit's valued scarce resources and rewards.[28]

The major variables clustered in this definition provide the basis for developing a framework of analysis. The impact on the leadership process of both variations in each of the variables and different combinations of variables will be examined so that a greater understanding of the dynamics of the concept may be obtained.

The first of the major variables which constitute the framework of analysis is the situation in which the leadership process takes place. The need here is to detail and analyse the components of the situation as they pertain to individual political leadership. This will be done under two main headings. First, those aspects of the general situation outside the specific unit under consideration which impinge on the leader/non-leader relationship within the unit will be examined. In this study the specified unit is the Federation of Malaya and the external situation is the international environment. Second, the situation within the unit will be analysed. This will be done by focusing on: the physical environment or in other words the weather, terrain and vegetation; the internal political configurations and more specifically the major social and political cleavages within the unit; the "rules of the game" by which conflicts arising out of the cleavages are conducted; and the strategy of the leader's opponents in these conflicts. By delineating the situation in this way the importance of the different aspects of the variable for the leadership process can be fully assessed.

The second major variable of the analytic framework concerns the set of role expectations involved in the leadership process. Role expectations are a collection of values, attitudes, elements of knowledge and subjective probabilities,[29] which specify the appropriate conduct for a person occupying a particular position. An attitude may be distinguished from a value in that "an attitude refers to an organization of several beliefs around a specific object or situation",[30] while a value refers to "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode or end-state of existence."[31] The various groups that constituted Malayan society will, therefore, be examined to determine their expectations concerning what was considered to be within the realm of politics and what was felt to be the role of political leaders at all levels of society, especially at the highest level. Similarly, the expectations of each leader with regard to his role will be analysed, for it has been suggested that the more these coincide with expectations of the people within his unit the closer the relationship between them and, thus, the more effective a political leader can be. Moreover, the expectations of both the social groups and the leaders will be analysed in terms of the "task" and "integrative" functions that are normally associated with the leadership process.

The third major variable in the framework of analysis is the organizational context which surrounds a political leader. If an organization is defined as a set of stable relations governed by explicit procedures deliberately created with the intention of continuously accomplishing some specific goal or purpose,[32] it can be seen that the organizational context provides an element of continuity to the leadership process. The "set of stable relations" acts as a reference point for any leader. Moreover, the cohesiveness of the organization in which a political leader holds a position enables him to accumulate information and mobilize resources. The extent to which a political leader is able to do this would seem to affect his ability to fulfill his functions. Hence, the nature of the relations within those organizations in which a leader holds a position needs to be detailed and analysed. In this study the leaders in question held the position of High Commissioner, the highest constitutionally prescribed position in the Federation. The organization which needs to be described and analysed is, consequently, the Malayan Government. All branches of the Government--the civil bureaucracy, the police and the military--and other constitutionally defined mechanisms by which the High Commissioner governed the country--the State Governments, the Conference of Rulers, and the Legislative Council--will be examined in terms of those relations which were pertinent to the High Commissioner's ability to mobilize the organization towards fulfilling his function as leader. Further, the formal constitutional links with units outside the country--in this case the formal links through the Colonial Office with the British Government--will be analysed in the same terms.

The final major variable around which this study is to be developed is the pattern of communication between leader and led. As leadership is considered to be an interaction phenomena, this part of the analytic framework is at the heart of the study. It is assumed here, as Tannenbaum et al. argue, that communication is "the sole process through which a leader as leader can function."[33] For the purpose of this study communication is taken to mean the transmission of information, ideas, attitudes or emotions from one person or plurality of persons to another or others, through symbols, signs or signals. The communication pattern is, therefore, envisaged as a reciprocal flow of signs, signals and symbols essentially involving the leader, on the one hand, and members of the specified unit on the other. Analysis of the communication flow will be developed under two broad headings. First, the content of the communication or the nature of the signs, signals and symbols will be examined. It can be argued that a leader gets his support from "the issues he is associated with, the grievances he seeks to put right and the manner in which he proposes to do so."[34] Hence, the exchanges between each High Commissioner and the people of Malaya concerning the problems facing the Malayan people, the appropriate policies necessary to alleviate the problems, and the execution of these policies need to be detailed and analysed. As important as the policies associated with a leader is the way he personally behaves. Therefore, those signs, signals and symbols concerning the personal style or conduct of each of the High Commissioners will be assessed particularly in relation to the expectations held by the various social groups in Malaya. Second, the communication channels, which carry the signs, signals and symbols, will be analysed. Under this heading the crucial primary channels in which a leader talks directly to people and discusses problems with them will be detailed.[35] Furthermore, the role of the mass media in allowing the leader to communicate with the general population will be assessed. And finally the nature and extent of the chain of word-of-mouth communications which may link a leader to a substantial portion of the population will be examined.

Having outlined the analytic framework and before proceeding with the empirical analyses the following point must be emphasized. It is the major contention of this study that variations in each of the four variables detailed above, either by themselves or in interaction with the other variables, alter the relationship between a leader and the non-leaders in a specified unit and thus have a direct impact on the leadership process. The validity of this contention and its implication for the study and clarification of political leadership as a concept in political science will be central to the analysis contained in the following pages.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 2

[1] Lester Seligman has noted that "in general, political biography abounds in rich insights but suffers from its lack of criteria and conceptualization," and that "it is paradoxical that despite the marked stress given in American historiography to the role of the political personality, the analytic literature in the political biography is as sparse as it is." "The Study of Political Leadership" in *Political Behaviour: A Reader in Theory and Research*, eds. H. Eulau, S.J. Eldersveld and M. Janowitz (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 180. This article was first published in the *American Political Science Review* 44 (December 1950): pp. 904-15. With a few exceptions, this criticism is still valid.

[2] This is the type of experimental research done by many psychologists and some sociologists, as is clearly demonstrated in such analyses of the literature as Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership" in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd edition, eds. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley, 1969), Vol. 2, pp. 205-282.

[3] This is exemplified by research done on business administration and military organizations. See, for example, Frank Goble, *Excellence in Leadership* (New York: American Management Association, 1972): Carl J. Lange, "Leadership in Small Military Units: Some Recent Research Findings," *Defense Psychology*, ed. Frank Geldard (New York: Pergamon Press, 1962), pp. 286-301; and M.D. Harron and Joseph E. McGrath, "The Contribution of the Leader to the Effectiveness of Small Military Groups," *Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior*, eds. L. Petrullo and B.M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961).

[4] For a discussion of the "unitary trait" and "constellation of traits" see Gibb, "Leadership" in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, pp. 267-271. For an exhaustive discussion of early trait-analyses see Charles Bird, *Social Psychology* (New York: Appleton Century, 1940). Some scholars are still pursuing the elusive common trait. For a recent example see D.G. Winter's analysis of the "need for power" in political leaders in his *The Power Motive* (New York: Free Press, 1973). An excellent example of the shortcomings of the trait approach may be found in David Laitin and Ian Lustick, "Leadership: A Comparative Perspective," *International Organization* 28 (Winter 1974): pp. 89-118.

[5] For a discussion of the inadequacies of the trait approach, see Alvin W. Gouldner ed., *Studies in Leadership: Leadership and Democratic Action* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), pp. 23-25.

[6] Each of these authors, in analysing the "trait" approach concludes that the situation is of crucial importance. R.M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology* 25 (1948): pp. 35-71; Gouldner, *Studies*

in Leadership, pp. 3-49; William O. Jenkins, "Review of Leadership Studies with Particular Reference to Military Problems," Psychological Bulletin 44 (January 1947), pp. 54-79; Cecil A. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 42 (1947), pp. 267-84; J.K. Hemphill, "The Leader and His Group," Educational Research Bulletin 28 (1949), pp. 225-29; Helen Hall Jennings, "Leadership: A Dynamic Redefinition," Journal of Educational Sociology 17 (1944), pp. 431-33.

[7] For an analysis of this debate see E.H. Carr What is History? (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books), pp. 31-55.

[8] Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership," p. 65.

[9] Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," p. 231.

[10] See Theodore R. Sarbin and Vernon L. Allen, "Role Theory," in Lindzey and Aronson, Handbook of Social Psychology, pp. 497-506.

[11] Gibb, ed., Leadership, p. 202.

[12] "Patterns of Leadership," in Handbook of Political Psychology ed., Jeanne N. Knutson (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), p. 209. Lewis J. Edinger has expressed a similar view in, "Political Science and Political Biography (II)," The Journal of Politics 26 (1964), p. 658.

[13] These concepts were originally developed by Robert F. Bales and Talcott Parsons. See Robert F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups (Cambridge, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1950), p. 51. Bales used the terms "expressive" and "instrumental". See also R.F. Bales and P.E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision Making Groups," in Family, Socialization and Interaction Process, eds., T. Parsons and R.F. Bales (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955), pp. 259-306.

[14] Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (New York: Dolphin Books, n.d.) pp. 63-70. The parallel is drawn by such people as F.X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics" in Comparative Politics: A Reader, eds. H. Eckstein and D.E. Apter (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963); and Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961). "Expressive", "integrative", and "symbolic" are all terms which refer to the solidarity aspect of leadership, while "instrumental" and "task-oriented" refer to the leadership function of getting things done. Different authors have developed different terms to suit their own purpose.

[15] For a good example of the use of these concepts in an analysis, see Gayl D. Ness, "Expressive and Instrumental Leadership and the Goals of Government in Malaysia" in Leadership and Authority: A Symposium, ed. Gehen Wijeyewardene (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968).

[16] Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 4.

[17] Lucian W. Pye, Communication and Political Development (Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 4.

[18] E.P. Hollander, Leaders, Groups and Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 234.

[19] Pye, Communications and Political Development, p. 58.

[20] See Verba Small Groups and Political Behaviour, pp. 69-71, 112; 249; and International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 2nd ed., s.v. "Leadership: Political Aspect," by Lester Seligman.

[21] See the discussion of the difference between leadership in general and political leadership in particular in Katz, "Patterns of Leadership," p. 205.

[22] Cited in Bernard M. Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behaviour (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 87.

[23] For examples of definitions which centre on an individual's traits see Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership, pp. 8-9.

[24] See Helen H. Jennings' path-breaking work, Leadership and Isolation (New York: Longmans, Green, 1950). See also Gibb, "Leadership," The Handbook of Social Psychology, p. 211. Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behaviour, p. 87, lists his own classification of definitions in which he includes esteem-leadership. For an example of identifying informal leaders by means of sociometric choice, see Fred E. Fiedler, "Personality and Situational Determinants of Leadership Effectiveness," in Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, eds. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 362-380.

[25] Gibb, "Leadership," The Handbook of Social Psychology, p. 211.

[26] Among those who favour this approach to leadership are: Harold D. Lasswell Power and Personality (New York: The Viking Press, 1962); Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and

Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1950); and Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography."

[27] The importance of influence has been emphasized by such authors as: Andrew S. McFarland Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 154, who says "a leader may be defined as one who has unusual influence"; and E.P. Hollander, "Emergent Leadership and Social Influence" in Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior eds., Petrullo and Bass. Those who have defined leadership in terms of functions include: Downton, Rebel Leadership, pp. 3-4; and Fred E. Fiedler, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 8.

[28] This definition owes much to those posited by: Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership, p.411; Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography," p. 653. Note also that administrative leadership is distinguished from political leadership in that it is concerned with "the application of existing rules." See Katz, "Political Leadership," pp. 204-205.

[29] This definition is based on that of Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory," p. 498.

[30] Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 18.

[31] Ibid., p. 5. Rokeach has defined a belief as "any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does capable of being preceded by the phrase 'I believe that . . . . '" See Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), p.113.

[32] This is a slightly expanded version of the definition posited by Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in Handbook of Organizations, ed., James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 142.

[33] Robert Tannenbaum, Irving R. Weschler and Fred Massarik, Leadership and Organization: A Behavioural Science Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 27-28.

[34] Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership," p. 345.

[35] The importance of this aspect of communication has been emphasized by: Pye, "Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in Non-Western Societies," Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Spring 1956), pp. 249-256; and B. Berelson, "Communication and Public Opinion," in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, ed., B. Berelson (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1953), p. 452.

CHAPTER 3

SITUATION

The situation imposes parameters on the leadership process. The problems a leader has to face, the way he is able to deal with these problems and many of the resources at his disposal are often determined by aspects of the situation over which he has little or no control. In many ways the situation sets the stage for the development of the leader/non-leader relationships.

While the situation is commonly used as a fairly general, all-embracing term, for the purposes of this study it will have a restricted and precise meaning. In this way it will be possible to focus on those components of the situation which are most important to the leadership process. First, "situation" will include external stimuli or factors originating in the international system which impinge on the unit being analysed. These factors may be either politico-strategic or economic. Second, "situation" will be taken to include four domestic dimensions: the physical environment; the social structure, in particular the major social cleavages; the "rules of the game" by which conflicts arising from the cleavages are resolved; and the strategy of those who oppose the leader under study. Hence, in this chapter the crucial aspects of the international and domestic situation that confronted both Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer during their time as High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya will be detailed and analysed.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Economic Factors

When Sir Henry Gurney arrived in Malaya in the latter half of 1948, the international situation did not bode well for Malaya. The economic situation was unfavorable. The Malayan economy, dependent as it was on two major exports, rubber and tin, was wedded to the machinations of the international market. When a good price could be obtained on the international market for rubber and tin, the economy prospered; however, when the market was depressed, as was the case in the immediate post World War Two period, the economy foundered.[1] Compared with the pre-war years the terms of trade had moved very sharply against Malaya's products.[2] Rubber prices were low and tin production was slow to rise to pre-World War Two figures.[3] Moreover, these problems were compounded by the lack of international capital and the high cost of importing goods and machinery. Indeed, just at the time when the Government faced political and social turmoil which required considerable amounts of resources to combat, money and material were in short supply. Gurney and his administration were powerless in the face of this turn of international events. They were forced to cope with the situation as best they could.

The Malayan Government, confronted by what was officially described as a "gloomy financial position",[4] was severely constrained in what it was able to achieve. Gurney's political, social, and military problems were exacerbated by the recurring need to impose restrictions on expenditure. The uncertainties posed by the international market inhibited planning, meant that existing programmes might be suspended at short notice, and made an ordering of priorities a crucial matter.

As Gurney noted in 1948, "the solution of our difficulties and our future development in all fields is going to be concerned very closely with finance."[5] However, to a large degree, the solution was out of Gurney's hands.

Indeed, it was an international event of some magnitude, the Korean War, that completely changed the economic position of Malaya. Early in 1950, there had been a steady, although what was considered temporary, rise in the price of rubber and some other raw materials. This increase in prices had been stimulated by a number of factors: the slow build up of stockpiles in America and Russia; a resurgence of the American economy (after the slump of 1949); the devaluation of sterling; and political instability in Indonesia, an important rubber-producing country. On top of this, the Korean War, which broke out on 25 June 1950, injected into the international market all the uncertainties of a major international conflict. It created a scramble for primary resources and competitive stockpiling by the major powers. Fears grew that the conflict might extend to South-east Asia and freeze supplies of natural rubber and minerals. The bleak prospect of shortages of supply, coupled with an increased demand, produced a rapid and unexpected rise in the price of all raw materials, rubber and tin among them. The price of rubber was the most remarkable, averaging 169.55 cents per pound on the Singapore market in 1951, over four times the average price for 1949.[6] The average price for tin in 1951 was nearly double that of 1949.[7] These inflated prices lasted from the middle of 1950 well into 1952, and while there was a slump during the latter part of 1953 and the early months of 1954, the average price for these two years remained well above pre-

Korean War levels.

The impact of the prices boom on the total Government revenue was both unexpected and radical. The combination of increased customs revenue and income tax produced a total revenue for both 1951 and 1952 that was well over twice that received in 1949:[8] a remarkable change in Malaya's economic fortune. The constraints which the shortage of funds had imposed on Government spending were considerably loosened. And although there was a slump in the world demand for raw materials in 1953 and early 1954, the immense windfall revenues of the boom years allowed Government spending to remain relatively high. While the international economic situation put Malaya at a disadvantage prior to June 1950, in the years directly after the outbreak of the Korean War the insatiable international demand for primary resources had a very beneficial effect on the Malayan economy in general and the Malayan Government's coffers in particular.[9]

Politico-Strategic Factors

A number of politico-strategic factors had an impact on the relationship that each of the two High Commissioners was able to establish with the people of Malaya. First, World War Two and the Japanese occupation of South-east Asia had both undermined the traditional prestige of the Europeans and unleashed a wave of nationalist sentiment which expressed itself in widespread anti-colonial demonstrations. Indeed, Tan Cheng-lock, a respected Malayan Chinese politician, noted in 1948 that "one of the greatest events in human history, which is taking place at the present moment, is the revolt of Asia, where the prestige of the white man per se has gone."[10] Furthermore, news of the militant anti-colonial actions of groups in Burma, French Indo-China and Indonesia reached Malaya throughout the period under review and stimulated nationalist sentiments within the Federation.[11]

Second, the course of events in China and world reaction to developments greatly affected the people of Malaya and in particular the Chinese community. The success of the communists in China was certainly a stimulus to the Malayan Communist Party, and gave those who were unsure of which way to turn an added inducement to cooperate with the guerrillas. Thus, some Chinese felt it best to insure themselves against the possibility of a similar victory in Malaya by staying strictly neutral and aiding the M.C.P. when any request was made. This situation was compounded when, on January 6, 1950, the British Government recognized the Chinese People's Government in an attempt to influence the way the communists dealt with the vast British investment in China.[12] While The Times argued that "there can be little doubt that they have acted wisely", and suggested that the decision was based on the unanimous recommendation of British officials in the Far East and South-east Asia, community leaders in Malaya were deeply troubled.[13] Many argued that the decision encouraged the M.C.P. and its supporters. The general feeling was that the British Government had acted too hastily and should have waited for the concurrence of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and United States Governments.[14]

A third factor, and one which was closely linked to the second, was the ebb and flow of the Korean War. The outbreak of the war caused a great deal of apprehension in Malaya, for just as Europeans saw it as a prelude to a Russian strike across Western Europe, so those in Malaya anticipated another invasion through Thailand. The debacle of the fall of Singapore, which was constantly analysed in the immediate post-Japanese occupation period, was still fresh in the minds of all sections of Malayan society. Hence, a constant vigil was kept on the developments in Korea.[15] The initial impression gained from the Korean War, which was that the communists were on the move, further discouraged cooperation with the Government. Perhaps a good indication of the impact international events had on the domestic conflict in Malaya can be extracted from the fluctuations in the rate of surrender of communist guerrillas. As Lucian Pye points out, "the surrender rate dropped sharply at the time Britain recognized Red China and when the communists were scoring their greatest successes in the Korean War."[16]

DOMESTIC SITUATION

Physical Environment

The physical environment is an important dimension of the situation because of the restraints it places not only on the leader, but on all members of the unit. Although a relatively small country, Malaya was strategically placed at the junction of mainland and insular Asia, adjacent to the main sea route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Occupying the most southern portion of the peninsula tip of South-east Asia, the Federation of Malaya stretched roughly 500 miles from the Thai border to the Straits of Johore (which separate the peninsula from the island of Singapore.) The Federation had a total surface area of 50,886 square miles, approximately equal to that of England or New York State, or one fifth of the province of Alberta. However, while the Federation was relatively small in area, certain factors combined to make the country difficult to traverse and to give a feeling of isolation to some regions.

Much of the indigenous vegetation severely inhibits movement. Situated at the crossroads of monsoon Asia, between the first and seventh degrees north latitude, the region has an equatorial climate which supports luxuriant flora. Rainfall and humidity are high, particularly on the east coast, as is the temperature, which varies very little (except as a function of elevation) from the 80 degree Fahrenheit average. The result of this climactic combination is a tropical evergreen rain forest which covers over three-quarters of the peninsula. The exact composition of the forest varies, depending on the nature of the land--coastal swamp, foothills or mountains--but the overall picture is of a vast, dense jungle landscape. Of particular concern for the problem of movement within the jungle, and therefore across much of the countryside, is the undergrowth or secondary forest which can make the jungle almost impenetrable. The actual amount of secondary forest in lowland regions is fairly large because of the extensive areas that have been subjected to the practice of shifting or squatter agriculture. In the foothills and more mountainous regions, where the forest canopy is light, the penetrating sunlight encourages a profusion of vegetation on the forest floor. There are seven major ranges in the peninsula, all running roughly north-south and varying from 4,000 to 7,000 feet in height and all covered with thick forest. It is this combination of mountains and jungle that makes movement in the central region of the country so hazardous and arduous. The slippery, wet mountain sides, covered with prolific vegetation allied with a forest canopy which severely restricts visibility, make progress extremely slow (especially in an east-west direction) and constantly pose the prospect of being lost or of going around in circles.[17]

The problem of traversing the country resulted in the isolation of communities. This was particularly true along the east coast where, in direct contrast to the busy maritime and coastal shipping activities of the west coast, navigation was more difficult and maritime access more limited. Indeed, the west coast has always been thought of as "the front door" to Malaya, while the east coast has been described by one prominent British official as "the further side of silence".[18] Moreover, the distribution of settlements around the coast line of the peninsula has, in the past, been determined by the fertility of agricultural soils which have tended to be located in a few widely scattered lowland areas. Inland, the non-Malay population centres were based on the tin deposits and rubber plantations which were located in the western half of the peninsula.[19] Malay communities were situated along river valleys and used the water as their major form of transport. This isolation of certain communities was accentuated by the political geography of the country. Historically, the nine states and two Straits Settlements that constituted the Federation of Malaya had an independent tradition that encouraged ties with the state capitals rather than Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital.

The physical environment inhibited movement around the Federation and perpetuated the isolation of many communities. It, therefore, provided a relatively constant set of background problems with which leaders of Malaya had to contend.

Social Structure

The second dimension of the domestic situation is the social structure. The social structure and the consequent major social cleavages will be analysed in terms of the following: race; culture, which includes religion and language; region; economic base; and ideological commitment. The major cleavages arising from the social structure are of importance because of the problems they present to a leader. Not only may they be the major source of opposition to him and the organization he heads, but they may also affect the outcome of his policies and the relationship he is able to establish with the population in general.

The Federation of Malaya was a plural society of racial minorities. Racially the major division within Malayan society was between Malay and Chinese, or more generally between Malay and non-Malay.[20] The Malays, while by no means a completely homogeneous people, do have many cultural characteristics in common. The Malay ethnic group has occupied the peninsula and island region of South-east Asia since pre-Christian times.[21] Therefore, when successive waves of immigrants have reached the peninsula from various parts of the neighbouring archipelago, such as Java and Sumatra, their similar cultural characteristics have ensured that assimilation into the indigenous Malay community has been relatively easy. As well as a common ethnic origin these characteristics include: a common experience of first, Hinduization, then Islamization; a basically common language; analagous ecological backgrounds, which have helped to produce a characteristic orientation toward the resources of the area; and a common history of European colonial rule.[22] The importance of culture in the Malay identity, particularly the role of the

Islamic religion cannot be overstated. As Gordon P. Means has pointed out, "by constitutional and legal definition a Malay is and must be a Muslim. To abandon Islam would mean the renunciation of his Malay way of life . . . ."[23] Indeed, Islam regulates the Malay community's social life, for as one observer has noted, it is "difficult to exaggerate the intensity with which Islam approaches its mission of establishing on earth a divinely revealed social order."[24] Hence, Islam binds Malays to a prescribed set of social relationships, and thus cements the feeling of racial identity. It also determines the attitude of the "true believers" to the outside world. The least it demands is exclusiveness, while some interpret the tenets of Islam as counselling the expulsion of non-believers.[25] The fact that at least fifty percent of the population of the Federation were non-Muslims and, therefore, not subject to the laws and customs of Islam, generated at times considerable strain between the Malay and non-Malay communities.

The Chinese community, by contrast, is much less united. While Chinese immigrants over the years brought with them their own customs, religion, and social institutions, none of these acted to unite the whole community. In 1947, the vast majority of the Chinese population was made up of five linguistic groups--Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Tiechiu, and Hainanese[26]--and had origins in four of China's south-eastern provinces--Kwangtung, Fukien, Kwangsi and Hainan. This diversity inhibited any general communal feeling. Moreover, institutions such as the secret societies pitted Chinese against Chinese. These secret societies, which controlled much of the immigrant's social, political and economic life in the nineteenth century, were still a part of the fabric of Chinese society directly after World War Two.[27] Nor can it be said that religion binds the Chinese together, for the religious beliefs of the Chinese are not communally based, but rather are an individual or family matter. The three principal religions of China: Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, are represented in Malaya, although an individual might be hard pressed to categorize himself as belonging to any one of these faiths. The Chinese religion, therefore, is essentially eclectic and tolerant, and lacks the messianic fervour of the Muslims.[28] However, it can be said that the Chinese community is temporally united in the celebration of the major festivals and holidays observed in China.[29] Further, an important factor in setting the Chinese apart from the other ethnic groups in Malaya, although by no means uniting them, is their pride in the literature, history and art of China and in the richness of the Chinese dialects. This cultural pride acted to reinforce the gap that existed between Malays and Chinese in the early years of the Emergency.

Smaller, and therefore of less impact on the social fabric of Malayan society, the Indian community was more united than the Chinese community. A high percentage of Indians were Tamil-speaking[30] whose close ties with their homeland and social and religious institutions tended to keep them apart from other Malayan groups. Moreover, the fact that the Tamil-Indian population was largely Hindu and conscious of the religious strife in India during the post-World War Two period did not encourage good Indian-Malay relations.[31] By and large, however, the Indians attempted to keep themselves as far as possible out of the main currents of social conflict.

The fourth element of the Malayan society, the European or "white" community, was very small numerically but highly influential.[32] The Europeans constituted a fairly closed social group which centred on the Christian church and particularly, the British-style social and recreational clubs. They occupied senior positions in the Government, in commerce and in industry. Because an extremely low percentage of Europeans made Malaya their life-long home and most kept ties with, and planned for their retirement in Britain, loyalty towards, and interest in the affairs of the United Kingdom were very great. All these factors combined to keep the European community, as a whole, relatively isolated from the rest of Malayan society.

The gulf between each of these four communities created by religious and cultural customs and institutions was further accentuated by the language barrier. Each of the communities perpetuated its language in the family and social institutions and tended to group together, whether in urban or rural areas.[33] Thus, the towns and cities of Malaya were divided into Malay sections, Indian sections, European sections, and Chinese sections. The Chinese sections themselves were split into neighbourhoods where one Chinese dialect would predominate. Likewise in the rural areas, villages were usually of one race. For inter-racial communication English was the _lingua franca_ of the more educated, usually urban, elite, while a simplified and bastardized form of Malay was used in the urban market places and the countryside. This segmented pattern of ethnic distribution was compounded by the fact that the Malays were primarily rural dwellers, except in the three states of Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perlis, where they also constituted the majority of the population in the small number of towns. The Chinese formed the majority in the towns and cities of the west coast and lowland areas, and also constituted a substantial proportion of the population in the rural areas of much of this region.[34] Further, as Fisher has noted, the historical administrative divisions separated the predominantly Chinese populated areas (the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca and the former Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) from the predominantly Malay populated areas (the former Unfederated Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore).[35]

This physical separation of the communities was partly the result of, and reinforced by, an economic factor. The economic base which sustained the Malays was quite different from that which allowed the non-Malays to prosper. In 1947, nearly 75 percent of the Malays were engaged in agriculture and the vast majority cultivated rice.[36] This made each kampong, Malay rural village, essentially self-sufficient if it was coupled with some fishing in the rivers or coastal waters. But while this peasant or subsistence economy was often supplemented to some extent by a few acres of fruit, rubber or coconut to provide a cash crop and some stability to the economic position of the kampong, it brought little prosperity.[37] The Chinese community, on the other hand, was heavily involved in both the industrial and commercial aspects of the Malayan economy. The Chinese had played a vital role in the development of both the rubber and the tin industries as labourers, investors, and owners. They virtually monopolized the entreprenurial aspects of the economy, including small-trading, shop-keeping and money lending. Professor Silcock has calculated that by 1947 the aggregate wage and salary incomes of the Chinese was $633 million, as compared to $186 million for the Malays. The profits accruing to members of the Chinese community totalled $450 million, as compared to only $20 million for members of the Malay community.[38] Just as important as this large discrepancy in income was the fact that many Malays had over the years become indebted to Chinese money-lenders and had either forfeited the right to their land[39] or been forced into the position of a debt-worker, selling produce at a rate that was well under market value. Malay resentment at their lowly economic status, therefore, tended to focus on the Chinese community. Hence, the latent antagonisms that existed between the two communities, Malay and Chinese, often surfaced when economic circumstances and the resulting frustrations generated specific complaints. This problem had to be the constant concern of every High Commissioner.

The final aspect of the social structure of the Federation of Malaya that is of concern at this point is the ideological commitment of the various groups and the resulting social cleavages. First, the communist/non-communist split must be considered. It could be argued that this conflict was merely an imported version of the problems of the Chinese mainland. The Malayan Communist Party consisted almost exclusively of Chinese and maintained close contact with the Chinese Communist Party. During the 1930's, many activities of the M.C.P. were instigated upon receipt of directives from China, and involved a certain amount of anti-Kuomintang campaigning.[40] After the Japanese occupation, Kuomintang members became primary targets of the M.C.P. and many of those killed during the initial years of the Emergency had affiliations with the Nationalist organization. However, emphasis on this explanation for the ideological split ignores the fact that the M.C.P., which contained some non-Chinese members, based its appeal on eliminating not just Chinese capitalists but all capitalists; indeed, they advocated the overthrow of the capitalist system. The communists, therefore, challenged all those in Malaya who wished to maintain an essentially capitalist way of life. Hence, the M.C.P. crossed swords with a fairly large group of people headed by the Colonial Government.

This leads to the second ideological split in the Malayan society during this period. The division was between those who felt that independence should be granted in the very near future after federal elections had been held and those who felt that some stability should be attained before discussions about the prospect of the British handing over the Government to Malayans be even considered. The view that independence should be gained sooner rather than later was held by those who had been fired by the wave of nationalism that spread through South-east Asia after the Japanese occupation and were frustrated that decisions concerning Malaya could not be made by properly elected and fully responsible Malayans. The view that counselled caution and waiting on more propitious times was generally held by those who occupied responsible positions within the Administration and by those who feared that the withdrawal of the British Colonial Government and the lack of any substitute intermediary might allow the latent antagonism within the plural society to emerge to the detriment of all.

The third ideological split of some importance concerns the difference of opinion between those Malays who held that some reconciliation between Malays and non-Malays had to be worked out and those who argued for more radical ways of dealing with the non-Malay problem. Such radical proposals included suggestions that Malaya should join with Indonesia to form a Pan-Malay Union. The radical faction of the Malay community was small but vocal, and had some following, particularly in the north-eastern states. Essentially, their appeal was based on the virtues of Islam and Malay rights as "sons of the soil", or the "original inhabitants" of the peninsula.[41] To the extent that this radical group voiced their opposition to the efforts of the Colonial Government, they constituted a splinter group of some significance.

Two types of cleavages thus confronted the two High Commissioners. The first, the ideological or political cleavages, posed immediate and direct problems in that certain groups within the Malayan society directly opposed the Government of the Federation of Malaya and its policies. The Government, and therefore, the High Commissioners as head of the Government, were directly involved in the conflict arising from the ideological cleavages, and so had to respond to the problems the situation created. The social cleavages which centred mainly on the Malay/non-Malay division exacerbated the problem. While policies had to be devised to counter or mollify political opponents, each High Commissioner had to take into consideration the consequences of the Government's actions for the social cleavages that divided the society. In solving one problem the possibility of creating another, far worse, had to be avoided. Hence, the High Commissioners had the problems they were to attempt to solve to a great extent dictated to them by the domestic situation. Further, they were confined by the social cleavages, in the range of policies they could pursue in solving these problems.

"Rules of the Game"

The resolution of any conflict is governed by a number of rules, either explicitly stated or implicit in the behaviour of the protagonists.[42] As Edinger has noted, "the rules of the game must be observed more or less if the political system is to function efficiently." These rules may well restrict a political leader, particularly if they are well entrenched in the political culture of the country, or are so explicitly stated and well accepted that they are considered an integral part of the social fabric. In Malaya, this aspect of the domestic situation was complicated by the fact that there were two distinct, but in some respects, inter-related conflicts, with which the Government had to deal. They were inter-related in the sense that both opponents of the Colonial Government had as their goal, or as one of their goals, political independence. However, it must be remembered that the M.C.P. wanted the complete structural change of the Malayan society, while those who were non-communist and wanted independence desired only that the structure of political authority at the highest level be changed.

First, the conflict between the M.C.P. and the Government must be considered. The rules of this conflict were established during April, May and June of 1948, when the M.C.P. initiated a campaign of terrorist actions aimed at Kuomintang Chinese, Europeans, and their property. This crossing of the threshold of violence prompted the Government to respond by declaring the existence of an Emergency situation. Thus, the M.C.P., by its terrorist act, accepted violence as part of the rules governing the confrontation. The Government, by using the army, arming the Police and allowing all Security Forces to shoot at suspected communists and their sympathizers, accepted that under specific circumstances the taking of human life would be a part of this confrontation.[43] The Government introduced new regulations in an attempt to portray clearly its attitude to the conflict.[44] This acceptance by the Malayan Government of a legalistic definition of the conflict did as Lucian Pye has suggested, "contribute to clarifying the operational rules it was prepared to follow" and "caused the M.C.P. to adopt some marginal restraints on its activities."[45]

In the case of the second conflict in which the Government had a major role, the rules were laid down in the Federation of Malaya Agreement. Both sides accepted that the conflict should be resolved in a non-violent way and largely through the mechanisms established in the Agreement. Therefore, those who desired a speedy declaration of independence attempted to exert pressure on the Government through the Federal and State Legislative Councils. These Legislative Councils were made up of "official members", Government officers who held an office of emolument under the Federal Government or the Crown, and a larger number of "unofficial members", who represented the various ethnic and economic interests of specific groups. "Unofficial members" were appointed by the High Commissioner; their regular term of office was three years.[46] Since policy matters were debated in the Legislative Council and the High Commissioner was formally its presiding officer, the Council became the most important forum for those pursuing the goal of independence in the shortest possible time. Advocates of early independence were also allowed to conduct their campaign through such channels as public meetings and the press, although the problem of being mistaken for a communist did require some caution!

The Opposition

The nature of the opposition confronting any leader has important consequences for the relationship he is able to develop with other members of his unit. Indeed, when members of a unit have a choice between alternative political organizations, each headed by a political leader, their assessment of any one individual political leader will depend, in part at least, upon the quality and nature of all the leaders involved. Therefore, in the study of one set of political leaders it is necessary to describe briefly the leaders and strategies of those who oppose them.

In discussing the quality of leadership in the M.C.P., the effects of the Japanese occupation must be taken into account. During the first year of the occupation, the M.C.P. upper echelons were decimated by the Japanese. In August 1942, most of the top men of the M.C.P. in Singapore were suddenly arrested and summarily executed.[47] On the first of September 1942, at a conference of high-ranking officers in the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (M.P.A.J.A.) and the M.C.P., the Japanese ambushed and either killed or captured nearly one hundred men, including at least half of the M.P.A.J.A.'s political commissars.[48] Similar, though smaller, incidents of betrayal leading to the capture of high officials continued throughout the Japanese occupation. The result was that by the end of the war power was concentrated in the hands of one man, Lai Teck. Lai Teck had full command over policy and organization and held the post of Secretary of the M.C.P. directly after the war. However, suspicion was aroused by certain pieces of evidence that began to accumulate that Lai Teck had been a Japanese agent.[49] Finally, his position within the M.C.P. became so untenable that early in 1948 he fled the country, accompanied by a considerable portion of the party's funds. The consequence of the Japanese actions and the defection of Lai Teck was a scarcity of politically mature, qualified personnel at the higher levels of the M.C.P. This was reflected to some extent in the strategy that was adopted by the communists.

The new man chosen to lead the M.C.P. was Chin Peng. Only twenty-six when he was elected Chairman of the Political Bureau in 1947, Chin Peng had been a lieutenant of Lai Teck and had received all his training in the jungle of Malaya. He was considered by the British soldiers who had spent the Japanese occupation in the jungle with the Chinese guerrillas to be a highly competent administrator, a likeable companion, and a sincere and dedicated communist.[50] However, whether he had the experience to direct a country-wide campaign against the British must be questioned. The initial decision made in March 1948, to conduct a guerrilla-warfare style campaign came at a time when mass support, a prerequisite for the successful establishment of a guerrilla base, was dwindling and the British were stronger than at any time since the end of the Second World War.[51] Moreover, the imitation of "Mao Tse-Tung's military concepts" seemed to have come about not so much because of the similarity in conditions between those in China and those in Malaya--there were in fact few similarities--but rather because the Chinese Communist Party was providing a spectacular and, most importantly, a successful example.[52] When the M.C.P. guerrillas failed to set up the required "liberated areas" and the timetable for victory had to be abandoned,[53] the decision was made in 1949 to use most of the original guerrilla forces, as well as the new and highly trained recruits that had been held back in reserve, in order to step up terrorist activities.[54] The M.C.P., by diverting most of its manpower to conduct this reign of terror, not only sacrificed the work of the political cadres, but also lost much of the sympathy its propaganda groups had built up. Fear produced a sullen neutral population rather than an actively sympathetic pool of support. The fruitlessness of this strategy was recognized by the M.C.P. leaders in September 1951 after complaints had been received from all levels that the masses might be forced into cooperating with the Government.[55] In October 1951 a directive was issued by the Central Committee of the M.C.P. which ordered that guerrilla attacks should be more discriminating and that political propaganda should be increased.[56] The idea was that a sounder revolutionary base could be developed by employing both force and persuasion in a two pronged attack. This policy continued well into 1953 when "more aggressive" action was called for, although by then the problem of survival rather than offensive initiative was the primary consideration of most units.[57] The reasoning behind these decisions seems to have been based on an inadequate appreciation of the prevailing conditions within the population of Malaya, the strength of the Government, and the determination of the Europeans and Malayans in the more remote areas.[58] It might well have been better for the M.C.P. if they had either continued with the policy of political subversion and operated largely within the law or conducted an all-out terrorist campaign from the very beginning.

The leaders of the diverse organizations that called for the speedy granting of independence generally came from the Malayan elite. Many had been educated either in Britain or in British style institutions, such as Raffles College, and were fully aware of both the British style of government and the British way of thinking. Moreover, most of these leaders had either spent the period of the Japanese Occupation in Allied controlled countries, or had managed to survive the rigours of the Occupation unscathed. Thus, unlike the M.C.P., the majority of the leaders were older men with a wealth of experience in business, politics, and in dealing with the British. A major problem in trying to characterize their actions is that they did not really act in concert. Indeed, there was considerable dispute as to who should represent the movement towards independence, and some leaders, notably Dato Onn, the organizer of the Malay fight against Malayan Union and founder of the United Malay Nationalist Organization, vacillated on the question of the early withdrawal of British rule. On the whole, however, it can be said that the general strategy of these leaders was to support the British Administration in the fight against the communists, for they wished to preserve the general social structure of Malayan society while pressing strongly for the granting of independence. As the political parties grew stronger and attracted greater numbers, the leaders were able to provide greater assistance in weaning the general population away from the M.C.P., and at the same time, exert greater pressure on the Government to accept their request for independence.

Summary

Leadership is an interaction process. The actions of both the leader and the individuals or groups that constitute the society in which the leadership process takes place are crucial. The "situation" affects both sets of actions. First, the social cleavages within a society generate the grievances and pose the problems which concern both the leader and the general population. These cleavages and resulting grievances test the efficiency of the leader in successfully completing tasks and tax the leader's ability to maintain the internal coherence and structure of the society. In Malaya at the beginning of the Emergency both the social and ideological cleavages were deep. The major aspects of the social structure tended to divide the Malayan society along communal lines while the two sides in the ideological split were poles apart. Moreover, the grievances resulting from these divisions, particularly those involving the ideological split, were intensified by the international economic situation which had created food shortages, low wages, and a rising cost of living. As the Financial Times noted just before the declaration of the Emergency, "to some extent it has been a miracle that Malaya with all her economic troubles has been so quiet for so long."[59] The Korean War, of course, was responsible for alleviating many of the problems imposed by the international economic situation. Second, the actions of the leader and the organization he heads may be severely limited by the "situation". The physical environment can limit movement or place obstacles in the way of the execution of policies. The international environment can restrict or make readily available resources necessary for a leader to take action concerning a specific problem. The "rules of the game" may inhibit a leader in his choice of actions. Certainly each of these aspects of the situation were important in the Emergency for they all affected the actions of both Gurney and Templer. Third, the situation has an impact on the assessment people in a unit make of a particular leader. The physical conditions can isolate communities from the political centre and thus from the main political leader. The international situation can have a marked effect on the views held by various groups in the society as to the strength and efficiency of a leader, as opposed to his opponents. In the same manner, the nature and policies of a leader's opponents can influence the calculations of an individual member of a unit when he is deciding whom to support. Perhaps the most important point that needs to be made at this juncture is that the effects of these factors on "leadership" are such that an individual has little or no control over them. Therefore it should be recognized that the nature of the relationship between a leader and the members of a specific unit is not solely dependent upon the characteristics or even the actions of the leader.

"Situation" is only one aspect of leadership. It is, however, an important aspect because of the parameters it establishes for the interaction of a leader and the general population of a society. Moreover, it is an aspect of leadership which is inextricably inter-related with other aspects, a fact which will become readily apparent as this analysis continues.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 3

[1] This situation prompted one Financial Secretary to tell the Federal Legislative Council that the "financial fortunes of the Federation vary in direct proportion to the fortune of our two main primary products, rubber and tin, and of these the more important is rubber. So close is this connection that it is probably not incorrect to say that 'Malaya is as rubber does'", Federation of Malaya, Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c.800.

[2] In 1947, a pound of rubber brought less than a fifth of the rice, a quarter of the flour, half of the milk, a fifth of the sugar, or a sixth of the textiles, it had bought before the war. See Government of the Malayan Union, Interim Report on Wages by the Joint Wages Commission (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 29 July 1947), p.6.

[3] See Appendix, Table A.

[4] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Progress Report on the Development Plan, 1950-1952 (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1953), p. 19.

[5] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B537.

[6] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Malaya Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1956 (Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, n.d.), p. 53. See also Appendix, Table A.

[7] Yip Yat Hoong, The Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1969), p. 396. See also Appendix, Table A.

[8] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, Report of the Director of Audit on the Accounts of the Federation of Malaya, 1949, 1951, and 1952 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer). See also Appendix, Table B.

[9] For a detailed account of the changes in Government revenue and expenditure caused by the Korean War boom see Richard Stubbs, Counter Insurgency and the Economic Factor: The Impact of the Korean War Boom on the Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 19 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, February 1974), pp. 4-24.

[10] Tan Cheng-lock, "A Chinese View of Malaya" in Three Reports on the Malayan Problem by David R. Rees-Williams, Tan Cheng-lock and S.S. Awberry and F.W. Dalley (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949), p. 21.

[11] Official concern was expressed about this in Federation of Malaya, Annual Report, 1948 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1949), Introduction.

[12] Reports that the British Government was under pressure from commercial interests appeared as early as October 1949. For an example see Straits Echo 4th October 1949.

[13] The Times, 7 January 1950.

[14] See Straits Echo, 14 January 1950; and Singapore Tiger Standard, 15 July 1950, which quoted The Planter, a monthly magazine that served the rubber estate managers and those associated with the rubber industry, as saying: "In fact this recognition gave a considerable jolt to the confidence of loyal citizens, especially the Chinese who failed to see why Red Consuls will not be permitted to operate in Malaya, when their form of Government has already been officially acknowledged."

[15] For example, fears of an invasion through Thailand were constantly expressed to a visting journalist, Joe Illingworth. See his article in Yorkshire Post, 26 July 1950. See also similar expressions of concern in Quarterly Review 288 (October 1950), p. 439.

[16] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 108-9. See also Appendix, Table E.

[17] The problems of moving in the jungle have been vividly described by people who have worked and lived in it. See, for example, F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral; Carveth Wells, Six Years in the Malayan Jungle (New York: Garden City, 1923); Oliver Crawford, The Door Marked Malaya (London: Ruper Hart-Davis, 1958); and Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).

[18] The official was Sir Hugh Clifford: see Charles A. Fisher, South-East Asia: A Social, Economic and Political Geography (London: Methuen, 1966), p. 589.

[19] This western belt is the most densely populated part of the Federation of Malaya, containing three-quarters of the total population in only thirty percent of the total land area. Another twelve percent were to be found in the Kelantan and Trengganu deltas of the north-east, while in the remaining two-thirds of the country, mostly the mountainous areas, only thirteen percent of the population lived. See Ooi Jin-bee, Land, People and Economy in Malaya (London: Longmans, 1963), pp. 126-128.

[20] See 1947 Census, p. 40.

[21] For a discussion of the origins of the Malay people, see D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1964), p.7.

[22] These characteristics are based on those posited by Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 191.

[23] Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press, 1970), p. 17. For a discussion of the legal origin of this definition, see K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1965), pp. 78-9. For a detailed account of the role of Islam in Malayan society, see Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia," Comparative Politics I (January 1969): pp. 264-284.

[24] Donald C. Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 16.

[25] See Kenneth Perry Landon, Southeast Asia: Crossroads of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 16-17; and Means, "The Role of Islam in the Political Development of Malaysia", p. 278.

[26] 1947 Census p. 75.

[27] See Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 439-464; and Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 155-174, and pp. 209-221.

[28] A good discussion of the religious customs of the Chinese in Malaya may be found in ibid., pp. 119-141.

[29] See Means, Malaysian Politics, p. 30.

[30] See Kernial Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement 1786-1957 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 237.

[31] Over 80 percent of Indians were Hindus. See ibid.,p.233.

[32] The term "Europeans" is used here, as it was in the Census Report, and it should be remembered that it included Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, etc. Europeans constituted 0.2% of the total population of the Federation of Malaya. See 1947 Census, p. 40.

[33] See Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 131-141.

[34] See 1947 Census, p. 47 and Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 132.

[35] C.A. Fisher, "The Problem of Malayan Unity in its Geographical Setting," in Geographical Essays on British Tropical Lands, eds. R.W. Steel and C.A. Fisher (London: George Philip, 1956), p. 313.

[36] Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 195.

[37] For a discussion of the rural economy in Malaya, see E.K. Fisk, "Features of the Rural Economy," in The Political Economy of Independent Malaya: A Case-Study in Development, eds. T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk (London: Angus and Robertson, 1963), pp. 163-173.

[38] See Appendix in ibid., pp. 277 and 279.

[39] In the 1930's registered and unregistered indebtedness in the Federated Malay States alone on reservation lands (lands especially allotted to Malays) was said officially to total $5 million. See William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 208.

[40] Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, p. 219.

[41] Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 154-156.

[42] See Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography (II)," p. 663. For a discussion of the implicit acceptance of rules in a conflict, see Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 131-141.

[43] The officer commanding British troops in Malaya, Major-General Boucher, noted a few months after the declaration of the Emergency that when soldiers fired, they fired to kill. See a review of the Batang Kali incident, in which a number of Chinese prisoners were killed trying to flee custody, in The Straits Times 3 February 1970.

[44] See Annual Report, 1948, pp. 182, 183 and 189.

[45] Lucian W. Pye Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, n.d.), pp. 13-14.

[46] Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 58-59.

[47] Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya (London: George C. Harrap, 1954), p. 39.

[48] For an account of this incident and its repercussions, see Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1971), pp. 74-76. Pye has argued that Lai Teck's "contacts with the Japanese resulted in strengthening the M.C.P., often precisely because they reduced the party's opposition to the Japanese." While this may well be true at the cadre level, it is certainly questionable at the highest levels with so many top officials eliminated. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 66; fn. 8.

[49] For a discussion of the activities of Lai Teck, see Miller, Menace in Malaya, pp. 65-73. Lai Teck, alias Mr. Wright, was believed to be a French-Annamite who first arrived in Malaya in 1937. It now seems fairly certain that Lai Teck had worked for both British and Japanese Intelligence. See Ng Yeh-loh to Hugh T. Pagden, October 1945, in The Private Papers of Hugh T. Pagden, National Archives of Malaysia, SP7/3.

[50] Chapman The Jungle is Neutral, passim.

[51] Hanrahan The Communist Struggle in Malaya, p. 108.

[52] Ibid., p. 109.

[53] Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, pp. 38-39.

[54] Government of the Federation of Malaya Malaya Under the Emergency (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, n.d.), p. 1. Communist guerrilla inspired incidents rose dramatically in 1950. 221 incidents were reported in February 1950, an increase of 80 percent over the average monthly figure of 1949. This figure rose to 534 in May 1950, and 571 in October 1971. Annual Report, 1950, p. 2.

[55] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 104-105.

[56] The fullest translation of this important directive may be found in The Times 1 December 1952. See also Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya pp. 121-123 and 220-224.

[57] Ibid., p. 129 and Pye Guerrilla Communism in Malaya p. 106.

[58] A captured communist document noted the problems that had arisen from the fact that the initial attacks had been uncoordinated and that too little was known of the enemy. Sunday Gazette, 13 March 1949.

[59] The Financial Times (U.K.) 11 June 1948.

CHAPTER 4

ATTITUDES, VALUES AND EXPECTATIONS

Underlying the assessments made of a particular leader by each member of a unit are certain expectations concerning the role of a leader.[1] In the case of a political leader these expectations concern the rights and privileges of a person with institutionalized authority as well as his obligations and duties in facilitating "the change or resistance to change of the unit's goals, the attainment of these goals and/or the distribution of the unit's valued scarce resources."

The expectations of groups of individuals may be inferred in two ways. First, in that expectations are rooted in attitudes and values, they are, therefore, a consequence of socialization. Since common socializing agents give cultural groups roughly similar beliefs concerning politics and authority, the socializing process produced by these agents --such as the family, religious institutions, and peer groups--may be analysed to determine, at least in general terms, the relevant expectations. Second, the expectations of various individuals and groups may be articulated. Such statements most often highlight attitudes and values concerned with specific issues or situations. By combining expressed expectations with the evidence accumulated from examining the socialization processes within the unit, a general outline may be developed of unit members' expectations related to politics and political leaders. Just as the members of a unit have expectations of how a leader should behave so a leader will have certain expectations about what others within the unit should do and how he should act in his role as leader. These expectations may also be inferred from articulated desires and the background of the individuals concerned. The purpose of this Chapter, therefore, will be to describe and analyze in general terms the relevant attitudes, values and expectations of: first, the cultural groups of Malaya in the immediate post World War Two years; and second, each of the political leaders under review just prior to their installation as High Commissioner.

SOCIAL GROUPS

Malays

Although in the period directly after the Second World War Malay society had to some extent come under the influence of Western ways, particularly at the elite level, it was still firmly grounded in common traditional customs (adat) and a common religion (Islam). It is therefore possible to state, as Wilson has done, that in the broadest sense, the Malays were "a united cultural group vis-a-vis the other cultural groups of Malaysia and Southeast Asia", and that among Malays there was "a consensus of basic values or cultural norms".[2] Adat, which held a place of high moral value within Malay society, governed the relationships between individuals within a family, within and among villages, and between ruler and ruled. Islam provided a formal set of requirements such as attendance at the mosque on Fridays and the observance of religious holidays which in their pervasiveness enmeshed the individual in certain specific obligations. These obligations were important in the development of relationships both between members of the family and between members of the Muslim community as a whole.

It is in studying the child-rearing practices and the parent-child relationship within Malay society that one is provided with the antecedents of the attitude and values Malays hold with respect to the exercise of political authority. Childhood socialization influences not only how an individual perceives himself but also what he thinks others expect of him and how he views his place in the social and political fabric of the community. Moreover, work done on the parent-child relationships, while by no means conclusive, does indicate that this relationship has a direct bearing on the way a political leader is viewed.[3]

The authority of elders and the praise and ridicule of family and neighbours were readily accepted as reference points for behaviour by Malay children. A Malay infant was constantly given attention by family and neighbours.[4] Children were rewarded by being effusively praised in front of their family and friends.[5] Similarly, discipline was usually in the form of a public rebuke.[6] These forms of reward and punishment highlight the importance of "others" in the individual Malay's appreciation of his worth, his place in his community, and his sense of what was right and what was wrong. The hierarchical relationship between parent and child that this pattern of behaviour produced was reinforced by the parental obligations decreed by adat and Islamic laws. These obligations meant that a Malay could always count on his parents for material aid and spiritual guidance.[7] With these obligations, however, went the respect that parents and elders could expect from the younger generations.

These attitudes regarding parental authority were transferred to, and perpetuated by, relationships outside the family unit. The individual child was instructed to distrust the wider world[8] and rely on those in positions of authority to look after his interests. Certainly the traditional relationships that characterized Malayan society seemed both to reflect the basic child-parent relationship and to encompass the general need for strong restraining rule.[9] Both adat and Muslim norms perpetuated an essentially hierarchical society. The Sultan, who stood atop this social structure was treated with the greatest respect.[10] The sense of loyalty towards the Sultan and the key position he held in the set of attitudes developed by all Malays was indicative of the "other directedness" which pervaded Malayan society. Murphy argues that the traditions surrounding the priest-king institution of early Malay times have merged with the semi-divinity of Muslim Sultan rule and perpetuated this respect for the Sultan.[11] The fact that the Sultan had both temporal and spiritual authority made his position particularly strong. Besides the Sultans and the other members of the aristocracy the social hierarchy was made up of upper, middle, and poor classes of peasantry.[12] Each individual assimilated the behaviour required of his social status. Different roles required different types of behaviour depending on the individual's place in the hierarchy. For instance, Swift notes that villagers who were "forceful leaders in their own surroundings become deferential, even abject, when they confront the official world."[13] These kinds of relationships were often formalized in specific acts of respect. One observer has described the Obeisance Ceremonies of Negri Sembilan in which the people on religious holidays paid homage to the District Chief and ritually acknowledged his religious and political authority.[14] However, with the privileges came obligations.

Those who held positions of authority within the village or region were required to adjudicate in disputes and represent the people in dealings with other villages, the Government, or the State's religious leaders. The overall effect of this hierarchical structure was to instill into the individual Malay a sense of obligation and a dependency upon people in positions of authority.

Within this hierarchical society, harmonious personal relations were highly valued. Swift comments that:

> Reactions to a given individual, while partially determined by the institutional definition of role behaviour are also very much affected by likes and dislikes, respect and contempt, flowing from personal qualities which cut across class position and which influence the rating of an individual within his class.[15]

This emphasis on harmonious personal relations was relevant to all aspects of an individual's social intercourse. Within a family, ailments were frequently attributed to pining for someone who was away; great value was placed on having kith and kin on hand during times of joy and sorrow.[16] The primacy of this mode of conduct was also emphasized in political matters. Wilson notes that during his stay in a Selangor village, the penghulu, a government official responsible for the affairs of several villages, was

> consistently criticised throughout the village for never calling a meeting to discuss affairs, for never spending any time with village people, for always being somewhat abrupt and for spending so much of his time in the district office—in other words for being distant and impersonal.[17]

For the Malay, then, good interpersonal relations were very important.

This basic pattern of Malay socialization needs to be placed in the context of the major changes in Malayan society that preceded, and thus affected, the attitudes and values of Malays during the Gurney-Templer period. The imposition of British rule during the nineteenth century changed the structure of Malayan society surprisingly little.[18] The Malays accepted this addition to the hierarchy and indeed, many, particularly among the aristocracy, welcomed the peace that British protection and arbitration provided. The British, with the cooperation of the Malay elite, ensured that the vast majority of Malays were isolated from the vagaries of the economic and social changes that impinged on the rest of the Malayan society.[19] But this protection could only last so long and then the traditional authority structure upon which the Malays relied began to be felt by the village Malays in practical ways. The depression of the 1930s caused a great deal of indebtedness, particularly among those who had cultivated small rubber holdings. A large proportion of these people were Malays and, of course, the vast majority of creditors were Chinese.[20] Registered and unregistered indebtedness in the Federated Malay States on reservation lands alone (lands especially allotted to Malays) was said officially to total five million dollars.[21] This control and acquisition of land, the very thing that was at the core of Malay subsistence existence, caused bitter resentment. Moreover, it emphasized the point that there were many non-Malays living within the boundaries of Malay society, but not subject to its authority. The authority of the Malay political system was consequently undermined, and Malays were reminded of the limited powers of their leaders.[22] The British, who had provided the bulwark against the Chinese influence, seemed powerless to prevent this intrusion into Malay life. The ease with which the Japanese swept down the peninsula and captured the supposedly impregnable island of Singapore confirmed the vulnerability of the British. Indeed, the British seemed to abandon them, for the end of the Second World War brought the Malayan Union with its extension of political rights to the non-Malays—rights which the Malays saw as a direct threat to their existence. While the restoration of Malay rights, which accompanied the promulgation of the Federation Agreement allayed some fears, the anxieties and troubles of the Malayan community were by no means fully assuaged.

The series of events in the decade preceding the declaration of the Emergency both expanded the experiences of Malays and eroded the authority of the political structure on which they relied for guidance and protection. H.B.M. Murphy argues that the anxiety-free child rearing pattern of the Malays did not really equip the individual to deal adequately with anxieties arising from the extension of community boundaries and the consequent expansion of experiences. Hence, Malays looked to their elite to restore a social and political structure within which they could feel free from any threat to their way of life and thus from anxiety.[24] Moreover, because the British held the reins of power many Malays particularly those within the aristocracy looked to the Government and the High Commissioner to maintain Malay interests. The High Commissioner was expected to stop any further Chinese attempts to encroach on Malay rights.

Chinese

While the Chinese were divided by language and clan ties, there were a number of factors which ensured a relatively common set of values and attitudes. Such factors included the value placed on the Chinese family organization, the emphasis on the written Chinese language, the acknowledgement of mainland China as the source of their beliefs and ideas, and the desire to belong to Chinese associations.[25] The family was of central importance in Chinese life. The family relationships were marked by the authority of the father and the obligations of the children to their parents. In particular, filial piety was highly valued. Newell notes that "according to Malayan Chinese beliefs, a son owes all that he is to his father, with the result that in theory the son's obligation is infinite and can never be repaid."[26] Traditionally the series of parent-child relationships within the kinship structure encased the individual in a set of obligations and rights which provided "a human network of mutual dependence."[27] This framework, however, was modified in the case of Malayan Chinese by the fact that immigrants were often far removed from the mass of their kinship group.[28] Formal kinship ties, therefore, were to some extent supplemented by ties based on similar areas of origin in China, association membership, and employment or cooperative endeavors around the community. These relationships, as with the kinship ties, required the observance of a fairly specific and essentially materialistic and situation-oriented set of reciprocal rights and obligations in times of need and prosperity.[29] Hence, although in Malaya the tight kinship grouping was not as extensive as had been the case in traditional Chinese society, each individual was surrounded by a set of relationships that provided him with a secure reference point for dealing with the world outside his immediate environment.

Contact with the world outside the individual's set of personal relationships was more than likely to be limited. Children were often forbidden to play outside their home.[30] Moreover, as Murphy notes, "whereas most cultures show an early displacement or extension into the surrounding society or into the supernatural sphere, the Chinese continue to obtain most of their satisfactions through the family."[31] As an adult the individual Malayan Chinese obtained his material and psychological needs through his set of personal relationships. Few of the groups to which the individual Malayan Chinese might belong had state or federal wide relations with other groups that would give members an appreciation of life beyond their immediate environment. This relative isolation was reinforced by the religious practices which centred on the family and local temple. There was no state or federal hierarchical religious structure that might have linked a rural farmer or urban labourer to the total Malayan Chinese community in the Federation.

The consequence of these social structures was a socialization process that rooted attitudes and values in the set of personal relations in which each individual was embedded. Thus, while an individual was accepting of authority and obligations, he was only prepared to do so within a family, friendship, or similar structure. The sense of right and wrong was likewise related to the kinship and friendship networks. Newell notes that the breaking of a friendship relationship was "a more serious fault than anything that may be done outside the relationship", and that, for instance, a person "supports a criminal friend because he is a friend".[32] The world was seen as essentially hostile[33] and the set of personal relations an individual surrounded himself with as the best bulwark against the intrusion of this hostile world into his life. Hence, the Malayan Chinese would seem to have been more concerned with the well-being of specific groups to which he felt he belonged than to any larger entity with which he was unfamiliar.

This general attitude may well have been at the root of the traditional uneasiness that Malayan Chinese had about establishing relations with formal government authority. Certainly, relations with the Government were tenuous at best. Indeed, the majority of rural Chinese had only a very vague notion of what the Government was. Pye reports that of the surrendered communists he interviewed:

> Over 70 percent of the respondents indicated that they perceived the colonial administration as existing completely apart from the Chinese community in Malaya. The Government operated in distant and limited spheres and they could not always comprehend how its acts might impinge upon their daily lives.[34]

Both Pye and Newell note the belief held by many Malayan Chinese that the Government generally acted in an arbitrary and unpredictable manner.[35] Moreover, explanations for actions on the part of the Government officials tended to be based on the idea of personal motives. Policemen were thus viewed as arresting people not because they had broken a law but because they had a personal grudge against the person arrested.[36] The whole of the Government apparatus was personalized and few had any idea of the real extent or power of the Colonial Administration. The result of these beliefs was an avoidance wherever possible of Government interference and a generally apathetic attitude towards politics at the State and Federal level. There was no inclination to get involved with what was felt to be a Government with which the individual had no personal ties and thus over which he had no influence.

During the years prior to the outbreak of the Emergency, specific events affected those attitudes, values, and expectations of the Malayan Chinese community concerning the exercise of authority in a number of important ways. First, the Japanese occupation destroyed much of the faith the more educated and politically aware Malayan Chinese had formerly had in the power of the British. The ease with which the British-sponsored tranquillity of earlier decades was shattered had a considerable effect on the Chinese community. Second, the harshness of life under the Japanese dislocated large numbers of families. This, on top of the turmoils of emigration, produced an even greater shift from reliance on the family and kinship group to reliance on the peer group friendship network as the source of material and psychological security. Third, the only resistance to the Japanese came from the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army. Consequently, when the war ended, the M.P.A.J.A. felt they deserved, and indeed, were credited by many with, the accolade of victors. The mass of the Malayan Chinese had little appreciation of what went on at the national, never mind the international level, and relying as they did on personal contacts, were quite prepared to accept that the M.P.A.J.A. were responsible for the defeat of the Japanese.[37] Fourth, the economic chaos that beset Malaya directly after the war caused frustration among those who had difficulty finding jobs which brought them the money and status they felt they deserved. The need to find some way of advancing themselves became important to a number of the younger Chinese.[38] And finally, the British decision to renege on the reforms enunciated in the Malayan Union by replacing it with the Federation Agreement caused those who were politically aware (mainly the more educated) to question the ability of the British to arbitrate fairly between the interests of the racial communities. This feeling was exacerbated by the racial tensions that the Japanese occupation had fostered and the British reluctance to prosecute many of those the Chinese felt to be collaborators;

a large number of which were Malays.

The combined effect of the family and peer group socialization agents and the events described above produced a number of attitudes, values, and expectations with regard to the exercise of Government authority which may be considered as being of importance to this analysis. While the Chinese were generally amenable and responsive to the exercise of authority in well structured relationships,[39] they had little or no respect for what they saw as a much weakened British Government which, in the years immediately succeeding the Japanese Occupation, maintained only limited links with them. Few within the Malayan Chinese community expected this state of affairs to change. Their strong sense of racial origin reinforced their tendency to remain isolated from other communities and from the Government. Certainly the Government was not expected to provide improvements to living conditions through community and social welfare programmes. Indeed, the mass of Malayan Chinese expected little from the Government apart from the occasional arbitrary action at the village level. They neither expected to gain anything from the Government nor to have to demonstrate their support for, or provide aid to, the High Commissioner and the Colonial Government. The Chinese elite who had a residue of good will for an Administration that had, in the early part of the century, provided the conditions for prosperity, hoped for, but did not necessarily expect equal treatment for all Malayan residents and accepted the necessity of guarding their own interests.

In general, then, the Malayan Chinese expected, under the auspices of their various associations and groups, to look after their own problems.[40] In this regard, the M.P.A.J.A., which had seemingly proved so powerful during the Japanese occupation, was accepted as having a role to play. Moreover, that a group such as the communists should take to the countryside to fight the ruling administration, be it the Japanese or the British, was considered acceptable by many Malayan Chinese. There was a long and honourable tradition of groups of Chinese going into the forests to fight injustice and corruption.[41] When this happened the tendency was to wait and see who would prove to be the winner. Hsu has written concerning this problem:

> In Chinese political history there has been the recurrent fact that once the different factions saw the rise of a probable victor, they tended to seek a subordinate place in the sun; in this way they thought to ensure the integrity and continuity of their immutable inner world, the kinship group.[42]

In Malay, this tradition seemed to hold with the peer group friendship network as well as the kinship group being the social structure to be protected. This need to maintain the security of these social networks has been alluded to by Purcell who states:

> Traditionally the Chinese have always followed the line of least resistance when subjected to intimidation. 'Protection Money' to secret societies and to political socieites after them had for long been a heavy item in the budget of a trader and it was paid in dollars and cents even by the smallest farmer. The reply of the Chinese towkay was that in default of protection from the authorities he was taking the only course open to him to ensure the safety of himself and his family.[43]

These beliefs tended to reinforce what may be thought of as a generally passive attitude within the Malayan Chinese community towards the exercise of authority by groups and institutions outside the individual's personal set of relationships.

The Malayan Chinese hoped and, in many instances, expected, to be left in peace to attain a certain prosperity in order to provide for the well-being of his family and friendship group. The members of the Chinese elite for whom the Government was a more substantial structure looked for the protection of their rights vis-a-vis the Malays, and for the creation of a situation favourable to the development of their business interests. With regard to what was looked for in a British High Commissioner, Tan Cheng-lock probably summed up the general feelings of those Malayan Chinese who were active in politics, when he noted that what was needed was a "far-sighted, impartial and open-minded administrator" who would be "unencumbered by bias and prejudices or preconceived ideas or predilections" and who would ensure that the rights of non-Malays would not be ignored.[44]

Indians

The Malayan Indian community constituted just over 10 percent of the population of the Federation. The community was divided between the rural areas, where they provided over 50 percent of the estate labour, and the urban centres where a substantial number of Indians were employed by the Government.[45] However, as over 80 percent of Malayan Indians were South Indian Tamils by origin,[46] with a relatively common set of social traditions and with virtually unanimous acceptance of Hindu practices,[47] some pertinent generalizations about the values, attitudes, and expectations of the Indian community may be posited.

The experiences of the child in the Indian family promoted a respect for authority. The father, particularly in the rural areas, was considered very much the "master" with the wife more of a servant than partner. The husband definitely ruled the household. The large kinship group usually consisted of a cooperative or network of family units with different residences, but with a great deal of social intercourse. There was a general acceptance of "joint responsibility for all members" of the kinship group and a "recognition of the senior male as a sort of chairman with a right to veto" in collective matters and a person to be consulted on personal matters.[48] This pattern of kinship cooperation and hierarchy was replicated in the wider world where associations were based on the union of "many small units of leader and followers".[49] The individual's relations with this wider world were encouraged not only by the family structure, but also by religious practices. The communal worshipping practices of the Malayan Indians fostered an interest in political and social matters outside the kinship group.[50] There was, therefore, a general acceptance of the social hierarchy and as Murphy notes, "a strong tradition of dominance and submission in Indian culture".[51] Moreover as Hsu has observed there was a well ingrained sense of dependency on those accepted as leaders within the society.[52]

Prior to the Second World War, the Indian labourers who populated the estates were generally apathetic towards, and accepting of, British rule. The more educated section of the Indian community, consisting mostly of commercial and professional families, was very loyal to the British. This was not surprising in that a large number were Government employees. Arasaratnam observes "Government honours were fervently sought after and eagerly celebrated and British civil servants were lavishly feted and presented with petitions of loyalty."[53] The British Administration until the Japanese Occupation commanded the support of the vast majority of the Indian community in Malaya. While the Japanese occupation did spark a certain amount of nationalism among the more educated Malaya

Indians, its consequences, once the British returned, were limited. Similarly, although the significance of the British defeat at the hands of Asians was recognized and respect for the British somewhat diminished, once the paternalistic wardship was re-established on the estates and within the Government, the majority of Malayan Indians once again accepted the authority imposed on them. Within the elite, as within the Chinese elite, concern was expressed over the British Administration's reversal of policy embodied in the Federation Agreement; however, the community as a whole was too disorganized to mount any concerted effective campaign to oppose it.[54]

The Malayan Indians were generally loyal to the British. Where there was disenchantment it was usually evidenced by passivity or apathy rather than positive action. They expected the British Administration to maintain order and prosperity and while the elite looked forward to the reform of the rights of non-Malays, they were seemingly more hopeful than expectant.

Europeans

The European population in the Federation of Malaya was small--under 20,000[55]--but significant. Europeans held managerial positions in the major production and commercial enterprises as well as posts in the higher levels of Government. Well over three-quarters of the Europeans were British, and it was this group that most influenced the attitudes of the European community as a whole. In part at least, as consequence of the fact that a high percentage of the administrators and many of those in industry and commerce came from middle and upper middle class homes and had had a British Public School education the European community was essentially conservative by nature. This background produced an acceptance of an hierarchical order, an expectation that an authoritarian society would be a well ordered one, and an emphasis on the corporate spirit.[56] The Public School system ingrained in the individual the attitude that the responsibility of a leader was "an inextricable part of the power privilege" and that the follower could "rely on the comfort and security of being responsibly led."[57]

The experiences of the European community in Malaya prior to the Emergency had a considerable effect on the attitudes, values, and expectations of its members. British officials had in the past transferred the spirit of the domestic social hierarchy to the colonies and one of the major consequences, as Robert Heussler points out, was that "officials . . . buttressed instinctively the hierarchy which they found" in the colony to which they were assigned.[58] In Malaya this meant that officials maintained a friendly, though fairly aloof, liaison with the Malay aristocracy and bolstered its political authority. This close association, though interrupted, was not broken by the Japanese occupation. British officials returning to Malaya after the Japanese surrender still tended to favour the maintenance of Malay rights and privileges. The effects of the Japanese occupation on the residents of Malaya were not lost on the returning officials. One journalist quotes many Europeans as telling him that "they remember that we have been thrown out once (and) they have lost that old unthinking confidence in us."[59] But many officials found it difficult to fully appreciate what the changes meant to their role as administrators and governors. As Heussler notes, their background made many officials "unreceptive to criticism and unimaginative in the face of changing circumstances."[60] Hence, while the younger administrators accepted that innovations had to be made, many of the more senior officials whose ideas were rooted in the years when their careers began had problems adjusting to the changed circumstances of the post World War Two years.[61] Those Europeans who held jobs in industry and commerce in Malaya had similar problems adjusting to the changes brought about by the Japanese occupation. Many harked back to the pre-1942 days when "all agreed that it was the task of the government to create conditions under which merchants, miners and planters could make money".[62] About the period immediately succeeding the Japanese Occupation, however, it was generally agreed that firm rule had to be re-established.

With regard to expectations concerning the role of the High Commissioner, there were some differences within the European community, although they were relatively minor. Most Europeans expected the High Commissioner to be a person with experience in Colonial administration, preferably some thought, with experience of Malaya, and one who had demonstrated his abilities.[63] Others stated preferences for a military leader with a good war record. All seemed quite happy that he should be a person who had near autocratic powers. He was generally expected to have good contacts with London and thus gain benefits for Malaya. In terms of the policies he was expected to pursue, the creation of an ordered prosperous society in which reforms were introduced only after they had been fully studied and proven absolutely necessary, was given priority. Measured progress was expected to be the order of the day. However, whatever the variations in expectations, and they generally involved the same theme of firm rule, the role of the leader was held to be extremely important.[64]

LEADERS

Sir Henry Gurney

A Cornishman, born in 1898, Henry Lovell Goldsworthy Gurney received his education at one of the most prestigious Public Schools, Winchester. Commissioned into the Army in 1917 and later wounded, he went on to University College, Oxford, in 1919. In 1921, he entered the Colonial Service and was posted to Kenya. Rising steadily through the ranks, he became Chief Secretary to the Conference of East African Governors in 1938, Secretary to the Gold Coast in 1944, and Chief Secretary to the Palestine Government in 1946. A keen sportsman--he gained a golf blue at Oxford--Gurney had the reputation of being reserved, always neatly dressed, and calm under the most trying of circumstances.

Gurney possessed many of the characteristics of the British Colonial officials of his era.[65] His attitudes, values, and expectations concerning both his and other people's role in the governing of the Federation were, in a major part at least, the product of his educational background and experiences as a Colonial Official. Steeped in a series of hierarchical structures, Gurney expected that those in what he felt to be responsible positions should exercise their authority for the good of the whole.[66] Moreover, he expected to perform his role as High Commissioner and leader of the Federation of Malaya within an hierarchical society that fully accepted his right, and indeed, obligation to make all the crucial political decisions. Although others should be listened to, he expected to make the final decisions. Indeed, he did not, it seems, appreciate interference by those he deemed outside the consultative apparatus.[67] Gurney's background also ensured that he valued tradition and saw benefit in ceremonial occasions and such activities as showing the flag.[68] Like his fellow officials he placed a high value on the corporate spirit of the Colonial Service and expected loyalty to be a high priority for everyone. While he could be warm in personal relations, he more usually demonstrated a reserve or aloofness which indicated his wish to remain distant from the general mass of the people he ruled. A quietly forceful and determined man, Gurney arrived in Malaya with a well formed set of values and expectations regarding his role as High Commissioner.

Gurney's experiences in the Colonial Service had generally been in areas and an era of relatively little governing. Colonial governments had been limited in what they had done in the regions where they exercised authority. The maintenance of order, usually accomplished with just a small force of policemen and a few dedicated administrators, and the encouragement of trade, were generally accepted as the basic functions of a Colonial Administration. In this sense, Gurney's experience had been somewhat limited. He had, however, the experience of guerrilla warfare and its attendant problems during his tenure in office in Palestine. But even in Palestine the Government saw its primary role as being concerned with policing the area, rather than the development of services usually associated with a modern government. Hence, Gurney's expectations concerning what came within the realm of Government business was, initially at least, restricted. As his first address to the Federal Legislative Council clearly demonstrated, he did not at the beginning of his tenure anticipate any extensive participation by the Malayan Government in the areas of social and community services.[69] In short, Gurney expected to deal with the problems facing the Malayan Government in much the same manner as Colonial Administrations had done in the past.

General Sir Gerald Templer

Born in 1898 into an Ulster army family, Gerald Walter Robert Templer was educated at Wellington College and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Royal Irish Fusilers in 1916 and served on the European Front. A highly competent soldier, Templer also proved to be a first-class sportsman. A skilled rider and swordsman, he was also an international athlete gaining a place on the 1924 British Olympic team as a hurdler. In his career as a professional soldier, he proved equally successful. Gaining experience in several areas of operations, Templer's progress through the ranks was relatively swift. In 1942 he was appointed a Lieutenant-General, the youngest then in the British Army. Serving in a number of diverse positions during and directly after the Second World War, Templer was appointed Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1948 and in 1950, G.O.C.-in-Chief Eastern Command.

Templer's background and Army experiences meant that many of his values and expectations were the result of having spent much of his life in a highly structured authoritarian organization. He expected everyone involved in solving a problem to act as part of a team and to work flat out until the problem was solved. He expected to have full authority over all those within his area of command and he demanded their total cooperation. He spoke directly and forcefully and expected that his orders and directives would be promptly obeyed. An explosive character, full of nervous energy, Templer neither spared himself nor allowed others to slacken from the tremendous pace he set.

A number of Templer's army experiences influenced the way he approached his work in Malaya. First, Templer had served under Field Marshal Montgomery, who was influential in shaping many people's attitudes towards leadership. Montgomery's energy, his emphasis on personal communications with the men he led, his blunt manner and his sometimes unorthodox approach to the exercise of authority seem to have fitted in with Templer's own feelings about the role of a leader. Certainly, Montgomery's axiom that "the beginning of leadership is a battle for the hearts and minds of men"[70] was an important feature of Templer's attitude towards his task as leader of the Federation of Malaya. Second, Templer had the invaluable experience of being Director of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the area occupied by the 21st Army Group; an area which included Belgium, a large part of Western Germany, and a small part of Holland. From May 1945, to April 1946, Templer, therefore, was responsible for restoring to a semblance of order a vast area hit by the ravages of war. During a chaotic summer and a cold European winter, Templer ensured that as many people as possible were provided with the basic necessities of food, housing, and fuel: a tremendous task which he carried out with verve and efficiency. This experience acquainted Templer with the practical problems of Government, what could be done to overcome them, and the fact that a government had broad responsibilities, including the need to provide some social and community services to ensure the basic welfare of the individual. These lessons stood Templer in good stead when he arrived in Malaya. Third, Templer's operational experiences during the two World Wars including fighting the Russians in Persia and Mesopotamia (1919-1921), and the problems of Palestine in the late 1930s, had made him aware of the subtleties of guerrilla warfare, the importance of an efficient intelligence organization and the necessity for coordinated action. Templer's experiences were wider than perhaps would normally have been expected of a British General and they provided him with a clear set of principles from which to approach his role as High Commissioner and Director of Operations.

SUMMARY

The expectations of the people of Malaya concerning the actions of the High Commissioner and the Malayan Government may be categorized in terms of either one of the two functions of a leader outlined by Bales.[71] The first category--the instrumental or task function--concerns the problems the leader is expected to solve. In Malaya the High Commissioner was clearly expected to create an ordered society in which all felt secure. He was also expected to generate conditions which were conducive to economic growth and prosperity. The Malay, Chinese, Indian, and European communities each expected the High Commissioner to ensure that the integrity of their respective racial communities was maintained. This raised the difficulty for both High Commissioners that the expectations of one community might conflict with the expectations of another group within the Federation. One major example of this was the fact the Malays expected the High Commissioner to sustain the *status quo* with regard to the balance of political power between the communities while the non-Malays pressed for the expansion of their political rights. Some expectations cut across communal lines. For instance within all communities there were a few people who looked to the High Commissioner to introduce elections and prepare the way for independence: however, there were also people within each community who felt the British should remain in order to ensure communal peace. The difficulties of balancing the expectations of Malayans placed a heavy burden on both Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer.

The second category--the expressive or integrative function—concerns the maintenance of the internal coherence and structure of the group. In that Malaya was a plural society consisting of a number of racial groups, this function was to some extent limited. Each racial group tended to look to its own leaders to maintain the solidarity of the group as a whole. Thus, it was the European community that mainly looked to the High Commissioner to maintain the community's spirit and morale. However, in that Malaya, in many respects a country with artificial boundaries, was created as a unit by the British, many of the more educated within each community did look to the High Commissioner to support and maintain the coherence that existed at the elite level.

How the High Commissioner and the members of his Administration were expected to carry out these functions was also an important ingredient in the way Malayans viewed Templer and Gurney. The Malay, Indian, and European communities accepted that Malayan society was an hierarchical one, and that the High Commissioner should act, when necessary, in an authoritarian manner. The Chinese community, although being somewhat isolated from the British Colonial Administration and therefore less ready to fully accept its directives, was prepared to be impressed by demonstrations of its strength. All communities placed a high value on personal relations and were more prepared to accept the validity of personal communications than any other. Moreover, personal communications were held to be just as important in political as in social relationships. This produced a major difficulty with regard to the Chinese community for many Malayan Chinese did not recognize the Colonial Government as being concerned with them and had little experience of contact of Government officials. It was Gurney who initially had to confront this difficulty and attempt to establish relations with the Chinese community as a whole. Hence, not only were the High Commissioners expected to solve particular problems that Malayans faced they were expected to do so in a particular manner.

The crisis situation that gripped Malaya during the period under review was an important factor in sharpening these expectations. Research on leadership has shown that individuals faced with a crisis situation will look more towards a central figure for guidance and will show a preference for a more authoritarian task-orientated leader.[72] Solving the problems caused by a crisis or series of crises becomes crucial. In the Malayan Emergency, the threat to individual security posed by the communists became of central concern. In crisis situations, people value and expect from their leader inventiveness, initiative, decisiveness, and above all, visible success.[73] In this regard, Malayans were no exception.

While the backgrounds of the two leaders, Gurney and Templer, were similar in many respects, there were important differences which influenced the way each approached his role as High Commissioner. Each had experience of different hierarchical institutions. Gurney's allegiance was to the traditions and practices of the Colonial Service, while Templer was used to the ways of the army. Hence, although both expected to rule with a relatively firm hand, Gurney accepted that he should do so in the traditional manner of the Colonial Service, while Templer was prepared to contravene these traditions and govern in the more direct fashion of the military. Further, Templer was more experienced than Gurney with crisis situations. Indeed, the expertise of the military is in dealing expeditiously with the threat, and use, of force, and Templer was a senior man in his profession. Hence, Templer had more experience from which to draw in making his initial assessment of the military problem facing Malaya. Moreover, Templer had been embroiled in the dilemmas of civil administration in post-war Europe and, therefore, was able to draw on this experience in assessing the civil problems the Emergency posed. In general, then, it can be argued that Gurney's initial expectations as to what should be done and how the problems should be tackled were, in contrast to Templer's expectations of his and the Administration's role, based on a narrow set of experiences.

The broad set of values and expectations examined in this Chapter were fairly deeply rooted in the various sections of Malayan society. However, some of the more specific expectations held in the period directly after the Japanese Occupation were amenable to modification by changing circumstances. Just as certain experiences had helped to form some expectations, so those expectations could be further altered by the ever changing situation. Indeed, it is possible through his communications with members of his unit for a leader himself to either reinforce or restructure some of these expectations. Similarly, of course, a leader's expectations concerning his role may be altered by events and by leader/unit-member communications. This dynamic process involving the constant modification of certain expectations is important because past research has shown that the more a leader behaves in accordance with the expectations of members of the unit he leads, the more effective he is in persuading people to aid him in solving group problems.[74] Hence, the ability of the political leader to facilitate the change or resistance to change of the unit's goals and priorities and/or the distribution of the unit's valued scarce resources and rewards is dependent to some extent on the congruence of the leader's behaviour and achievements with the expectations of the members of the unit he leads.

In terms of the initial expectations regarding the role of High Commissioner, Templer would seem to have had an advantage. His direct and personal approach to leadership would seem to have been more akin to the general expectations of the Malayan people. However, it was the dynamic interaction between the actions and communications of the High Commissioner, as well as the ever changing situation on the one hand, and the expectations of the various groups in Malaya, on the other hand, that was crucial to the development of the relationship between each High Commissioner and the people of Malaya. These interacting factors will be analysed further as the study progresses.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 4

[1] See Sarbin and Allen "Role Theory" pp. 497-498.

[2] Peter J. Wilson, A Malay Village in Malaysia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1967), pp. vii-viii. See also M.B. Hooker, Adat Laws in Modern Malaya: Land Tenure, Traditional Government and Religion (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 2, who argues "Adats in Malaya are possibly unique in the area of customary legal systems in that they are so uniform and well documented."

[3] See, for example, Fred Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

[4] Judith Djamour, Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore (London: Athlone Press, 1959), p. 100; and T.H. Fraser, Jr., Fishermen of Southern Thailand: The Malay Village (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 75.

[5] Djamour, Malay Kinship, p. 104.

[6] Wilson, A Malay Village, pp. 130-1; Djamour, Malay Kinship, p. 105.

[7] See Djamour, Malay Kinship, pp. 128-129 and 144; and H.B.M. Murphy, "Cultural Factors in the Mental Health of Malayan Students," The Student and Mental Health: An International View, ed. Daniel H. Funkenstein (n.p.: The World Federation of Mental Health and International Association of Universities, 1959), p. 208.

[8] See Djamour, Malay Kinship, p. 105; and M.G. Swift, Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu (London: Athlone Press, 1965), pp. 152-153 and 156.

[9] The link between social distrust and the need for strong restraining rule is explored in James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia, Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 91-117.

[10] See Wilson, A Malay Village, p. 111; Ginsberg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 216 and p. 225; and R.O. Winstedt, The Malays: A Cultural History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 63.

[11] Murphy, "Malayan Students," pp. 207-8.

[12] See Swift, Malay Peasant Society, pp. 149-150; Ginsberg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 225; and R.E. Downs, "Malay" in Frank M. Lebar,

Gerald C. Hickey and John K. Musgrove, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1964), p. 260.

[13] Swift, Malay Peasant Society, p. 157.

[14] Diane Lewis, "The Minangkabu Malay of Negri Sembilan: A Study of Socio-Cultural Change" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1962), pp. 54-58.

[15] Swift, Malay Peasant Society, p. 162.

[16] Djamour, Malay Kinship, pp. 35, 101.

[17] Wilson, A Malay Village, p. 137.

[18] See W. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 250-1; and Scott, Political Ideology, p. 218, who notes how akin the style of colonial rule was to that of traditional rule.

[19] Ungku A. Aziz, "Poverty and Rural Development in Malaysia," Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia 1 (1964), p. 81, has said this policy produced "the fossilization of the rural people, most of whom were Malays". Cited in Wilson, A Malay Village, p. 10.

[20] See R.W. Firth, "Money, Work and Social Change in Indo-Pacific Economic Systems," in T.H. Silcock (ed.), Readings in Malayan Economics (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1961), p. 17.

[21] Roff, Origins, p. 205.

[22] Swift, Malay Peasant Society, p. 88.

[23] Murphy, "Malayan Students," pp. 206-216.

[24] See, for example, editorials in Warta Negara, 9 October 1948, and 16 November 1948; English translations in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 173.

[25] William H. Newell, Treacherous River: A Study of Rural Chinese in North Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1962), p. 200.

[26] Ibid., p. 73.

[27] F.L.K. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 2.

[28] See Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore (London: H.M.S.O. 1957), p. 225.

[29] See Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, pp. 50-54; and Freedman, Chinese Family, pp. 87-92.

[30] Murphy, "Malayan Students," p. 187.

[31] Ibid., pp. 185-6.

[32] Newell, Treacherous River, p. 171.

[33] See Scott, Political Ideology, pp. 100-101; and Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 168 and 198.

[34] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 201.

[35] Ibid., p. 202; and Newell, Treacherous River, p. 31.

[36] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 202.

[37] See James D. Clarkson, The Cultural Ecology of a Chinese Village: Cameron Highlands, Malaysia (Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1968), pp. 102-104.

[38] See Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 152-153.

[39] See ibid., p. 253 for the acceptance of the strict discipline imposed by Chinese members of the M.C.P.

[40] Murphy, "Malayan Students," p. 194 emphasizes this self reliance.

[41] See, for example, the comments of Han Suyin, . . . and the Rain My Drink (London: J. Cape, 1956), pp. 180-181.

[42] Hsu, Clan, Caste, and Club, p. 253.

[43] Victor Purcell, The Chinese in South East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 336.

[44] Tan Cheng-lock to Rt. Hon. Lord Listowel, Minister of State for the Colonies, 24 July 1948, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 133.

[45] Two-thirds of the Malayan Indian population was rural and one-third urban. See 1947 Census, p. 47.

[46] See ibid., p. 78.

[47] See Sinappah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 162; and 1947 Census, p. 124.

[48] Murphy, "Malayan Students," pp. 196 and 199.

[49] Ibid., p. 196.

[50] See Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, p. 256.

[51] Murphy, "Malayan Students," pp. 197 and 201.

[52] Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, pp. 50-54, p. 256. Interestingly, Scott notes that an Indian civil servant he interviewed talked of the Prime Minister as "the grandfather of everything", Political Ideology, p. 220.

[53] Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia, p. 84.

[54] Ibid., pp. 115-119.

[55] 1947 Census, p. 80.

[56] See Robert Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963), pp. 82-106.

[57] Ibid., p. 91.

[58] Ibid., p. 98.

[59] See Joe Illingworth in The Yorkshire Post, 26 July 1950.

[60] Heussler, Yesterday's Rulers, p. 101.

[61] See Ibid., p. 164.

[62] Parkinson, Templer in Malaya, p. 2.

[63] See, for example, The Straits Times, 29 June 1948, and 6 September 1948; and The Times of Malaya, 2 September 1948.

[64] Note, for instance, that the editors of The Observer stated on 18 July 1948, that the appointment of the right man as High Commissioner "might shorten the period of rebellion and avoid the necessity for warfare."

[65] For a discussion of the qualities and characteristics looked for in recruiting to the Colonial Service at this time, see Ralph Furse, Aucuparius (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), passim.

[66] This is perhaps best exemplified by a note written shortly before he was murdered, in which he criticises Chinese leaders for not actively participating in the fight against the Communists. See TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 144.

[67] See, for example, Norman Cleaveland's account of his attempts to make his views known to Gurney on the matter of the transfer of the Ghurkhas in Bang Bang in Ampang, pp. 107-108.

[68] See Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, p. 78.

[69] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B524.

[70] Montgomery of Alamein, The Path to Leadership (London: Collins, 1961), p. 10. (The original is in italics.)

[71] Bales, Interaction Process Analysis, p. 51.

[72] See Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership, pp. 296 and 402; Bass, Leadership, Psychological and Organizational Behaviour, pp. 437-443; and Seligman, "Leadership", p. 108.

[73] Bass, Leadership, Psychological and Organizational Behaviour, p. 438.

[74] See Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership, p. 331.

CHAPTER 5

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A political leader, by definition, holds a position in an organization. Indeed, he may well hold positions in several organizations, depending on the complexity of the political system. Within any organization there are regulations which govern the relationship between the individuals and groups that comprise the organization. The assumption underlying this Chapter is that these changing regulations and the resultant relationships between the various parts of an organization are crucial to the process of political leadership. The organization is the major tool by which a leader accumulates and orders information, establishes alternative policies, and executes decisions. The organization acts on his behalf and in return he is expected to accept responsibility for the actions of the members of the organization. Thus, a leader can be said to personify, for those who live in the unit he heads, the structure in which he holds a key position and may be blamed or praised for its actions.[1] This Chapter, then, will contain a description and analysis of: first, the organizational relationship between the leader, the High Commissioner, and those parts of the constitutionally defined hierarchy outside the unit in question, in this case, the British Government; and second, the organizational relationship between the leader, the High Commissioner, and those parts of the hierarchy within the unit, in this case, the State Rulers, the State Governments, the Executive and Legislative Councils, the army, the

CHART I

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: SIR HENRY GURNEY


U.K. CABINET
WAR OFFICE
FOREIGN OFFICE
COLONIAL OFFICE
Commissioner General MacDonald
High Commissioner Gurney
War Council
Exec. Council
Rulers
GOC Malaya Army
Comm. of Police Police
Chief Sec. Civil Bureaucracy
State Govs.
Leg. Co.
——— Direct responsibility
- - - - - - Constitutionally prescribed consultations

CHART II

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: SIR GERALD TEMPLER


U.K. CABINET
Comm. General MacDonald
High Commissioner Templer
Deputy Director of Operations
Deputy High Commissioner
Exec. Council
Rulers
GOC Malaya Army
Comm.of Police Police
Chief Sec. Civil Bureaucracy
Leg. Co.
State Govs

———————Direct responsibility

- - - - - - -Constitutionally prescribed consultations police, and the civil bureaucracy. (For a diagrammatic representation of these relationships see Charts I and II).

EXTERNAL CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

The British Government

The nature of the link between the Malayan Government and the British Government was crucial for both Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer. For Gurney, the relationship was fairly typical of the traditional links between a Colonial Governor and Whitehall. Gurney, a career diplomat, was appointed through the usual Colonial Office channels, and was responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Business between the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office was conducted through the usual formal channels.[2] Gurney visited London only once while he was High Commissioner and received few visits from high ranking Government officials. He submitted regular reports on the Emergency and the general affairs of the Malayan Government to the Colonial Secretary and in return received various suggestions concerning policy matters.[3] The Malayan Government was also required, like other Colonial Governments, to furnish Whitehall with full details of all projected budgets so that "advice" on modifications and restrictions could be handed down.[4] Moreover, there was a clear understanding that the High Commissioner would not override, with the vote of Government officials, the views of the rest of the Federal Executive Council, the major policy-forming body, without special reference to the Colonial Office. However, while these limitations on the power of the High Commissioner existed and were at times invoked, especially in financial matters, Gurney did have considerable latitude in the making and execution of policies. He was "the man on the spot" and his views were respected.

The importance of this constitutional link for the process of leadership in Malaya lay not just in the powers to act bestowed on the leader, the High Commissioner, but also in the feelings of the people towards the British Government and thus to Gurney as its official representative. Accusations were made about the lack of urgency and the air of complacency which it was felt characterized the statements and actions of the British Government.[5] The small amount of monetary aid supplied by the British Government was cited as just one example of the fact that the Government in London failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation.[6] Moreover, some groups, notably the rubber producers, felt that their interests were not being taken into consideration when decisions concerning the rubber industry were made in London.[7] While the exact nature of the relationship between the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner was not clear to many,[8] these expressions of frustration were, by implication, a partial indictment of the High Commissioner himself for not being able to impress on the officials in London the nature of the situation in Malaya and the feelings of its people. This produced a tendency to by-pass the Malayan Government and attempt to exert pressure on the Government in the United Kingdom directly through British M.P.s and members of the Government. However, there is little evidence to suggest that this kind of lobbying brought about immediate reversals of policy or the initiation of specific actions. Representations made in London were usually channelled back to Kuala Lumpur for comments and were dealt with directly by Malayan Government officials.[9] Indeed, Gurney went to great lengths to make it perfectly clear that governing Malaya was the responsibility of the Malayan Government. He underlined this point in a speech to the Legislative Council when he said:

> There has been a tendency in some quarters to criticise Whitehall on grounds of delay and red tape. So far as I am concerned such criticisms are unjustified. It should be remembered that the Federation is not governed or administered from Whitehall and those there would be the last to pretend that it is. The responsibility for the internal security of this country lies squarely on the shoulders of the Government of the Federation, whose duty it is when necessary to call upon His Majesty's Government to discharge the obligation assumed in Clause 4 of the Federation Agreement to protect the Malay State from external hostile attacks.[10]

In contrast to Gurney, Templer's relationship with the British Government was far from typical of the normal relationship between a senior colonial administrator and the Colonial Office. The circumstances of Templer's appointment and his terms of reference were exceptional. The death of Gurney in October 1951, and the need for a replacement as High Commissioner coincided with the election in England of a new Conservative Government headed by Winston Churchill. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttleton, decided to tour Malaya to see at first hand what the requirements were. He reported back to Churchill and recommended that a general be put in charge. After perusal of the list of generals to ascertain who was available, Templer was chosen and summoned to Ottawa where Churchill was presiding over a discussion of Commonwealth problems. Having decided that Templer was indeed the man for the job, Churchill told him to "ask for power, go on asking for it and then--never use it."[11] The exhortation to keep on asking for power, however, was hardly necessary given the power conferred on Templer by Lyttleton from the very beginning. In a directive, made public on Templer's arrival in Malaya, it was stated that "not only will you fulfill the normal function of High Commissioner, but you will assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the Federation and will be empowered to issue operational orders to their commanders without reference to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East."[12] Templer made continual reference to this directive in his speeches to the Legislative Council, noting at the same time that his directive came not from the Secretary of State alone but from the whole Cabinet, to whom he was responsible.[13]

Nor was the way in which Templer conducted relations between Kuala Lumpur and London usual. Rather than write telegrams and long reports, he chose to make frequent visits to London to ensure that his impressions, decisions and needs were fully understood. Arriving in Malaya in February 1952, Templer returned to London for consultations in June and December of that year and in May, June and December 1953; four times in two and one half years as High Commissioner. Moreover, it should be noted that he was thoroughly familiar with the corridors of Whitehall as a result of his work as Director of Military Government in the British zone of Germany in 1945 and later as Director of Military Intelligence and Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Lyttleton readily delegated power and Templer fully accepted the responsibility.[14] The Colonial Secretary fielded questions in the House of Commons, refusing to press Templer but allowing him to get on with the job. After a few months Lyttleton was able, as he has said, to dismiss "Malaya from its place in my mind amongst the danger spots. My role had become simple: it was to back him up and support him."[15] Templer, unlike Gurney, therefore, was able to establish from the inception of his term in office, that he had complete freedom of action and this was widely recognized by the people of Malaya.

A further, and complicating, consideration in analysing the formal links between the High Commissioner and the British Government was the role of the senior British representative in the region, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. MacDonald's position was important to the process of leadership in Malaya, not so much because he limited the power of the High Commissioner but rather because of the ambiguity he created in the minds of many as to exactly who was leading the fight against the M.C.P. Arriving in South-east Asia in 1946 to take up the position of Governor-General of Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo, MacDonald rapidly came to know and be known in Malaya. On the first of May 1948, he was elevated to the position of Commissioner-General in South-east Asia, with the personal rank of Ambassador.[16] Responsible to both the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary, he was the senior British representative and general advisor and coordinator for the British Colonies in the region. He travelled extensively and made a number of broadcasts, warning of the communist threat, encouraging cooperation with the Government and reassuring the people that Britain and the Malayan Government were doing everything possible to ensure their security.[17] Moreover, at the beginning of the Emergency, during the interregnum between Gent's death in an air crash near London, in July 1948, and Gurney's arrival in Malaya, in October 1948, MacDonald carried much of the burden of responsibility in the eyes of the Malayan public, for the Colonial Government's policies. Indeed, the Sunday Gazette in January 1949, stated that "the present emergency in Malaya is directly identified with Mr. MacDonald in the minds of nearly all the people in Singapore and the Federation."[18] While there is undoubtedly some journalistic licence involved here, there is also some truth in this assessment, particularly during Gurney's first year in office.

Yet with regard to the internal policies of the Federation, and therefore, policies regarding the conduct of the Emergency, MacDonald had no executive authority.[19] In domestic affairs the High Commissioner referred directly to the Colonial Office. MacDonald was only officially called in if the cooperation of another colony was needed in the execution of a domestic policy, or if a particular policy affected relations with another country. Moreover, even as an advisor, MacDonald had limited influence. While he was well liked and respected by the people of Malaya, particularly the Chinese,[20] and had excellent contacts in the Cabinet in London, the British officials in Kuala Lumpur were a little wary of him. He rarely wore a coat or tie, not thought suitable for the leading representative of the British Crown; he tended to fraternize with members of the local population a little too much; and he was an ex-politician, rather than a career civil servant--and an ex-Labour Party politician at that. However, MacDonald's influence should not be underestimated. He suggested, prodded, and made frequent trips to Kuala Lumpur to talk with Gurney and his officials, particularly about the political problems that arose. His connections with the Communities Liason Committee, an unofficial group of senior Malayan politicians from all communities, were particularly invaluable in this regard.

While MacDonald's position was somewhat vague[21] and, therefore, Gurney's relationship to him difficult to define, Templer immediately established that the Federation of Malaya was his bailiwick and MacDonald was to stay out. Given Templer's directive and the full support he had been given by Churchill, MacDonald complied. The confusion that had, to some extent, clouded Gurney's leadership was resolved. Indeed, one paper which was very critical of the Colonial Administration and which had attacked MacDonald as the prime instigator of the attack against the forces of liberation, noted that "with the appointment of General Templer and the formal declaration of military dictatorship, MacDonald's position appears redundant" and that "the appointment of General Templer with overall command shows how a man can be sacked without being removed from office.":[22] comments which demonstrate both the perceived importance of MacDonald prior to Templer and the appreciation, generally felt, of Templer's commanding position.

Hence, the formal links between the leader and those aspects of the constitutionally defined hierarchy outside the unit were, in the case of the Malayan Emergency, important. On the one hand, Gurney was constrained in his actions, and the people of Malaya were confused as to his exact status in the battle against the Communists. Moreover, those who did recognize his primary position in the Federation were apt to blame him for the actions, or lack of action, of the British Government. On the other hand, Templer had no such constraints and few problems with establishing his sole responsibility for the actions of the

Malayan Government. Further, Templer had the backing of a Conservative Party Government that gave a higher priority to the colonies than the former Labour Government Gurney had served:[23] a fact that was no doubt fully appreciated by the predominantly conservative European community and Asian elite in Malaya.

DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

The Rulers and the State and Settlement Governments

The Federation of Malaya Agreement invested the Rulers of the States that comprised the Federation with important powers. The Secretary of State for the Colonies acknowledged, in a letter to the Rulers, that "although it is an incontestable fact that the agreements of 1948 (the Federation Agreement) have altered the pre-war position of your States, nevertheless the Government regards your Highnesses as independent Sovereigns insofar as your relations with the Government are concerned, and, save as provided in the agreements of 1948, independent sovereign rulers in your several states."[24] The Agreement specified that a Conference of Rulers be established that would provide the forum for consultation between the Rulers and the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner was directed to send each of the Rulers an advance copy of every Bill which the Malayan Government intended to bring before the Legislative Council and to explain to the Rulers the policy of the Federal Government and ascertain the views of the Rulers. The High Commissioner was particularly required to consult the Rulers on the immigration policy of the Government.[25] On the vital matter of constitutional changes, the general agreement of the Rulers had to be won. Meetings of the Conference of Rulers were scheduled to take place at least three times per year.

Gurney got off to a bad start with the Rulers. The original plan for his installation as High Commissioner had to be revised after the Mentri-Mentri Besar (the Chief Ministers to the Rulers) made strenuous complaints about the protocol of the ceremony. The revised version allowed the representatives of the Malay Rulers to arrive just before Gurney and to be in seats each side of the High Commissioner "denoting as it should be, a partnership", as one Mentri Besar put it.[26] There was considerable resentment at the way in which the British officials had attempted to re-establish their positions as "Tuans" or the masters of the Malays.[27] However, Gurney, by meeting nearly every month with the Rulers, was able to gain their confidence and, largely because of the obvious necessity for central leadership in the insurgency situation, their general acceptance of his policies. Templer, too, had the full cooperation of the Rulers. He noted that "I have had very considerable assistance both from Their Highnesses, the Rulers, in person, and from the State Governments in general, and they have assisted me a great deal in many cases where it might have been easy for them to block me."[28] Impressed by Templer's terms of reference and by the need to resolve the security crisis, the Rulers readily concurred with his decisions.

The State Governments were more of a problem for Gurney. While the Federation Agreement provided for a strong central government with firm control over matters concerning finance and internal security,[29] the State Governments, particularly those which had constituted the Unfederated Malay States prior to the Japanese Occupation, were jealous of their independence and the powers ceded to them by the new constitutional arrangement. This concern with States' authority prompted Data Onn, then Mentri Besar for Johore, to give notice of a strongly worded resolution that charged the Federal Government with endeavouring "to force upon State and Settlement Governments directives of policy on matters affecting, and within the jurisdiction of the State and Settlement Governments", and it asked the Federal Legislative Council to declare that it deplored and resented "the manner in which the Government of the Federation is implementing the spirit and intention of the Federation Agreement." Data Onn eventually withdrew the resolution on the understanding that "steps would be taken to put matters right."[30] The problem was certainly a serious one. As the editors of The Straits Times noted at the time:

> The Federal Secretariat still has a good deal to learn about the right way to deal with State Governments. Directives have been received in Johore Bahru from Kuala Lumpur which have read more like orders from a pre-war British Resident to his District Officer than communications to a State Government, which is still very much a Government, whatever powers it may have voluntarily sacrificed to the Federal Government for the sake of Malayan unity."[31]

Gurney, therefore, despite the wide powers granted to him by the Federation of Malayan Agreement and the "omnibus clause" of the Emergency Regulations Bill of 1948,[32] was required to tread carefully in certain aspects of his relations with the States, particularly in the first few years of his term in office.

Templer, on the other hand, had four major advantages over Gurney in his relations with the States. First, as time progressed and the M.C.P. remained unbeaten, the necessity of firm and coordinated action became more apparent. The State Governments began to rely more heavily on the Federal Government for leadership. Second, Templer was invested with greater powers than Gurney by virtue of his being both High Commissioner and operational commander of all armed forces in Malaya. Third, as pressure mounted for political independence, it was accepted that communal problems had to be resolved at the centre to ensure that Malay interests would be safeguarded in those States and Settlements dominated by non-Malays.[33] Fourth, and perhaps the most important factor was that Templer had the whip hand in financial matters. As the expenditure of the States went up, due to the Emergency, so they became more dependent upon the allocation of funds from the Federal Government. Their extremely narrow tax base could not possibly keep up with the demands made by new education, health and welfare, and public works programmes.[34] Templer, therefore, had an extremely good position from which to encourage the cooperation of the States and Settlements; he gained that cooperation. Hence, while Gurney's ability to execute certain policies was limited in some degree by the failure of the State and Settlement Governments to cooperate fully with the Federal Government, Templer was able to command a greater measure of assistance.

Federal Legislative and Executive Councils

The Central Government consisted of a High Commissioner, a Federal Executive Council to aid and advise the High Commissioner and a Federal Legislative Council.[35] The Federal Legislative Council consisted in 1948, of: the High Commissioner, who as President presided over debates; three *ex officio* members, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary; eleven official members, who as servants of the Crown were Government officials who ran the various Departments; and fifty unofficial members, who represented Malayan interests. The State and Settlement members were the nine presidents of the Councils of State in each State, and one representative of the Settlement Council in each Settlement, Malacca and Penang, selected from among themselves by the members of each Council.[36] All the unofficial members were appointed by the High Commissioner. These appointments tended to be made on the basis that the person represented a body of opinion such as: an organization like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce or U.M.N.O.; an interest like planting or mining; or a community group like the Eurasians or Indians. They were all, with one or two exceptions among the Malays, from the English educated elite. The powers of the Federal Legislative Council were limited. The Council was allowed to make laws for the Federation in those areas outlined in the Second Schedule of the Federation Agreement, but Bills that were passed required the assent of the High Commissioner and of the Rulers, as expressed by a Standing Committee consisting of two Rulers. Moreover, if the High Commissioner considered that it was:

> expedient in the interests of public order, public faith or good Government that any Bill introduced or any motion proposed for discussion in the Legislative Council should have effect and if the Council (failed) to pass the bill or motion within such time and in such form as the High Commissioner (thought) reasonable and expedient, the High Commissioner (had) 'reserved power' to give effect to the Bill or motion as if it had been passed by the Council.[37]

The High Commissioner's overriding powers, however, were used sparingly with unofficials generally recognizing that under the Emergency conditions the High Commissioner should be accorded every cooperation.[38] When dissent did become apparent and a division was necessary, the High Commissioner could always be assured of a majority, for most of the appointed unofficial members of the Legislative Council recognized that their interests coincided with those of the Colonial Government.

The difference in the way Gurney and Templer dealt with the Legislative Council is informative. On the one hand, Gurney spent a great deal of time fulfilling his duties as Presiding Officer of the Council. Not only did he write and deliver speeches, review Bills that were to be presented to Council and reconcile differences of opinion, but he also attended all full meetings of the Council, allowing himself to be embroiled to some extent in the cut and thrust of debate. Templer, on the other hand, delegated much of the responsibility of dealing with the Legislative Council to the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr. Donald MacGillivray. It was MacGillivray who attempted to smooth out problems and who presided over the debates, reporting back to Templer the tenor of the discussions. After 2 September 1953, a Speaker was installed to take over the function of chairing the proceedings. In this way, Templer, while still maintaining contact with the Legislative Council through the Deputy High Commissioner and his senior Government officials, was freed from the time consuming tasks carried out by Gurney. Templer, was able both to streamline the official system by which he solicited advice, and to free himself from the onerous duties of overseeing the Council debates, thereby giving himself more time for what he considered to be higher priority activities.

From 1948 to 1952, the Executive Council, which was presided over by the High Commissioner, was comprised of the following personnel: three ex officio members; not less than four official members; and not less than five or more than seven unofficial members, of whom not less than two in the former case and three in the latter case were Malays.[39]

Members of the Executive Council were also members of the Federal Legislative Council. All were chosen by the High Commissioner. The Executive Council usually met once every two weeks while Gurney was in office, reaching its decisions by consensus rather than by a show of hands. Although Gurney was constitutionally allowed to ignore the advice of the Executive Council, this proved unnecessary for Gurney's ability to argue logically and his status enabled him to develop the consensus around his point of view on all crucial matters. Essentially, general matters of policy were discussed at Executive Council meetings with more specific decisions about the prosecution of the Emergency being discussed in the Federal War Council. This latter body, which met once every three weeks, was created to tender advice to the High Commissioner, and more specifically, to the Director of Operations when this position was established in 1950.

Templer found this system cumbersome. In February 1952, the Executive Council was expanded by a Proclamation amending the Federal Agreement to include four ex officio members, eleven official members, and five unofficial members. The eleven official members included three Malays, one Chinese and one Ceylonese and the unofficial members were made up of two Malays, two Chinese, and one Indian.[40] The reason for this expansion was that Templer wished to streamline the advisory system by abolishing the Federal War Council, and merging it into the Executive Council. The restructured Executive Council met with the High Commissioner once a week.[41] Templer, who was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, thus avoided administrative schizophrenia. As an official statement put it: "the Government cannot have a split personality guided by two separate Councils, one advising the High Commissioner and Director of Operations on questions of policy arising out of the Emergency and another advising him on questions of policy regarded as not falling within this category."[42] This rationalization of the advisory system enabled Templer to digest information more efficiently and to acknowledge publicly the primacy of the communist threat, by making it known that the Emergency was being discussed in the highest executive body in the land.

The Armed Forces

The primary though not always the only function of the armed forces is to maintain the security of a society in the face of armed aggression. Given the violent conditions which engulfed Malaya in 1948, the role of the armed forces was therefore crucial. Important too is the question of who directs the operations of the armed forces. In this respect, the contrast between the control over the higher echelons of the forces exercised by Gurney, the career civil servant, and Templer, the seconded professional soldier, is striking indeed.

Even before Gurney had had a chance to get himself briefed and installed in King's House, the official residence of the High Commissioner, the armed forces had established their relative independence of civil control. Gent, Gurney's predecessor, had been recalled to London for discussion (he almost certainly would have been asked for his resignation) because of differences with service chiefs over steps to be taken against the communist guerrillas.[43] Major-General C.H. Boucher, G.O.C. Malaya, was in a strong position from the very inception of the Emergency. Not only was he the man at the head of the most highly organized group fighting the communists, he also presented himself as the expert in guerrilla war[44] and the man, therefore, most qualified to take charge of operations. With the police in disarray, the Police Commissioner incapacitated by ill health, and no High Commissioner from July to October 1948, Boucher "ran the show". When Gurney did arrive, and brought with him a new and very forceful Police Commissioner to coordinate the counter-guerrilla operations, Boucher was extremely reluctant to accept his orders. A general accepting orders from a policeman seemed to him unthinkable,[45] and he was backed up by a new Commander-in-Chief Far East Land Forces, General Sir John Harding. The lines of authority encouraged Boucher's obstinacy. On the one hand, the Police Commissioner derived his authority from the High Commissioner, who in turn was responsible to the Colonial Secretary; on the other hand, the G.O.C. Malaya was responsible through the various levels of the army command to the War Office. The civil authority had no clear cut right to give orders to the military. Gurney, a civilian, found it exceedingly difficult, therefore, to exercise any authority in the sphere of military operations where he was told he had no experience, no competence, and no responsibility.

But Templer had the experience and the authority to keep the military in its place. Not only was he a general in his own right, with experience of insurgency warfare in Palestine prior to World War Two, and therefore qualified to tell the G.O.C. Malaya where and how he could improve operations, but he also had a clear mandate to "assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the Federation and . . . empowered to issue operational orders to their commanders without reference to the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East."[46] Moreover, in June 1952, Lt.General Sir Hugh Stockwell assumed the position of G.O.C. Malaya. This was a man with whom Templer had worked in England in his previous post as head of Eastern Command. Under these circumstances, the working relationship between the High Commissioner and the army became clearly defined and relatively harmonious, in marked contrast to the framework in which Gurney had worked. The steady build up of military personnel which was considerably augmented in 1952 by African and Fijian battalions was, therefore, harnessed to the common cause under Templer's firm personal command.

Police

Not only was Gurney handicapped by an uncooperative army command, but he also had to work with a Police Force that was severely troubled by low morale. There were many reasons for this state of affairs. First, the Force was split into factions. There was hostility between those officers who had avoided capture during the Japanese invasion and had got out of Malaya and those who had stayed at their posts, been captured by the Japanese, and endured nearly four years in the infamous Changi jail. However, a greater division arose with the influx of police officers from outside Malaya, especially Palestine. Brought in to enable the Police Force to expand and meet the increasing number of security commitments, the ex-Palestine sergeants and officers, while providing much-needed experience, caused a great deal of resentment. Colonel Nicol Gray, ex-Inspector General of Police in Palestine, was made Commissioner of Police in Malaya and brought with him a number of ex-Palestine officers who manned the Force Headquarters. This preponderance at Force H.Q. of officers new to Malaya and the appointment to senior posts of seven ex-Palestine officers aroused suspicion and frustration. Moreover, the antagonism was deepened by the obvious lack of interest shown by Gray and the H.Q. officers in the views of the Chief Police officers, mainly old Malay hands, in the various parts of the country. As a Commission set up by Gurney to look into the many allegations of disaffection within the Force reported in 1950, the old Malaya officers feel "that there has . . . been an unwarranted loss of confidence in them. It has been distressing to us to find how widespread this impression was among officers."[47]

Second, there was a clash of personalities within the upper echelons of the Police Force which tended to reflect and reinforce the internal divisions. Gray, a hard man who had been a marine commando during World War Two and who had very set ideas about guerrilla wars, based on his experiences in Palestine, was the key protagonist. It was felt by Malaya trained officers that he ignored the advice of senior men with long experience of Malaya and exhibited an abrupt and often abrasive personality when dealing with his fellow officers. The resignations of two highly respected senior police officers, B.M.N. O'Connell and K.J.N. Duthie made the internal dissension public and while the Report of the Police Mission set up by Gurney to look into the administration and morale of the Police Force, ignored the reasons for their decision to leave Malaya, the matter was widely discussed and its significance appreciated.[51] Further personality problems arose when in 1950, Sir William Jenkins was appointed Director of Intelligence in a move to strengthen the Special Branch. Jenkins, a noted expert, had a considerable personal reputation based on the work he had done in India and was quickly able to increase the establishment of the Special

Branch. Jenkin's presence, however, obviously detracted somewhat from Gray's authority and his ability to pursue his own policies and, as a result, a certain amount of friction entered into their relationship. This friction produced a schism between the Special Branch and the rest of the Police Force at the highest level. Gray also earned for himself a great deal of enmity by insisting that no police vehicles be fitted with armour. Unarmoured vehicles meant a much greater chance of death and injury in an ambush. Gray was bitterly criticised for this policy, not only by senior police officials, but also by Legislative Council Members and State Officials.[49] Gurney, who had worked with Gray in Palestine,[50] and had been instrumental in his appointment as Commissioner of Police, was put in the position in which he had to support Gray as the man with the authority and experience. Thus, while the relationship between the High Commissioner and the Commissioner of Police remained good, morale within the Police Force suffered and the effectiveness of the security forces' fight against the M.C.P. restricted.

Third, the rapid increase both in the demands made on the Police Force and the recruitment of personnel created strains within the organization that contributed to the lowering of morale. The total strength of the Force rose from 10,819 in 1947 to a peak of 72,935 in 1952,[51] and the amount of work undertaken paralleled this increase in manpower. Initially, the administrative organization at the Force Headquarters was inadequate to meet the demands created by the Emergency. The number of officers attached to the H.Q. was small and it had not been thought necessary to develop an organization capable of dealing with a large volume of work by dividing it among administrative branches controlled by an appropriate chain of command.[52] Gradually, by trial and error, the administration of the Force was reorganized, but progress was slow.

Not only was the Force slow in adapting to the administrative demands of the increased work load, but difficulty was also experienced in recruitment and training. After the initial influx of European officers and sergeants from Palestine, India and Hong Kong during the last months of 1948 and first few months of 1949, good recruits were scarce.[53] Among the rank and file there was a severe shortage of Chinese recruits.[54] This was partly because of the Chinese dislike of uniforms, partly because the police were associated in many Chinese minds with the Malay police who had helped the Japanese, and partly because higher pay could be gained from other occupations, especially after the Korean War boom boosted wages in private industry. The result was a decided lack of communication and a certain amount of distrust between the police in the field and the Chinese communities. New recruits were given a minimum of training. Because of the need for immediately putting newly recruited officers into service, the training course for cadets was suspended. New officers, therefore, lost the advantage which cadets formerly had of being instructed in professional police work, the Malay language, the customs of the country, and the standard of work and conduct expected of them.[55] Lack of training meant lack of knowledge, lack of confidence, and a lowering of morale. Moreover, because recruits had no basic grounding in police work and because Gray, the ex-Commando Police Commissioner, wanted many operations to be conducted in an army style, the Force, to the consternation of many officials and civilians became more and more like a para-military organization.[56]

Links with the general population were broken as fewer officers were able to speak Malay, let alone Chinese. Compounding this deficiency was the fact that the six months leave of absence granted to European members of the Force meant that officers and sergeants were continually being transferred, prohibiting any continuity of operations in an area and any profitable contacts within the community from being established.[57]

Finally, low morale was both a product of, and a spur to, corruption. Corruption had been a problem ever since the Japanese surrender. When the European officers began to resume control in 1945, not only was the Police Force "ill-clad, badly equipped and poorly disciplined",[58] but also the pay was very low. While some order and discipline was restored in the Force, corruption, particularly among Chinese detectives, continued. The Emergency made extortion and bribery much easier for those who wished to line their own pockets. If bribes were received, there were no arrests, but if a "donor" became uncooperative he could always be shot as a communist sympathizer. Secret Societies particularly were good patrons of the detectives in the major towns and gained some insurance against Police attention in this way.[59] Most forms of corruption were, however, of a petty nature and many officers regarded it as "a minor and ineradicable failing."[60] This lack of supervision and acceptance of the situation as inevitable by the officers only served to exacerbate the problem.

This analysis of the problems within the Police Force should not obscure the fact that the M.C.P. had to a large measure been contained. The Police had played a significant role in achieving this state of affairs. While Colonel Gray had been a controversial figure, he had been able to expand the Force and maintain its cohesion. Gray's tenacity and determination had also earned him, however grudgingly, the respect of many senior officers.[61] There was only one Commissioner of Police, and he had the support of the High Commissioner; hence, his rule was accepted and the work was done.

Templer was fortunate that he did not inherit all of these problems. First, the clash of personalities was solved by the resignation of both Gray and Jenkins. After Gurney had been ambushed and killed at the hands of the guerrillas, Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the newly elected Conservative Government, decided to visit Malaya, and assess the situation for himself. It was Lyttleton who, appalled by the schism within the Force and the general lack of cooperation among the security forces at the top levels, secured their resignations.[62] In Gray's place, Lyttleton sent out Colonel Arthur Young, Commissioner of the City of London Police, on a year's secondment. Young was a professional policeman rather than a converted soldier and placed a great emphasis on basic police work. Although Young was yet another outsider, he was much more acceptable to the Malaya trained senior officers because of his training and background. He was also less tolerant of the cruder practices of some of the ex-Palestine police--a characteristic which quickly gained him the respect of those familiar with the Malayan people and their customs. Templer backed Young and encouraged him to reorganize the administration and eliminate some of the more gross inefficiencies in the system. Departmental duties were reassigned to give more responsibility to Staff Officers at Police Headquarters and to free the Commissioner from mundane administrative chores. This allowed him to devote himself to the primary task of directing and co-ordinating policy. The post of Deputy Commissioner of Police (Field) was established to facilitate close liason between Chief Police Officers in the States and Settlements, and Federal Police H.Q.[63] This was a change which facilitated the accumulation of information and imparted a greater feeling of participating in the work of a more integrated Force; a welcome improvement for those in the more outlying parts of the country. When, after serving for fourteen months, Young left Malaya, Templer appointed Mr. W.L.R. Carbonell, a relatively young officer in the Malayan Police Service, to succeed him. Carbonell was equally successful in injecting a high degree of efficiency into the Force.

Second, Templer was able to divert more resources to training. He considered training to be of the greatest importance, and noted on arrival that "unfortunately as things stand today, a great deal of the resources of the Police must be devoted to the para-military side of their duties. This makes it all the more necessary to ensure that the Regular Police are trained in and are attending to their basic civil police duties." As expansion slowed and the strength of the Force became more stable, greater numbers of people could be released for training. New training establishments were formed and the necessary training staffs and students withdrawn from active duties. Various types of courses were created for all levels of personnel, including Special Constables.[64] Technical staff were seconded from the Army and special courses put on for senior officers. This policy produced a more efficient Force and greatly increased morale. Moreover, armoured vehicles were ordered from Britain and the overall standard of equipment was increased considerably. The increase in the amount of money spent on the Police Force after Templer arrived--money derived from the Korean War boom--testifies to the priority given to the raising of standards and the improvement in morale.

Third, Templer was able to capitalize on the reduced number of incidents generated by the M.C.P. to foster better relations between the police and the people. Late in 1952, it was decided to introduce "Operation Service" in an attempt to emphasize that the Police were servants of the people of Malaya and their job was to help them. Largely a public relations operation, the results were probably better than expected. The police, with increased morale from better training and equipment, and with the knowledge that incidents were on the decline, gained confidence in themselves and were more inclined to be well disposed towards the public. Members of the public, finding themselves better served by the police and more secure from guerrilla terrorist actions, were more inclined to cooperate with the police. The consequence was that "Operation Service" proved to be a success. It made the public more aware of the role of the police and thus made the Force in general more effective.[65] Problems arising out of corruption continued to plague the Force, however, and the gains from such measures as "Operation Service" need to be assessed against the losses in public confidence resulting from the activities of unscrupulous individuals.

Templer, therefore, while having to work with the same Police Force as Gurney, did not have to labour under the same constraints. Unchecked by personality problems, growth pains, money and trained manpower restrictions, and a high rate of guerrilla activity, Templer was able to encourage Young, his Commissioner of Police, to turn the Force into an efficient and effective arm of the security services.

Civil Bureaucracy

For Gurney, the career civil servant used to devising administrative solutions to testing problems, the civil bureaucracy was of prime importance. If Gurney was to be an effective administrator, he had to have an efficient administration. Moreover, the work of his subordinates would reflect on him. As one Legislative Council Member stated, "it should always be borne in mind that the public judge the policies and intentions of Government, not by White Papers or broadcasts, but by the attitude and conduct of Government employees."[66] While this may be somewhat of an exaggeration, the relationship between the people and the High Commissioner was partly a product of the relationship between Government officials and the people.

But Gurney was not blessed with a trouble-free administration. First, the core of the Federal administration in Kuala Lumpur had its problems. At the apex of the hierarchy was the Chief Secretary, who was directly responsible to the High Commissioner for the whole Secretariat administration except the Finance Branch. The Financial Secretary himself reported directly to the High Commissioner.[67] The burden of work thus placed on the Chief Secretary was formidable and, as The Straits Times noted, tended to create an administrative bottleneck.[68] The new federal structure created confusion and prompted many queries about State powers and legislative rights. Indeed, Gurney set up a committee to attempt to smooth away "the administrative difficulties felt during the early months of the Constitution."[69] Committees and meetings were a constant drain on the time and energy of the Chief Secretary and his staff. Rulers Conferences, which required both preparation and follow up, were frequent; Emergency committees demanded information and recommendations; and such internal matters as salary negotiations and the difficulties encountered with the machinery to deal with employees' requests had to be attended to. And of course, there was a constant stream of visiting American senators to be "briefed". The "Member" system was introduced in March 1951, partly to relieve the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary of their burden and partly to give experience to members of the Legislative Council. Under the "Member" system, various departments and subjects were grouped together and placed under the supervision of the appropriately designated Member. These officials, who had previously been "unofficial members" and who, under the Member system, were now considered officers of the Government, guided bills through the Legislative Council and answered questions on the areas of Government administration for which they were responsible. However, far from relieving the pressure on the Chief Secretary, initially the system was very taxing for the new Members were in frequent contact with his office, desiring guidance about administrative procedures and the solution to problems.

Second, there was a shortage of trained personnel and of labour. This affected all aspects of the Administration. The Emergency necessitated the reallocation of a number of skilled and experienced people, leaving positions open and work incomplete. There were many requests to London for more replacements, but there never seemed to be quite enough people available. For example, in the Public Works Department in 1949, there were 162 Officer duty posts in all the States, but only 121 were filled.[70] Money was initially an important factor. The Government found itself in a dilemma: if it raised the salaries of Government officials to attract more recruits the amount it could spend elsewhere and thus the range of activities it could undertake would be limited; but even if priority was given to expanding Government activities, and the Emergency certainly required this,[71] there was little guarantee they would be effective without a greater number of administrative personnel. Not until the Korean War boom provided a spectacular rise in revenue was this problem resolved. Lack of training facilities was also a problem. New recruits were hustled out into their positions without adequate instruction and expected to "pick up the strings". The teaching of languages, a crucial aspect of a normal introductory course, was neglected. The one person who might have been able to rationalize the work load, the Organization and Methods Advisor, assumed that the situation would become more settled and tended to ignore the demands of the Emergency. He recommended reductions in staff rather than accepting the necessities imposed by increased responsibilities.[72] The shortage of labour affected a number of programmes and slowed the expansion of much needed facilities, such as roads and buildings. It was officially estimated in 1948 that there was a shortage of some 25,000 workers, mainly due to the ravages of the Japanese occupation and the post-war restrictions on immigration.[73] Perhaps the best indication of the inadequacies of the Administration came when the Government, in attempting to mobilize the population in a much publicized anti-bandit month, could not sustain the voluntary work carried out by civilians in all walks of life because of a lack of the necessary administrative machinery.

Third, the reorganization of the Administration after the Japanese occupation tended to isolate the Chinese community. This reorganization made the Administration less effective in its attempts to separate the M.C.P. from the Chinese population. Prior to 1941, each State or Settlement had a Protector of Chinese Affairs. The Secretary of Chinese Affairs had his headquarters in Singapore. The Protector of Chinese Selangor was his chief officer in the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. They dealt with all aspects of the life of the Chinese community, including labour, family matters, the registration of Societies, and they tendered advice to the British Residents or Advisors. After the Federation of Malaya Agreement was signed, this system was abolished, partly to allay any feelings the Malays might have that the Chinese were being given special treatment, and partly, it would appear, to encourage the equal treatment of all communities. The majority of pre-war "Protectors" were transferred to the Department of Labour and dealt exclusively with labour matters. The position of Secretary of Chinese Affairs, Federation of Malaya, was created with an office in Kuala Lumpur, but the function of the Secretary was purely advisory. He did not have the field contacts so necessary to make his position influential. The position of Secretary of Chinese Affairs was also created in the Settlements, Penang and Malacca, and later as the Emergency became more critical, in some of the States. In 1950, an attempt was made to expand the Chinese Affairs Department by introducing Junior Chinese Affairs Officers at the District level.[74] However, few recruits with suitable qualifications in both English and Chinese could be found. But the major problem was the lack of power of the Junior Officers. As one prominent member of the Chinese community argued in a letter to the Commissioner-General, Mr. MacDonald:

> Give the Chinese Affairs Department the prestige and power which it had before the war. The mere creation of a Secretary of Chinese Affairs in each State and Settlement does not meet the needs of the Chinese community at this serious time if the officers concerned, however sympathetic and devoted to their splendid work, have no voice in the administration. My experience is that the post-war Chinese Affairs Officer has no power.[75]

Moreover, it would seem that the senior Malayan Chinese politicians were not wholly satisfied with the Secretary of Chinese Affairs in Gurney's Administration.[76] Not even the Chinese Advisory Committee, set up by Gurney in April 1949, to advise him on Chinese matters, could assuage the feeling that there was no one responsible for the interests of the Chinese who had both the power to act on their behalf and the ability to provide guidance in their dilemma.

Fourth, Gurney was faced with a demand that the Administration be opened up to more Malayans, particularly Malays. For example, Warta Negara, an influential Malay newspaper, supported Data Onn's proposal that a Malay be appointed Deputy High Commissioner.[77] The 50,000 man Government[78] was essentially run by the Malayan Civil Service, a largely British-manned group. Indeed, in 1950, fewer than 15 percent of the M.C.S. consisted of Malay recruits.[79] One of the major problems of admitting more local recruits was that few were able to measure up to the traditional criteria. The educational level and language proficiency required for entrance into M.C.S. were not easily acquired in Malaya. Gurney decided that the criteria could not be drastically changed (presumably because he thought it would lower administrative efficiency.) Thus although some Malays were admitted to the M.C.S., the lack of sympathy displayed by the Government, towards the argument that a great many more should be given key positions and training in senior posts, did cause some resentment among the Malaya elite.

Finally, corruption was rife, particularly in the lower levels of the Administration. Directly after the war the cost of living was officially estimated to have been 300 to 400 percent higher than pre-war levels; this figure did not take into consideration the necessity of buying some produce on the open "black" market.[80] The Asian middle-class found it difficult to adjust to this new situation and debt was widespread at all salary levels.[81] Moreover, many Government and Municipal employees were living in intolerable conditions in temporary housing because the prices of new houses were too high.[82] It is not surprising, therefore, that with a shortage of manpower and an increased work load created by the Emergency, bribery and corruption should oil the administrative machinery. The Government was aware of the problem. Gurney noted in February 1950, that "the facts regarding the prevalence of corruption in the Government are well known to the Government and the situation requires drastic remedy."[83] The Acting Attorney-General, in introducing a bill designed to stem corruption, noted that there was "not one dissentient voice on my two assertions that bribery in this country is widespread and that the situation is most serious."[84] The bill, however, did little to curb what many felt to be a fact of life in Malaya. Senior officials turned a blind eye to "indiscretions", not wishing either to lose the services of a possibly irreplaceable subordinate or to bother with the cumbersome and often problematic process of prosecution. Moreover, this lack of rigorous supervision was perhaps a reflection of what

Graham Greene noted at the time as "defeatism".[85]

Templer shocked the Administration out of its despondency. In his first address to the Legislative Council, Templer stated that "I regard the officers working on the ground as the most important cogs in the machine of Government".[86] He quickly established that he was not prepared to suffer fools or incompetent officials gladly. Rumours spread quickly that Templer, not prepared to accommodate the normal civil service niceties, was going to roll some heads.[87] Templer summoned all the top civil servants in Kuala Lumpur and told them in no uncertain terms that red tape was to be cut and the job to be done. He also sent out a circular which underlined that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency were not two separate entities, but utterly interrelated. As The Straits Times was to note later, "he invigorated the administration from the day he arrived . . . ."[88]

Just prior to Templer taking up his appointment as High Commissioner a number of administrative reforms were introduced. The most significant change was the creation of the post of Deputy High Commissioner. Lyttleton had decided during his tour of Malaya that Gurney's successor should be free from the constant need to attend to administrative chores. Thus, from 8 February 1952, the Deputy High Commissioner was authorized to exercise the High Commissioner's powers under the Federation of Malaya Order-in-Council, 1948, and under the Federation Agreement, with certain specified exceptions. The exceptions, in respect to which the High Commissioner retained sole authority, concerned matters affecting his relations with Their Highnesses the Rulers, the prerogative of pardon, the power of making and assenting to laws, the reserved powers relating to legislation mentioned in Clause 52 of the Agreement, and the appointment of Judges and Law Officers.[89] In other words, the day to day running of the Administration and the general political problems of the day became the Deputy High Commissioner's responsibility. As a press release stated, "The Deputy High Commissioner will, therefore, be the authority to whom Members of Government will initially submit matters and it will lie in the discretion of the Deputy High Commissioner as to which of the matters should be referred by him to the High Commissioner."[90] Templer was particularly fortunate that this executive and screening position should be occupied by a highly able administrator, Mr. Donald MacGillivray. Once MacGillivray had settled in, mastered the complexities of Malayan politics, and pulled together the strings of the Administration, he proved of invaluable help in shielding Templer from involvement in extraneous, minor and often time-consuming problems. The bottleneck which had been created by the excessive responsibilities placed on the Chief Secretary was largely abolished. It was a gradual process, however, as until MacGillivray found his feet the Chief Secretary was his principal guide. The formal responsibilities of the Chief Secretary, such as being Head of the Civil Service and having authority over matters concerning external relations, were not significantly altered. However, his wider, and formerly more vaguely defined responsibilities, such as advising the High Commissioner on domestic political matters, were greatly reduced.

The importance of the administrative links with the Chinese community through the Chinese Affairs Officers had begun to be fully appreciated in Gurney's final year in office. Indeed, by the time Templer arrived in Malaya, most States and all the Settlements had been persuaded to recognize and accept a Secretary for Chinese Affairs[91] and by the end of 1952, 28 out of the possible 52 positions for Chinese Affairs Officers had been filled.[92] Recruiting Assistant Chinese Affairs Officers started in 1952. This part of the Administration, therefore, gradually improved as more Chinese candidates, qualified in both English and Chinese, became available. Templer was fully aware of the necessity of making the Government accessible to the Chinese and giving the Chinese the feeling that their administrative "representative" was influential. Thus, when it became necessary to appoint an acting Chief Secretary for a period of time, he chose Mr. David Gray, the Federal Secretary of Chinese Affairs (S.C.A.) in his Administration. This move gave the Chinese Affairs Department "face" and ensured that the S.C.A. was also in contact with the other communities. Thereby, both the confidence of the Chinese in the Government was strengthened and links with other communities facilitated.

Malayanization of the Malayan Civil Service proceeded slowly with no real dent being made in the predominantly British ethos of the organization. In March 1953, Templer announced that non-Malay Asians of suitable qualifications would be admitted to the M.C.S.[93] Very few applied. Qualifications remained based on British criteria and educational standards. With facilities for an English style education limited, the number of eligible Malay applicants was small. This caused some dissatisfaction, particularly within the Malay community, and both major parties, the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A.-M.I.C. Alliance Party and Party Negara, advocated a policy of accelerated Malayanization in their 1955 election platforms.[94]

The problem of corruption concerned Templer as it had done Gurney.

Templer noted in his first speech to the Legislative Council that "no country in the world can afford an inefficient Civil Service, for it is through such a service that Government policies are translated into practice and are interpreted to people", and he further noted that "I am very well aware that in some respects, especially in regard to housing (that the) terms and conditions (of the Civil Service) fall short of what is necessary."[95] The terms and conditions improved somewhat as mechanisms for dealing with internal Civil Service matters were established. The Government also brought in legislation which changed the rules of evidence in corruption cases, amended the General Orders and regulations which ensured discipline within the Civil Service, and launched a publicity and education campaign to acquaint the public with the evils of and penalties for corruption.[96] But probably the general success of the Government against the communists and the resulting boost to morale was the most successful antidote to the problem. However, despite every effort on the part of his Government, Templer, like Gurney before him, failed to completely eliminate this blot on the efficiency and public image of the Administration.

Gurney, the administrator, was hampered by an inefficient administration that because of structural defects needed constant attention. Templer, the soldier, was able to leave the day-to-day administrative problems to his Deputy High Commissioner and devote his time to operational matters. The expansion of responsibilities brought about by the Emergency and the shortage of trained men created a strain that inevitably produced a less than perfectly efficient Civil Service. Gurney, therefore, had to work with the knowledge that his policies could not possibly be executed in the most efficient manner, and that this inefficiency led to the creation of tension between his administration and the general population. However, because of his general administrative abilities, he was able to ameliorate some of the problems although it took a great deal of his time. By 1952, the taxing demands of the Emergency had reached a plateau and from the time he arrived Templer was able to consolidate the administrative structure. Reorganization, that had been made possible by the direct intervention of the Colonial Secretary, streamlined the higher echelons, while training and more men and money strengthened the lower levels of the Civil Service. Thus, Templer was able to work with an Administration that got the job done and maintained fairly good relations with a public that saw the tide was turning in favour of the Government and against the communists.

Operational Coordination

The coordination of counter-insurgency operations is vital if a Government is to be successful in defeating a guerrilla campaign. All three arms of the Government--the armed forces, the police and the civil bureaucracy--must act in concert on all policies and at all levels to eliminate the possibility of one organization destroying the work of another. This, however, can be an exceedingly difficult goal to attain.

When Gurney reached Malaya in 1948, the problem of coordination was immediately apparent. Mr. J.S. Ferguson, a leading European spokesman, told Gurney that "it is . . . felt that there is a lack of coordination from what we term dual control. We feel, Sir, that you ought to be the supreme head, knowing that you would, in that position, utilize local knowledge to the full and thus give unified direction to the Police and

Military."[97] On paper some coordinating machinery seemed to have been established. A few days after the state of Emergency was declared, a senior administrative officer was appointed to a new post of Secretary for Internal Security. His duties were to deal with all matters arising out of the Emergency and to act as Chairman of the Internal Security Committee. The Committee was composed of representatives of the three Services, the Police, and all Government Departments deemed to be concerned with the Emergency.[98] But this committee only dealt with the allocation of supplies and equipment. No attempt was made to discuss operations. Operational decisions were made by the head of the respective organizations and overall control seemed to be undetermined. Prior to Gurney's arrival, the G.O.C. Malaya, General Boucher, assumed some responsibility for the overall direction of the Emergency. This situation seems to have developed largely by default, the Commissioner of Police being incapacitated by ill health and the Administration being in the hands of "acting" officials. There was certainly no official confirmation of Boucher's assumed position.[99] Indeed, as soon as Colonel Gray arrived to take up his position as Commissioner of Police, Gurney confirmed that it was Gray who had overall authority and that the military should act in support of the civil power.[100] Gray had difficulty exercising any authority, however, for the military were responsible to the War Office, not the Colonial Office, and could, therefore, ignore the orders of the Commissioner of Police. Hence, despite the fact that Security Committees were set up in most States and Settlements, each arm of the security forces tended to deal with the insurgency threat as its chiefs thought best.[101]

The problem of coordination became so acute that Gurney decided there was a need to create a civilian Director of Operations who would be free from routine administrative responsibility and could plan, coordinate and generally direct the operations of the police and the military. Amid much criticism that this decision had been reached far too late, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs agreed to accept the position.[102] Officially appointed on 21 March 1950, Briggs quickly set to work interviewing spokesmen from different communities, business groups, and the senior men in the various branches of the security forces. He then announced his Plan. The part of what became known as the Briggs Plan, which is of concern here, was the setting up of the War Executive Committee chain of command. These committees were established at three levels, the Federal, State, and District. The members of the F.W.E.C. included the Director of Operations, the Service Chiefs, Senior Government officials, including the Chief Secretary, and eventually senior political representatives of the various communities. At the State and District levels, the W.E.C. were similarly composed of the appropriate senior officials and politicians in the area. At the Federal level, the Director of Operations chaired the meetings, while at the other levels, the senior civilian official, usually the Mentri Besar in the case of S.W.E.C. meetings, took the chair.[103] The aim of these committees was to encourage complete integration of Emergency effort and ensure that security forces always acted in support of the Civil Power. However, while this structure was little more than had previously existed, Briggs did stimulate an important refinement in that operational subcommittees were formed which met daily, rather than weekly or bi-weekly as the whole committee did. These operational sub-committees consisted of the senior officials of the security forces, who, reviewing the day's operations, made joint decisions and then issued the appropriate orders to their subordinates through their respective chains of command. Thus, the overall structure allowed general policy decisions made at the highest level to be handed down through the War Executive Committee chain, and for day-to-day operations to be coordinated in the field. If disputes arose at lower levels, the theory was that they would be sent up the chain to a higher W.E.C. for consideration and a binding decision.

The major difficulty, however, was that Briggs had no executive authority and he was faced with personalities who were jealous of their areas of responsibility and command. Initially, Briggs had stated that "as far as running the show is concerned, I have a completely free hand", and that he was quite satisfied with the powers given him.[104] When he retired in December 1951, he had changed his mind. He stated that he did not have the authority to deal with people like Gray, the Commissioner of Police, or the various military commanders he came in contact with, despite what the Government had said.[105] Insufficient cooperation had led to a lack of coordination. This was plain to all. Both the European planting group and the Malayan Chinese Association expressed their concern that Briggs, who had been touted as the man in charge of operations, in fact had no power.[106] Thus, while Briggs had been able to establish a mechanism for cooperation and coordination, a clash of personalities and a lack of power on his part, which Gurney had been unable to resolve or remedy, had prevented it working successfully. Gurney was, therefore, unable to take advantage of the structure that Briggs created and the execution of Government policies suffered as a consequence.

Templer was given the "Supremo" powers denied to Briggs and Gurney. He was delegated the authority to assume complete operational command over all armed forces assigned to operations in the Federation and empowered to issue operational orders to their commanders without reference to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.[107] Thus, Templer as High Commissioner and Director of Operations, was in command of all the security forces in the Federation of Malaya. General Sir Rob Lockhart, who had succeeded Briggs as Director of Operations, became under Templer, Deputy Director of Operations. This post paralleled in operational matters MacGillivray's authority in administrative and political affairs. With the resignation at about this time of a large number of top officials, including Colonel Nicol Gray, the Commissioner of Police; Mr. M.V. del Tufo, the Chief Secretary; Briggs, the Director of Operations; Jenkins, the Head of Special Branch; and the operational commanders of the three services, Templer could start from scratch and avoid the personality problems that plagued Gurney's efforts to develop a united effort. In June 1952, the operational Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur were reorganized so that in the same group of buildings were installed the Deputy Director of Operations, the Secretary for Defence, the Federal Commissioner of Police, the Director of Intelligence, and the staffs (both operations and intelligence) of the Army, the Navy, and the R.A.F.[108] With the reorganization of the Headquarters consultation and cooperation concerning operational decision-making were greatly facilitated. The Director of Operations' staff was reorganized and expanded to include a combined Emergency Planning Staff, consisting of an officer from each of the Malayan Civil Service, the Police, and the Army, and also a Coordination and Liason Section with the same composition.[109]

Relieved of the burdens of day-to-day administrative chores by the Deputy Director of Operations and the Secretary of Defence in operational matters, and the Deputy High Commissioner and Chief Secretary in administrative and political matters, Templer was free to look for himself at policy in action. He had a small staff representing each branch of the security forces who travelled with him. After each of Templer's many tours, minutes would be sent out to State and District officials, demanding action or information about grievances that had been aired, or projects and people he had seen. Replies, either with the answers to the queries or reports on action taken to remedy a problem had to be within a specified period of time. No branch of the security forces was spared his probing questions. Templer ensured that cooperation on the ground accompanied cooperation on paper. He discouraged the habit of passing problems up the War Executive Committee chain of command, telling those involved to sort it out over a bottle of whiskey. In this way he exhibited his trust in the men in the field. Templer was always ready to congratulate as well as to chastise officials. Hence, added to the structure that Briggs created was a will to make it work--and a will that achieved its goal.

In contrast to the entrenched spheres of influence and petty jealousies encountered by Gurney, Templer was able to work with a completely new set of top officials. He also had the power to enforce his decisions. Moreover, as the October 1951 directive of the M.C.P. got through to their units, the number of guerrilla created incidents dropped and the security forces could move from the defensive to the offensive. Goodwill and cooperation are more easily come by when men feel they are getting on top of the job rather than being harassed on all sides. But undoubtedly the attitude of the individuals involved was crucial. As Templer has commented:

> It has struck me more and more forcibly that in dealing with the actual Communist threat, this coordination of tactics, which, of course, was my objective from the start, depends immensely upon the goodwill of individual men on the ground. Where military, police, and public leaders get on well together, the conduct of the Emergency goes well. Where there is friction, no amount of directives from the High Commissioner will put it right.[110]

Templer benefitted greatly from the work of Briggs and was able to modify it to suit his own purposes. It should not be assumed from this analysis that there was no coordination during the Gurney period, for, indeed Gurney was able to persuade the Armed Forces, the Police, and the Administration to work together on many occasions. Rather, it is apparent that the integration required for the most efficient use of the resources in manpower, equipment, and ideas was not achieved until Templer had made his presence and his powers appreciated by all who were engaged in the fight against the guerrillas.

Summary

It is a basic argument of this study that organizational relationships are an integral part of political leadership. If this argument is accepted, an understanding of the organizational and institutional constraints placed on a leader is, therefore, crucial to an analysis of any political leadership interaction process. Both the institutions with which, by the accepted set of rules, a leader is obliged to work, and the organizational hierarchy in which an individual leader holds a key position may, to a greater or lesser degree, inhibit his ability to act on a given subject. Moreover, a leader's actions, and the actions of those for whom he assumes responsibility affect the assessment made by the people in the unit of that person as a leader. It is in this manner that the interaction process of political leadership is influenced. The analysis contained in this Chapter would seem to substantiate these assertions. The different constraints imposed by the organizational structure on each of the two leaders, Gurney and Templer, resulted in their having different latitudes of action and being assessed by the people of Malaya in different ways.

With regard to the institutions with which the two High Commissioners were compelled by the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 to deal, the following points may be made. First, the federal system contributed in no small measure to the constraints imposed on Gurney. Relations with the State and Settlement Governments consumed Gurney's time and energy, as well as that of a senior advisor, the Chief Secretary. The execution of a number of important policies was also frustrated because of the lack of cooperation from some of the Governments. Templer, on the other hand, partly because of his financial and operational powers, and partly because the State and Settlement Governments had realized the utility of centralized policy making and execution, had relatively few difficulties in this respect. Second, the Rulers, kept well briefed by both Gurney and Templer, presented no real obstacles to the initiation of policy. However, their need for constant briefing cut into the finite amount of working hours of the Administration and meant that some tasks which were given lower priority, but which may have been useful in the fight against the communists, could not be tackled. Finally, the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Legislative Council presented less of a problem than might have been expected. The members were appointed and apart from a few persistent and articulate dissenters, they were reluctant, on the whole, to voice a great deal of criticism of the High Commissioner or his Government. Furthermore, the Emergency persuaded most members that unity against the communists should be a primary objective and that, therefore, the Government should be given their fullest support whenever possible. It is important to note that while Templer had to deal with a more demanding Legislative Council that contained a greater number of appointees from the embryonic political parties--appointees who were more likely to raise probing questions about Government policy--he worked with an administrative structure that enabled him to free himself from the time-consuming duties connected with the business of the Legislative Council that had enmeshed Gurney. Time has been mentioned in all three points and its significance is fully evident. The fact that a leader is forced to spend time on duties prescribed by the rules which relate his position to other institutions, limits the amount of time he can spend dealing with tasks and problems, such as policy formulation and execution, that may for him have more relevance to his relations with the mass of people in a unit. Formal demands on a leader's time are, therefore, an important constraint on his actions and the leadership interaction process.

With regard to the hierarchy within which a leader is located, the following points may be made. First, it is important to establish the relationship between the leader and any part of the hierarchy which may lie outside the unit. The leader may, as was the case with Gurney, be held responsible by the people within the unit for the actions of that part of the hierarchy, even though he may have no influence or very little influence over it. If the leader derives his power from this section of the hierarchy or even just part of his power, the nature of that power needs to be fully analysed, for it can limit or enhance a leader's ability to act. Such was the case in Malaya: Templer's powers were much wider than Gurney's. This was a factor which contributed significantly to the relationship Templer was able to establish with the people of Malaya. Moreover, the confusion that arose over the relationship between Gurney and MacDonald points to the fact that individuals with formal authority outside the unit, but popular with the unit, can greatly affect the leadership process. Second, the structure of the hierarchy and its efficiency is crucial to the accumulation of information upon which a leader relies for the formulation, execution, and modification of policies. Gurney was severely hampered in this respect. The scarcity of information about Chinese problems and attitudes stemmed, to some extent, from the lack of a properly structured Chinese Affairs Department. The inadequate training of both the Police and the Administration, especially in languages, also created a barrier between the public and the Government. Templer, by contrast, was able to expand the Chinese Affairs Department and reintroduce training schemes.

Third, the ordering of information and the development of alternative policies, from which a leader can choose the most suitable, is dependent upon the setting up of an efficient administrative system. If the leader's subordinates in the hierarchy cannot create such a system, the leader's ability to tackle problems is severely diminished. Gurney faced this dilemma. The Chief Secretary's office proved to be a bottleneck blocked with work, rather than a place which could advise the High Commissioner about well considered policy alternatives. Qualified personnel were simply not available to fill important psoitions. Similarly, the Police Headquarters was not organized to cope with the vast and rapid expansion in security demands and the influx of new recruits. Consequently, overall long range planning and the thorough sifting of information suffered. Moreover, despite the valiant efforts of Briggs, policy alternatives were not fully considered by all three branches of the security forces, each preferring to go their own way. Late in 1951 some improvement was discernable. It was Gurney's fate, however, to be killed before he could reap the full benefits of his efforts. It therefore fell to Templer to modify the administrative system, train new Police and Civil Service recruits, and insist on cooperation, thus enabling him to make full use of an efficient system that provided ordered information and well informed policy proposals.

Fourth, the execution of policy by officials for whom the leader accepts responsibility is crucial to the leadership process. It is during the execution of policy that the officials of the hierarchy come into greatest contact with the public. Their efficiency and ability to lend aid, rather than create difficulties, is consequently a significant factor in assessments made by people of the hierarchy in general and of the leader in particular. In this regard Gurney was handicapped by inefficiency and low morale. The latter were the result of schisms and personality clashes, corruption, lack of adequately trained personnel, and a general overload of work. Gurney was also faced with the problem of having to accept, in the eyes of the public, responsibility for the actions of the Armed Forces, while not having the authority to give them direct orders. Moreover, operational coordination, particularly during the first two years of Gurney's period in office was poor. Different parts of the hierarchy often seemed to be acting at cross-purposes. Even when Briggs was appointed to supervise and plan coordinated operations, the situation did not improve as much as had been hoped by many Malayan residents. Templer, on the other hand, was able to rejuvenate both the Police and the Administration, and because of his wide powers and experience, he was able to ensure the cooperation of the Armed Forces and the coordination of all operations at every level.

It is important at this stage of the analysis to discuss briefly the impact of the "situation" on the "organizational structure" aspect of leadership. In the case under study, three aspects of "situation" proved to be significant. First, changes in the strategy of the M.C.P. affected the ability of each leader to develop the various branches of the Government into efficient working units. The original M.C.P. decision to fight the Government from the jungle and the escalation of terrorist activities put enormous demands on the security forces and the Administration--demands which could not be fully met. The rapid expansion of manpower required reduced the opportunities for training new recruits, and the wholesale reorganizations needed to deal with the increased work load could never be properly implemented. The Government was continually on the defensive. The M.C.P. decision of October 1951 to reduce terrorist activities was an important turning point. The drop in incidents allowed men to be sent for training, reorganization to be conducted, and morale to rise as the security forces moved on to the offensive. The benefits accrued to Templer but not to Gurney. Second, the rise in revenue from the commodity price boom created by the Korean War made money available for higher salaries and more equipment. Templer again was the major beneficiary. While the boom began in 1950, the total expenditure for 1950 of $340.0 million was actually less than 1949. In 1951 it rose to only $548.7 million. For the three years during which Templer was High Commissioner, 1952-54, the total expenditure was $672.2 million in 1952, $790.4 million in 1953, and $714.0 million in 1954.[111] Figures for the individual branches of the security forces show a similar marked increase in expenditure.[112] Third, experimental research has suggested that people expect authority to be centralized in crises. The crisis situation produced by the M.C.P. guerrilla threat was no exception. During Gurney's term in office there were a number of calls for the High Commissioner to be given greater powers. Hence when Templer arrived in Malaya as "Supremo" there were few voices raised in protest. Indeed, many felt that their expectations of what a leader should do to end the Emergency could now be fulfilled. Being able to fulfill immediately some of the expectations about his capabilities as a leader, thus gave Templer a considerable advantage over his predecessor in establishing good relations with a large proportion of the Malayan people.

The analysis in this Chapter has implicitly been concerned with the ability of the High Commissioner to perform the "instrumental" or "task" function of a leader. The organizational structure is the means by which a leader exercises his formal authority in a wide range of matters. A leader's power and the way he exercises this power, therefore rests to a great extent on the nature and efficiency of the organizations he controls. Gurney had at his disposal a relatively inefficient administration while Templer had under his authority not only a much more efficient bureaucracy but also more responsive and experienced Armed Forces. Less, however, has been said of the "integrative" function. The good relations that both leaders were able to maintain with the Rulers and with the Legislative Council were valuable assets in the performance of the "integrative function". Gurney, however, preoccupied as he was with the Administration and burdened with administrative chores and problems, had less opportunity to pursue activities that could be regarded as increasing the unity of Malaya. Templer, because he headed a reorganized Government, was given more time to fulfill these functions. Time again was an important factor. It should also be noted at this point that the High Commissioners were leaders of the organizational structures as well as leaders of the Federation as a whole. In this regard Gurney, because of a number of factors including, shortages of resources and manpower, and personality clashes, was at a distinct disadvantage in trying to maintain the coherence of the Administration. The result was a lowering of morale that interferred with the execution of policy. Templer, however, was able to devote more time and resources to boosting this sagging morale and aided by a diminishing communist threat was able to create a well integrated organization with which to work.

On the whole, then, Gurney was not well served by the organizational structure in which he was placed. Templer fared much better; he experienced few of the constraints which inhibited Gurney. Therefore, the corporate structure with which Gurney worked tended to be a millstone around his neck, while for Templer it became an effective weapon in the fight against the communists.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 5

[1] See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 78-79.

[2] Gurney had a well deserved reputation for the lucidity and quality of his memoranda.

[3] An idea of the nature of the correspondence may be gained from Government of the Federation of Malaya, Index of Telegrams, Savingrams, Despatches from the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1949 and 1950; and Government of the Federation of Malaya, Index of Despatches, Savingrams and Telegrams from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, 1951. (Both may be found in the National Archives of Malaysia.)

[4] See Martin Rudner, "The Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya 1950-1955," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 3 (March 1972): p. 71.

[5] See in particular issues of The Planter 24 (November 1948): p. 655; 26 (June 1950): p. 231; 26 (December 1950): editorial passim.

[6] See the debate in the Legislative Council in September 1948, in particular a very sarcastic speech by Dato Onn bin Jaafar in which he termed the money contributed by the British Government "lousy". Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, p. 28. There were people inside and outside the Federal Legislative Council who felt that all expenditure directly due to the Emergency be met by the British Government. Times of Malaya, 3rd September 1948.

[7] One of the major figures in the rubber industry, Sir Sydney Palmer, put the blame on Whitehall. See Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, pp. 181-194; and also Straits Echo, 22 July 1949.

[8] Dato Onn articulated this feeling of ambiguity. Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, p. 60.

[9] See for an example of this Sir George Maxwell to Mr. Kanapathy Pillai, 26 June 1951 and letter from the Chief Secretary, Federation of Malaya, on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Mr. Kanapathy Pillai, 5 May 1951. The Private Papers of Sir George Maxwell (SP/5) National Archives of Malaysia.

[10] Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, p. 140. This state of affairs was underlined by General Briggs in a broadcast to the Malayan people, when he said that it was a misconception to think "that our actions here are controlled by London." Malayan Tribune 27 January 1951.

[11] Lord Moran, Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 387. See also Time, 15 December 1952), p. 24.

[12] Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? (London: Victor Gollanz, 1954), p. 87; the whole directive is produced in its entirety, pp. 86-87.

[13] See, in particular, Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, pp. 9, 15, 458, and 475; and The Straits Times, 12 February 1952.

[14] The importance of this aspect of Templer's leadership has been noted by C. Northcote Parkinson, Templer in Malaya (Singapore: Donald More, 1954), p. 27.

[15] Oliver Lyttleton, Lord Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: Bodley Head, 1962), p. 382.

[16] The Times, 30 April 1948. A local paper likened his position to that of a Minister of State. See Sunday Gazette, 23 January 1949, and also the Times of Malaya and Straits Echo, 25 January 1949.

[17] Malcolm MacDonald, People and Places (London: Collins, 1969), pp. 201-203, The Sunday Gazette, 23 January 1949, noted that MacDonald had broadcast five times up to that date on the situation and "in June, his revelation of the Communist designs in Malaya and South East Asia drew the attention of the World. It is the opinion of well informed people here that his broadcast caught the communists by complete surprise. As a result the planning of their revolution went off at half-cock."

[18] Ibid.

[19] An interesting point here is that R.O. Tilman asserts that MacDonald was able to give orders to the police and army, something he certainly could not do. This is perhaps symptomatic of the confusion over who led the Government. "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency," Asian Survey 6 (August 1966): p. 409.

[20] This is apparent from "Memorandum to the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill from Dato Tan Cheng-lock, President of M.C.A. and Tan Chin Tuan, Deputy President, Singapore Legislative Council," The Private

Papers of Tan Cheng-lock, National Archives of Malaysia, Item 169 (herein after cited as, TCL Papers (Malaysia); and from the tributes to MacDonald when he retired from office, Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Legislative Council, 1st Session, pp. 31-33.

[21] See Lyttleton, Memoirs, p. 380.

[22] Malayan Monitor 5 (February 1952). This was a London based paper of the left.

[23] This is clear from Lyttleton's seniority in the Conservative Party and influence in the Cabinet.

[24] The Straits Times, 16 January 1952. This letter was written in March 1951.

[25] Annual Report, 1948, p. 168.

[26] The Straits Times, 7 October 1948.

[27] See Utusan Zamai (Singapore Malay Sunday newspaper), 10 October 1948; translated in TCL Papers, (Malaysia) Item 173. The Sultan of Johore was not represented at the installation ceremony.

[28] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Text of a Statement made by Sir Gerald Templer at a Press Conference on Friday, 4 July 1952 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 7/52/20 H.C.).

[29] See Annual Report, 1948, pp. 168-9 for a summary of the legislative and executive powers of the States.

[30] The Straits Times, 27 October 1948.

[31] Ibid.

[32] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session B308, cited in B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, 1945-1963: A Study of Federal Problems in a Plural Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 57.

[33] See K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1965), p.3.

[34] For a discussion of the financial relationship between the Federal Government and the State and Settlement Governments, see Rudner, "The Draft Development Plan," pp. 81-84; and Simandjuntak, *Malayan Federalism*, pp. 58-59. See also Appendix, Tables F and G.

[35] *Annual Report*, 1948, p. 166.

[36] Ibid., p. 167.

[37] Ibid., p. 168.

[38] The one notable exception occurred before Gurney was appointed High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent was forced to use his overriding powers after the heavily business oriented Legislative Council had opposed the Income Tax legislation. This is discussed in Martin Rudner, "The Inter-Relationship Between Economic Development and the Functions of the Political System in Malaya, 1945-1963." D. Phil. dissertation Oxford University, 1968, cited in Rudner, "The Draft Development Plan," pp.64-65.

[39] *Annual Report*, 1948, p. 167.

[40] *Annual Report*, 1953, p. 374.

[41] *Legislative Council Proceedings*, 5th Session, p. 9.

[42] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, *Press Release* (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, n.d.), in The Private Papers of Tan Cheng-lock, Institute of South-east Asian Studies, Singapore, TCL/II/259a (Hereinafter cited as TCL Papers (Singapore).

[43] See *Malay Tribune*, 2 July 1948. Gent was killed when the plane he was travelling on crashed just before it reached London Airport.

[44] Boucher had seen action against the Greek guerrillas.

[45] See Miller, *Jungle War in Malaya*, p. 40; and Noel Barber, *War of the Running Dogs; the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960* (New York: Weybright and Talley, New York, 1971), p. 62. These two journalists give a good indication of the attitude of Boucher to police orders.

[46] Purcell, *Malaya, Communist or Free?* p. 87.

[47] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Police Mission to Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1950), p.13.

The Report was very succinct about the grievances of the Malaya trained personnel. It stated: "they think that they have been misjudged and that a poor opinion is held of them as a body, that small importance is attached to their knowledge of the country and its people, and that under the present administration they are likely to be passed over for promotion and are in danger of having their professional careers arbitrarily terminated"(p. 6). For a full discussion of the grievances of those who had served in Malaya for a long time, see pp. 6-13.

[48] See a letter to the Straits Echo, 7 October 1949, signed L.C.L. Penang; and the letter from Basil O'Connell to Shook Lin, 9 September 1949 in TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/111/211a.

[49] Barber, War of the Running Dogs, pp. 68-69.

[50] Gurney had been Chief Secretary in Palestine before being appointed to Malaya as High Commissioner.

[51] Annual Report, 1953, p. 223. See also Appendix, Graph I.

[52] Report of the Police Mission, p. 5.

[53] See the portions of a broadcast by Briggs in January 1951 reproduced in Malaya Tribune 27 January 1951.

[54] In December 1950, the first Chinese recruits took part in a passing out parade. Up until then Chinese had served only as officers or detectives. See Malaya Tribune, 31 December 1950.

[55] Report of the Police Mission, p. 13.

[56] Ibid., p. 15.

[57] For an example of the complaints made about this practice, see The Daily News (Ipoh), 3 March 1951.

[58] Report of the Police Mission, p. 4. One observer noted that after the war, British police officers returning to their former posts found "the dregs of a police force, badly equipped, shabbily dressed with no morale and carrying its share of the hatred and contempt which the Japanese system of secret police, working through spies and informants, had called down upon the force." A special branch of the Criminal Investigation Department had to be set up to investigate corruption. See S.W. Jones, Public Administration in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 169.

[59] See Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, pp. 438-464.

[60] Report of the Police Mission, p. 22.

[61] Barber, War of the Running Dogs, pp. 145-6, notes that senior police officers he talked to expressed these feelings of respect for Gray.

[62] Lyttleton, Memoirs, pp. 366-7. Colonel Gray left the country very secretly and not even senior police officials knew he had gone. The lack of explanation as to the circumstances surrounding Gray's departure made him as controversial after he had gone as he had been when he was in Malaya.

[63] Annual Report, 1952, p. 5.

[64] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[65] Public support for Operation Service was encouraged by such diverse sources as The Planter 29 (January 1953); and Melayu Raya 9 March 1953, translated in Government of Singapore, Daily Digest of Non-English Press (Singapore, Public Relations Office) No 54/53.

[66] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, p. 197.

[67] For a detailed discussion of the bureaucratic structure at this time see Government of the Federation of Malaya, Report on the Federal Secretariat (Kuala Lumpur: Organization and Methods Department, 27 February 1950).

[68] The Straits Times, 27 October 1948.

[69] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B.524.

[70] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report of the Public Works Department 1950 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer), p. 2.

[71] See Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya, 1950, p. 2.

[72] See Report on the Federal Secretariat, p. 67.

[73] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B 534. The total population of males 15-54 was under 1,700,000 in 1947 as compared to over 1,750,000 in 1931. See 1947 Census, p. 101.

[74] Annual Report, 1950, p. 10.

[75] See Groh Chee-yan to Rt. Hon. Malcalm MacDonald, 22 November 1951 in TCL Papers (Malaysia) Item 175.

[76] See Leong Yew-koh to Tan Cheng-lock 15 October 1951, in TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/XV/64a.

[77] Noted in China Press 17 November 1948, translated in TCL Papers (Malaysia) Item 173.

[78] Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, p. 87.

[79] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Report of the Public Services Salaries Commission, by H. Tousted (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1949) cited in Rudner "Draft Development Plan," p. 70. Rudner notes "that only 31 of the 254 officers then on the M.C.S. seniority list were Malays (at that time the only local community eligible for recruitment)."

[80] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Report on Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, by M.S.S. Awberry and F.W. Dalley (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1948), pp. 5-6. See also John Paul Meek, Malaya: A Study of Governmental Response to the Korean Boom, South East Asia Program Data Paper 17 (Ithica, New York: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, April 1955), p. 9.

[81] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report of the Director of Cooperation 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1950), pp. 2-3.

[82] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Final Report by the Joint Wages Commission (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1 March 1948), p. 24.

[83] Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, p. 6.

[84] Ibid., p. 66.

[85] Graham Greene, "Malaya, The Forgotten War," Life, 30 July 1951, p. 62.

[86] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 8.

[87] An example of the stories which circulated may be found in Time, 15 December 1952, p. 26. Templer is reported to have told the Civil Service that "if you don't make a decision and it's a mistake you'll be put on the next boat; if you make a decision and it happens to be a mistake, you'll be put on the next boat, but somebody'll be there to see you off."

[88] The Straits Times, 1 January 1954.

[89] Press Release, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/V/259a.

[90] Ibid.

[91] "Notes of a Meeting Held at King's House on 2 February 1952" TCL Papers (Singapore) TCL/III/274a.

[92] Annual Report, 1952, p. 16.

[93] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, p. 33.

[94] Means, Malaysian Politics pp. 164 and 168. See Government of the Federation of Malaya, The Annual Report of the Malayan Establishment Office 1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, n.d.) This document shows the small numbers of Malays admitted to the Malayan Civil Service between 1949 and 1953. Only 20 appointments were made in 1953. The Times Singapore correspondent stated that there were only 64 Malays and no non-Malays in the M.C.S. by October 1953. See his two articles, The Times, 1 and 2 October 1953.

[95] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 15.

[96] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, Commission to Enquire into the Integrity of the Public Services (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1955).

[97] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B622.

[98] Annual Report, 1948, pp. 187-8.

[99] One observer has noted that "Major-General C.H. Boucher was commissioned to take charge of the coordination of military and police activities in all the headquarters throughout the Federation." Given the confusion and public utterances of Boucher, this conclusion is understandable, but false. See Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, p. 57.

[100] This ordering of responsibilities was re-confirmed by the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Griffiths, in reply to a written question in the House of Commons. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, 472 (1950): c. 116.

[101] An interesting point was that responsibility for military operation in Johore, one of the worst hit areas, was transferred from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore in 1948. An unusual decision given the political and administrative division between Malaya and Singapore, and also the fact that the Emergency regulations covered all of Malaya, but not Singapore. See Annual Report, 1948, p. 169.

[102] See Mr. Gammans, Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 5th Series, 473 (1950): c. 1372, and Manchester Guardian, 1 April 1950.

[103] More detailed information on the composition of specific W.E.C.'s may be found in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 170, and The Private Papers of Leong Yew-koh, National Archives of Malaysia, Files 6-12. (Hereinafter cited as LYK Papers.)

[104] Straits Echo, 18 April 1950.

[105] The Straits Times, 9 January 1952. For the Colonial Secretary's original position on Briggs, see his speech to the House of Commons in which he stated "General Briggs" will be directly responsible to the High Commissioner and he will be in a position to give instructions to both the police and the military forces in regard to the planning and execution of the campaign. " Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series 473 (1950): c. 1400.

[106] The Planter 28 (December 1951) pp. 514-515. TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 169(i).

[107] Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 87.

[108] Parkinson, Templer in Malaya, p. 23.

[109] Annual Report, 1952, p. 4.

[110] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Press Release of the High Commissioner's Press Conference (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information), 5/54/205(HC).

[111] Appendix, Table B.

[112] Appendix, Table E.

CHAPTER 6

COMMUNICATION CONTENT

Communication provides the vital link between leader and non-leader. Its analysis is, therefore, central to an understanding of political leadership. The communication process itself may be envisaged as being comprised of: a source, a message, channels and an audience.[1] In the leadership process either the source is the leader and the audience is the membership of his specific unit or vice versa, depending on the direction of the communication. The message, or communication content, and the communication channels, or the means by which the message is transferred from the source to the audience, vary in each leader/non-leader relationship. The nature and importance of some of the variations to be found in these two dimensions of the communication process will be explored in the following two Chapters.

In this Chapter the content of communications between the two High Commissioners, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer, and the people of Malaya, will be detailed and analysed. Communication content essentially concerns the exchange of symbols, signs and signals among people. In the case of the political leadership process two types of communication content are of importance: first, those symbols, signs and signals relating to policy matters; and second, those symbols, signs and signals concerned with the personal style or conduct of the leader.

Policy

The policy aspect of communications between an individual acting in his capacity as political leader and the people in the unit he leads may be said to touch in one way or another on the assessment and resolution of political problems. Political problems arise within a unit when the situation creates obstacles to the achievement by an individual or group of either a desired political goal or a hoped for distribution of valued, scarce resources. A leader is expected to facilitate the removal or diminution of these obstacles. A complex undertaking, problem-solving may be thought to involve an assessment of the problems facing a unit and the execution of policies considered appropriate to deal with these problems. With regard to the assessment of problems it should be emphasized that it is not so much the perception of the problems by the leader but his portrayal of the problems that is important. A leader might perceive a situation in one way, but express his assessment of that situation in another. It is on the basis of the expressed assessment that the population of the unit will judge a leader's ability to come to grips with the problems they feel face them. The portrayal by a leader of the situation at any given point in time normally includes an ordering of priorities, or in other words, an indication of which problems pose the greatest threat to the unit and thus which should be dealt with first. Moreover, some indication as to how a leader will tackle the problems is usually expected. In terms of the execution of policy, the actions of the leader, the organizations in which he holds a position, and the people he may call on for aid, are all factors having an impact on the way a leader is viewed by the members of his unit. For the purposes of this study these actions will be examined under four main headings: security policies, policies concerning the allocation of decision-making powers, economic policies and social and cultural policies. Hence communications relating to both the assessment of the situation and the execution of policies will be fully explored.

Assessments of the Major Problems

The way in which a leader assesses the overall situation and the consequent problems facing individual groups within a unit is important to the way members of the unit evaluate that leader. Certainly the relationship that each High Commissioner established with the Malayan people was significantly affected by the congruity or lack of congruity between his portrayal of the nature of the most pressing problems facing the Federation and the appreciation of these problems by those who were, or felt they might be, affected by them.

Gurney's interpretation of the situation in Malaya was not always widely shared. While there was virtually unanimous agreement with Gurney that "overshadowing all else . . . (was) . . . the attempt of the Malayan Communist Party and its supporters to disrupt the economy of this country, already seriously dislocated by the war, and to cause a breakdown in the administration of Government",[2] there was some dispute as to the nature of the enemy, who should be involved in repelling them, and the extent of the threat. Different groups within Malaya saw the situation in different ways.

First, Gurney and the Malayan Government were criticised for labelling the communists as "bandits". The branding of M.C.P. guerrillas in this manner was a direct consequence of the prevailing view within the Colonial Administration--a view reinforced by Gurney's assessment of the situation--that the basic problem was one of restoring law and order.[3] This assessment is understandable, given the traditional role of British officialdom in Malaya's past. The British had initially been accepted by the people in Malaya partly because of their ability to maintain order and stability in the face of conflicting Malay and Chinese interests. The narrow, legalistic definition of the problem, therefore, was rooted in an acceptance that the historic functions of the Colonial Administration should be maintained. But the times had changed. To accept on the one hand that it was the Malayan Communist Party that was behind the insurgency, and yet on the other hand to call the actual perpetrators of the acts of terrorism "bandits", seemed to many to confuse the situation. It appeared not only to deny that the communists could be politically motivated, but also to ignore the fact that they had widespread and sympathetic support from various sections of the population. In describing every case of murder and armed robbery as the work of "criminals" and "bandits", the Malayan Government and the High Commissioner seemed unable to make a distinction between criminally motivated terror and politically motivated terror. The result was to give the impression of not being fully aware of the problem. The necessity of calling a spade a spade was urged on the High Commissioner from several quarters. One perturbed European in a letter to The Planter wrote: "to describe one of the foulest manifestations of Communism under the British Flag as "banditry" is sheer nonsense. The word Communism is, or should be, sufficiently obnoxious to all of us to warrant being applied to the present Emergency."[4]

A second area of disagreement arose over the role of the Malayan Chinese community in the conflict. Many within the Chinese community became alarmed at what they felt to be a general attitude amongst Malayan officialdom that the Chinese, as a race, were responsible for the continuance of the insurgency campaign.[5] It was felt that Gurney himself did little to dispel this attitude. This alarm was fuelled by the seeming inability of the High Commissioner and the Malayan Government as a whole to grasp the fact that while there were some Chinese who supported the M.C.P. many opposed them. Many Malayan Chinese felt bitter at the failure of the Government to appreciate the fact that it was the very group that the Government blamed for the breakdown in law and order, the Chinese community, that had to endure the greatest hardships at the hands of the communists. Their frustrations were expressed by Dato Tan Cheng-lock when he stated:

> How is it that if as a result of Government investigations it is said that the slogan of the terrorists is to kill the Europeans, the naked fact is that the vast majority of those killed so far are Chinese, whereas only a few Europeans and persons of other communities have similarly suffered?"[6]

A third area of disagreement concerned the support that the public should give to the Police and Security Forces. In the first year or two at least, the general Malayan population was reluctant to actively aid the Government Forces. The fight was thought by many to be solely between the M.C.P. and the Government. One Chinese newspaper editorial, which reflected this widely held belief, stated "as to the present unrest in Malaya, everyone knows that it is due to a war between the Communist Party and the English governing body. Viewed in the extreme, it is a link in the international political disruption."[7] In the experience of the people of Malaya, the maintenance of law and order was the job of the police and Government officials. In the past, the police had dealt with breaches of the law and the Malayan people had not been requested to come to their aid. Hence, at least in the first few years, for Gurney to portray the threat as one to law and order and at the same time suggest that it was the duty of all Malayans to give their full and active support to the counter-insurgency campaign seemed incongruous to many people. Gurney had a hard time recruiting active contributions to the struggle as is suggested by an official assessment that:

> A tendency had become increasingly evident at the end of 1949, particularly in the towns, for the general public of all races, with the exception of a relatively small number of public spirited individuals, to regard the prosecution of the Emergency as a matter solely for Government and the Security Forces.[8]

Fourth, Gurney's assessment of the nature and extent of the threat posed by the M.C.P. guerrillas was questioned by various groups. With regard to the intensity of the threat, he became embroiled in a dilemma. If, on the one hand he portrayed the threat as being considerable, he ran the risk of people believing the Government's cause was near to being lost and that there was no point associating with a sinking ship. If, on the other hand he underplayed the threat, then he ran the risk of the urgent need for active support of the Government being ignored. By and large Gurney tried to suggest both that the threat was great and that the Government would win. However, he did not really succeed in doing either. Part of the problem was that the threat from the guerrillas waxed and waned, making Gurney's pronouncements seem ill-considered. During the first few months after his arrival in Malaya, Gurney gave the impression he expected the fighting to be over within a relatively short period of time. He told the Legislative Council that he was "convinced that given certain conditions which we are doing our best and hope shortly to achieve, peace and order could be effectively restored in a comparatively short time. He also stated that "in any case we cannot contemplate the present state of affairs dragging on for two years or any similar period. Were it to be allowed to, it would get worse."[9] The impression that the Government expected the task to be easy was heightened by the intemperate comments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Malaya, Major-General Boucher, who stated within the first few weeks of the Emergency: "I can tell you this is by far the easiest problem I have ever tackled. In spite of the appalling country and ease with which he can hide, the enemy is far weaker in technique and courage than either the Greek or Indian Reds."[10] But although there was a lull in the communist offensive during 1949 following an M.C.P. decision to regroup and train more men, in 1950 the newly trained men were pressed into service and the terrorist attacks resumed with even greater ferocity. Two years after the declaration of the Emergency, therefore, the strength of the communist revolt had markedly increased, contrary to Government predictions.[11]

As the Emergency progressed Gurney was forced to acknowledge the dangers "of false optimism" and the "slackening of effort".[12] He turned more and more to the necessity of Malayans actively confronting the communist threat. However, the impact of these exhortations was reduced somewhat when, in 1950, the local Malayan newspapers started to move accounts of communist inspired incidents from the front to the inside pages.[13] Moreover, there were complaints that the press releases were too optimistic, or at least the interpretation that the press made of the information they acquired from the Government tended towards undue optimism.[14] Thus Gurney's attempts to portray the situation as one demanding active support of the Government were countered by the seeming complacency of newspaper reports.

A further problem for Gurney was that the fighting was characterized as an "emergency situation" rather than as a "war". This appellation caused some to question whether the threat was fully appreciated, for the situation was widely regarded, especially by those who lived in the jungle fringes or on isolated estates and mines, as a war. However, there were reasons for the insurgency being designated an "emergency". An influential consideration was the fact that industry in Malaya relied upon London insurance firms, which covered their losses of stocks and equipment in riots and civil activities in an emergency, but not in a civil or inter-nation war. Perhaps a compounding factor was that although the communist offensive was officially thought to have been orchestrated at the Democratic Youth Conference in Calcutta, February 1948, and to be the work of aliens fighting on behalf of international communism, the Colonial Administration refused to accept that an "external hostile attack" was involved, for that would have meant that Britain would have had to bear the full cost of the Emergency.[15] Despite insistent requests that the British Government should take full responsibility for the Emergency and pay all costs, Gurney firmly rejected the idea.[16] The situation continued to be called "the Emergency" rather than "the war".

A final problem area as far as the assessment of the situation was concerned centred on the priority given to activities of the security forces over all other aspects of Government. Because the insurgency was defined initially as a problem of law and order, Government activities, and to a large extent the various Government Departments, were divided into those directly concerned with the Emergency and those concerned with the normal running of the Government. Such activities as police work and the dissemination of propaganda came under the rubric of Emergency related matters, while such activities as social security projects were relegated to the non-Emergency category. This division was questioned by those who argued that the communists were supported by people with real grievances and that those grievances were caused by social, economic, and political frustrations which had to be assuaged before the communists could be beaten. And the responsibility for dealing with these grievances, it was argued, lay with those Departments considered to be engaged in non-Emergency work. Thus, again, the Government and particularly the man responsible for the running of the Government, the High Commissioner, seemed to some to be unaware of the true nature of the threat the country faced.

Gurney inherited many of these assessments of the problems facing the Malayan people from his predecessor and his newly acquired advisors. He did introduce the term "Communist Terrorist" or "C.T." as a substitute for "bandit",[17] and he gradually came to recognize the necessity of winning over the population by attending to their grievances. However, he seems to have been unable to establish a consensus as to the exact nature of the problem confronting Malaya, and consequently to have been criticised by various groups for his own interpretation of the situation. This criticism undoubtedly affected, in a detrimental way, the relationship he was able to establish with the people of Malaya. Certainly it limited Gurney's ability to unite the country behind him and to facilitate the removal of the problems facing Malayans.

Templer's approach to interpreting the situation in Malaya was different from Gurney's in a number of important respects. First, Templer had the benefit of arriving in Malaya with a directive which clearly indicated that the British Government placed their responsibilities to Malaya high on their list of priorities. This was reinforced by Templer's assurance that the directive came from the Cabinet and by the knowledge, widely circulated, that Churchill had had a personal hand in Templer's appointment. Hence, Templer's assertion that the Malayan Government was going to defeat the communists was given added authority. The directive also emphasized that Templer should promote political progress, and encourage such advances as a common form of citizenship and a redress of the uneven economic balance.[18] These instructions reassured people that Templer would be assessing the situation not only in terms of law and order, but also in terms of the economic, social, and political grievances which beset Malayans.

Second, Templer abolished the distinction between Emergency and non-Emergency activities. He instructed Malayan Government Departments that "the Emergency element of Government could not be kept in a watertight compartment, separated from what may be described as the normal peace-time process of Government." He made a further public declaration that this merging of activities should apply to the country as a whole.[19] This assessment of the situation as a need for total effort was widely welcomed. Moreover, Templer's portrayal of his task as one of winning the support of the people rather than just imposing a rule of law and order was received favourably. He noted that "it is up to us to persuade these people that there is another and far preferable way of life and system of beliefs than that expressed in the rule of force and the law of the jungle."[20] The importance of creating a situation that persuaded people to take the Government's side hit a responsive chord in many sections of Malayan society.

Third, the detail of Templer's assessments were impressive. Whereas Gurney had alluded in a rather vague way to the communist threat and the state of the security forces, Templer provided a very detailed assessment of the situation. His speeches to the Legislative Council went into every facet of M.C.P. and Government activities. Templer's prepared statements were at least twice the length of those delivered by Gurney and usually had a voluminous list of statistics attached. Indeed, he operated on the belief that "when the people know the truth about what is really happening or likely to happen . . . half their fears will be dispelled."[21] The wealth of information supplied by Templer showed that he was fully aware of the extent of the M.C.P. threat and the proportions of the task the security forces faced. Templer was able to demystify, and thus lessen, the apprehensions about the threat the guerrillas posed.

Fourth, Templer was aided by the reduction in guerrilla-initiated incidents, the result of the October 1951 M.C.P. directive. This turn of events enabled Templer to argue convincingly that while the insurgency threat was still potent, the Government was prevailing in the struggle. It meant that the information he disseminated and the assessments he made were accepted in the light of notable Government successes. Templer was therefore in an excellent position to persuade people to join the winning side, thereby being able to avoid the dilemma Gurney had faced.

By and large, then, Templer was able to develop a consensus within the Malayan society around his assessment of the major problems facing the Malayan people. While Templer, like Gurney before him, was criticised for arguing that "we are in fact fighting international communism" at the same time as disallowing calls for all costs of the Emergency to be paid by Britain,"[22] his portrayal of Malaya's problems were not subjected to the same extensive criticisms which Gurney's interpretations received. Indeed, Templer was frequently praised in the press for the factual correctness and truthfulness of his reports to the people of Malaya and to the people of Britain.[23] Focusing on the need to win the hearts and minds of the general population, Templer was able to portray his task, and the task of the Government, as re-establishing law and order by removing, in part at least, many of the problems that aggravated and frustrated Malayans. Templer, with the advantage of a visibly weakening guerrilla threat, which was not allowed to revitalize itself, was able to gain wide acceptance of his assessment of the major problems facing the Federation of Malaya. Because Malayans felt he evaluated the situation reasonably correctly, he was able to gain their support for his plans to defeat the guerrillas--something Gurney had been unable to do. Moreover, the general concurrence with Templer's assessment of the situation may be said to have been a contributory factor in uniting the large number of Malayans opposed to the M.C.P. quest for power.

Security Policies

The possibility of the use of force in an attempt to change the political goals of a unit or even the distribution of valued scarce resources within that unit must be considered by all political leaders. The threat or use of force may emanate either from outside the unit or from members within the unit. Proposals to counter such possibilities by the use, or threat, of force may be considered to come under the rubric of "security policies". In the case of the Malayan Emergency, the problem was, from the start, defined as one involving internal security. Policies which concerned the use of the Security Forces (as those who directly battled with the guerrillas on behalf of the Government were called) were constantly revised and modified, particularly in the first six years. Because the direct physical threat posed by the guerrillas was of major concern to a great many Malayans, these changing policies, the means by which they were executed, and their success were important factors in the way in which the Malayan people viewed the High Commissioners who were responsible for their introduction and implementation. Thus, the relationship between each High Commissioner and the various groups within the Federation may be said to have been significantly affected by these policies.

The initial security policy pursued by the Malayan Government under Gurney was primarily based on the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, under which the state of emergency was maintained.[24] These regulations complemented the normal laws of the land by outlawing those societies thought to be in support of subversive activities and by giving the Government greater control over the movement of the residents of Malaya. Among the powers conferred on the Government was the right to raise a force of Special Constables, the right to register the entire population, the right to control movement on the roads, increased rights with regard to search and arrest without a warrant, rights to order detention and the right to try all but capital offences in camera. Acting under these regulations, the security forces were sent out to apprehend those found or suspected of contravening the laws of the land. People who aided or who were thought to be aiding the M.C.P. were just as subject to arrest by the security forces as those who actually perpetrated terrorist acts. After their culpability had been duly assessed, those arrested were freed, sent to rehabilitation camps, deported, or simply kept in detention until their case was reviewed. In this way, it was hoped to remove the unlawful elements from Malayan society and re-establish law and order.

However, while it may have initially seemed that this policy was the logical answer to the problem, its implementation proved it to be inadequate. There were a number of reasons for this outcome. First, the lack of experience in jungle warfare among the senior Army officers was a distinct disadvantage. The experiences of the World War Two battles in Europe and North Africa were the bases for decisions about tactical operations against the guerrillas: operations that were to be implemented by men trained on the wide open flats of Salisbury Plain. Large scale "sweeps" designed to cordon off guerrilla camps were widely and vigorously employed. These exercises entailed large numbers of men moving steadily through the jungle, hoping to cut off unsuspecting M.C.P. members. However, the only effect of these mass movements of troops was to make so much noise that the guerrillas were alerted well in advance of the troops' arrival. The result was either the melting of the guerrillas into the jungle or an ambush. The success rate of early

Army operations was very low. Second, the army had to supplement the activities of an under-staffed police force. Army training and tactics in pursuing suspects in the villages at the jungle fringes were not those of a well trained police corps. Huts were burned and frightened people shot while running away. Nor were many of the ex-Palestine police brought in to bolster the Malayan Police Force much better. As Harry Miller, a reporter with The Straits Times, has noted, there were

> some rough types and adventurers who arrived in the country with fixed ideas of how to treat the natives, notions fostered in Palestine, where a heavy hand had been used on Jew and Arab without discrimination and the butt-end of a rifle had been more effective than an appeasing tongue. To many of the sergeants every Chinese was a bandit or a potential bandit and there was only one treatment for them, they were to be "bashed around". If they would not take a sock on the jaw, a kick in the guts might have the desired result.[25]

Third, the policy of detention was unsuccessful. The prospect of camps bursting with suspects and wholesale deportations was not appealing. The Government found itself unable to move and house in camps the many who fell prey to the pressure of the guerrillas to give them aid.[26] Moreover, the judicial process through which each arrested suspect was processed became overloaded. Fourth, the policy of issuing I.D. cards caused a great deal of inconvenience and hardship among people not familiar with forms and certificates. Many people, especially in the more remote districts had to go to great lengths to obtain the required proof of identification: a process that had to be repeated if, as often happened in the first few years of the Emergency the communists destroyed I.D. cards in an ambush or an attack on a village.[27]

Gurney failed to rectify some of the worst excesses of those operating on behalf of his Government. Indeed, he noted on more than one occasion that "it is paradoxical but none the less true that in present conditions in order to maintain law and order Government has itself to break it for a time."[28] He also stated publicly that

> There are bound to be cases in which hardship will be caused to innocent people who do not feel that they have a duty to distinguish themselves from the guilty. I say this in no way as a threat but as a plain statement of fact that it is inevitable that these things should happen in the process of dealing with the guilty.[29]

For the Chinese community who were left unprotected by Government forces and who were not allowed to arm themselves, these comments seemed most inappropriate. At one moment, they were harassed by the guerrillas seeking aid and recruits, and at the next by Security Forces who were unable to give full protection but who sought any collaborators or suspected collaborators no matter what the circumstances.[30] Despite the argument of Mr. Justice Laville that flight from the police by uneducated people was far from being proof of guilt of anything and the judgement of the Johore High Court that emergency or not, anyone who was not armed was entitled to the full shelter of the law in the matter of arrest and custody, many injustices were inflicted by the frustrated, inexperienced, and poorly led Security Forces.[31]

Gurney was widely criticised for the ineffectiveness of the Government's security policies. Success was far from being achieved. Sympathy for the High Commissioner and his Government was being eroded. As an interrogation officer noted, "it must be realized that squatters have relatives all over the country and these relatives are, quite naturally, antagonized when they hear of deportations and burnings, particularly if the victims themselves are innocent or at least most unwilling helpers."[32] Sir Robert Thompson has also argued that while there may be a strong temptation to go outside the law in dealing with ruthless insurgents, agents of the Government must act within its own laws if it hopes to maintain the respect of the people.[33] The guerrillas themselves had no difficulty in recruiting members and their resolve had been strengthened. They were under pressure from the Security Forces, but had not suffered unduly. The initial no-surrender or "Noose or Nothing" policy of the Government stiffened the attitude of luke-warm communists, and even after this policy was modified, those who might have thought of surrendering were fearful of the treatment they would receive.[34]

Perhaps the one event that epitomized the inability of Gurney's Administration to effectively galvanize support was the Anti-Bandit Month. This was an effort to "mobilize on a voluntary basis over a period of about a month all the civilian resources that can be made available to assist the security forces in an intensified combined operation."[35] Nearly a quarter of a million people put their names forward as volunteers for the occasion. But, as The Straits Times noted a year later, it was "a prize fiasco".[36] The Government was not administratively prepared to cope with the influx of people, few constructive operations had been devised, and little of a permanent nature was achieved. Moreover, many were disillusioned that Gurney could feel that substantial progress in the fight against the guerrillas could be achieved in one month. Not long after the Anti-Bandit Month, dissatisfaction with the Government's ability to subdue the M.C.P. guerrillas prompted a resolution to be presented to the Legislative Council which stated that: "This Council . . . views with grave concern the slow rate of progress being made so far to end the terrorist menace in this country . . . ."[37]

This virtually amounted to a motion of no confidence in the Government and Gurney. While the motion was not carried, it did receive a great deal of support from all racial communities and reflected a widespread disenchantment with the security policies being pursued.

The arrival in Malaya of Sir Harold Briggs, the first Director of Operations, heralded the inception of a number of policies, some new and some simply modifications of those that had been only partially successful. Arriving during the first week of April 1950, Briggs spent the next two months touring the country, often in the company of Gurney, soliciting advice on possible security policies from many different groups.[38] Economic and community leaders noted the necessity of concentrating on divorcing the guerrillas from their supporters in the rural villages and jungle fringes, and also the necessity of coordinated planned action by all sections of the Security Forces. Briggs quickly but thoroughly appraised the situation and drew up a basic framework for the future development of security policies in the Federation. The "Briggs Plan", as it became known, was greatly influenced by the experience and thoughts of Gurney and received his official endorsement. The Plan entailed the establishment of a chain of command with respect to Emergency related activities by restructuring and streamlining committees at the Federal, State and District levels.[39] These committees were to ensure the integration of the Emergency effort. Briggs clearly specified the roles of the Police Force and the Armed Forces. The Police Force was to maintain the security of the populated areas, while the Armed Forces were to search out the guerrillas operating in the jungle. The most far-reaching aspect of the Plan, in terms of its security, social, and political consequences, was the squatter resettlement scheme. This would be, it was envisaged, the main means of physically separating the guerrillas from their supporters. Briggs ordered that from June 1 1950, a concentrated effort would be made to move the entire rural population into fortified and defended compounds. Briggs accepted that fighting the guerrillas was a long-term proposition, and argued for a clearing of the country from south to north.[40]

Essentially the philosophy behind the Briggs Plan was sound. However, in the execution of the Plan, Gurney and Briggs were confronted with many of the problems of the first two years of the Emergency. In the War Executive Committees that Briggs set up, friction between the Police and Armed Forces was occasionally evident. Army personnel preferred to work with Army Headquarters rather than discuss matters with their civilian and Security Force counterparts. The top echelon of the Army, despite the impressive results of small patrols such as the Ferret Force and the Malaya Scouts, still insisted on the use of large numbers of men in "sweeps" through the jungle.[41] A major problem that did not get fully resolved was that of manpower. Gurney was unable to attract young Chinese men into the Security Forces. In an attempt to rectify the situation, Gurney introduced manpower regulations drafting men into the Police Force. The result was that "6000 decamped to Singapore and several other thousands to China".[42] Of those Chinese who in the first few months did report for service, over 95 percent lodged appeals.[43] Indeed, the whole issue caused a great deal of resentment within the Chinese community. Besides the fact that the Chinese tended to distrust the Police Force, a job with the Police was not economically attractive. Further, many felt as did Tan

Cheng-lock that "it would be unfair in the extreme and perhaps also illegal, if those who (were) conscripted (were) at the same time considered aliens under (the) citizenship laws."[44] Similar ill-feeling was generated by the policy of creating a Home Guard but leaving it as a largely unarmed force. The Chinese, so Gurney felt, could not be trusted with weapons. The Chinese felt they needed weapons to fight the M.C.P. guerrillas.[45] Hence, Gurney came under criticism both for being unable to acquire enough men to prosecute the Briggs Plan with the proper vigor and for the way he attempted to deal with this problem.

One of the major aspects of the Briggs Plan, indeed, one of the pillars of Gurney's security policy, the resettlement programme, received a good deal of criticism in the early stages of its implementation. Prior to Brigg's directive making resettlement a primary objective of the Federal Government, Gurney had attempted with little success to implement a limited resettlement programme. From his first assessments of the Emergency in Malaya, Gurney had argued that something needed to be done with the rural Chinese, often referred to as "squatters",[46] in order to stop their cooperation with the guerrillas. When the policy of detention and deportation foundered, resettlement became the obvious alternative. But despite the setting up of a Squatter Committee composed of State, Settlement and Federal officers to fully examine the problem, and despite the assertion by Gurney that resettlement "is our most pressing problem . . . . There can be no question that upon its solution depends the end of the Emergency",[47] little was achieved. Lack of conviction that the resettlement policy was feasible, reluctance to allocate State land to Chinese squatters,[48] and the problem of raising adequate funds dissuaded State and Settlement Governments from proceeding beyond the planning stage. Indeed, by the time Briggs arrived, Gurney had been so unsuccessful in pursuing his resettlement policy that only 18,500 squatters had been brought "under control".[49]

In June 1950, the Federal Government took over responsibility for resettlement, and Briggs, aided by the increased revenue provided by the Korean War prices boom and his powers as Director of Operations, was able to inject a new direction and urgency into the programme. During the first few months of the revitalized programme serious problems arose. These were largely a consequence of inexperience and were particularly apparent in the most southerly State of Johore. Some people were required to move more than once, creating an unfavourable impression in the minds of those concerned and in others who heard of their difficulties either through the media or by word of mouth. Greater experience, however, brought greater efficiency. Resettlement went forward at a remarkable pace.[50] By December 1951, 385,000 people had been resettled.[51] A parallel programme similar to resettlement involved the regrouping of estate, mine, and other workers in the rural areas. This was necessitated by the fact that guerrilla groups cut off from their supplies by the resettlement programme turned to estate and mine labourers who were intimidated into giving them support. In all, an estimated 650,000 workers were eventually housed in regroupment areas.[52] These programmes, which were designed to physically separate the guerrillas from their supporters within the general population, brought about a complete change in the logistics of the Emergency. Gradually, as the resettlement and regrouping programmes progressed, M.C.P. guerrillas had to re-establish links with their former sources of supply, and this meant converging on the new resettlement areas. The Security Forces could begin to think of setting their own traps, knowing that the guerrillas were more limited in their patterns of movement.[53] Food-control measures introduced in June 1951, held out the long-term prospect of flushing out the guerrillas by starvation. In many ways the long-term prospects were bright, but they were obscured by the short-term problems that resettlement created.

The immediate results of resettlement did not encourage the people of Malaya to feel particularly well disposed towards Gurney. Those being moved suffered considerable hardships. The expense, inconvenience, and deprivations of creating resettlement areas "without the opportunity for careful sociological and economic survey and planning which would normally precede so abrupt a disturbance of a long established pattern of rural life" created considerable resentment among the rural population.[54] The amount of crops and livestock fell sharply as the land to which people were assigned after resettlement had to be cultivated over an extensive period of time before it yielded a reasonable crop. Only the great demand for labour and the unusually high wages prompted by the Korean War prices boom kept large numbers from becoming destitute.[55] But perhaps of equal importance to the rural population and of greater concern to the rest of the Malayan people was the increased intensity and frequency of the guerrilla attacks. Recorded incidents involving guerrillas rose from over 4,700 in 1950 to over 6,000 in 1951. Similarly, the total casualties suffered by the Security Forces rose from 889 in 1950 to 1195 in 1951.[56] The increased ferocity with which the guerrilla war was being fought did nothing to reassure the general population that Gurney's security policies were correct or that they were policies that should be given their full and uncritical support. Certainly the Government did not appear to be winning.

During the three years that Gurney was High Commissioner in Malaya his security policies came under attack. He received little support from the Chinese community, many of whom felt the policies were designed to inflict unnecessary hardship on them rather than on the guerrillas. They felt more harassed than protected. Many within the Malay, Indian, and European communities were very uneasy about the apparent lack of success of Gurney's security policies. The author of a letter given some prominence in the English language paper, the Straits Echo, noted in 1949 that the "handling of the Emergency since its declaration (has not) shown efficiency or vision. It requires a very generous assessment to make the campaign against banditry appear as even a qualified success."[57] That this was a relatively widely shared view may be judged from the frequently expressed argument favouring the establishment of martial law. This point of view proffered by highly respected leaders from both the Malay and European communities was by its very nature a condemnation of the Emergency operations pursued by Gurney and his civilian Government.[58] Thus, the relationship between Gurney and the Malayan population was clouded by the short-term problems and apparent ineffectiveness of the High Commissioner's security policies. The long-term benefits of his security policies, which were to accrue to the Government cause after his murder in October 1951, came too late to strengthen his hand in dealing with the Malayan people.

Like Gurney before him, Templer largely inherited the basic set of security policies he pursued in the first few months of his tenure in office. Unlike Gurney, however, he found that his legacy gave him a sound basis from which to develop policies that led to the elimination of a substantial number of communist guerrillas. Indeed, Templer later acknowledged the importance of the role played by the Briggs Plan when he stated that Briggs

> without much authority or power had the vision to see where the future lay and his implementation of the policy of resettlement of squatters in my opinion, not only made possible the gradual improvement in the situation leading to the final ending of the Emergency but also made it possible for many hundreds of thousands of people--and not only Chinese at that--to have a much better standard of life socially, educationally, medically, and in many other spheres.[59]

Templer pressed ahead with resettlement. The programme was extended to all parts of the country; and by the end of 1954, over 570,000 of Malaya's rural population were housed in resettlement areas (or as Templer decreed they should be called, "New Villages").[60] Despite the uneven quality of the New Villages, as Gurney and Briggs had predicted the rural population became to a great extent physically isolated from the communist guerrillas.

Templer extended the resettlement programme, though in a greatly modified form, to the aborigines living in the heart of the jungle. In 1951, the communists had decided to consolidate their positions in the deep jungle and had built up extensive contacts with the aborigines, from whom they gained supplies and information. Early attempts by the Government to resettle the aborigines had proved disastrous, with diseases previously unknown to the jungle people causing numerous deaths.[61] Under Templer a series of "forts" were constructed near the main aborigine areas so as to afford protection, medical services and supplies for those aborigines who felt they could benefit from them.[62] In October 1953 Templer appointed Richard Noone, an anthropologist who had extensive knowledge of the Malayan aborigines, as the head of the Department of Aborigines. In November 1953 he placed the Department on an Emergency footing, with a greatly expanded staff consisting mainly of field teams which had the task of making contact with those aborigines still under communist influence.[63] This combined programme of forts and trained field teams proved to be very successful in weaning the aborigines away from the communists and thus providing information about the guerrillas' activities and whereabouts.

During the first few months after his arrival in Malaya, Templer initiated a number of programmes that attempted to improve the efficiency of the Security Forces and ensure they were deployed for maximum effect. First, Templer placed great emphasis on training and retraining, particularly of Police Force personnel. Templer was anxious that everyone in the Police Force could be expected to handle competently regular police work. He also emphasized that weapon training, field-craft, and jungle techniques should be improved so that the Security Forces faced with the task of tracking guerrillas had every chance of success. Courses in civic responsibilities, vocational training, and reading, writing, and arithmetic were established for Special Constables so that they could make a full contribution to civilian life when they left the Force.[64]

Second, Templer, like Gurney, had to deal with the manpower situation. He proposed, in March 1952 that a Federation Regiment, open to all communities, should be set up to complement the Malay Regiment and that together they would be the beginning of a Federation Army.[65] An attempt to solve the problem of manning the new regiment was put forward by the Government in the form of the National Service Ordinance. This was introduced in July 1952. There was, however, a great deal of opposition to this policy, mainly from the Chinese community. The M.C.A. argued that they could produce enough volunteers through monetary inducements but this idea was rejected by Templer.[66] Other problems arose concerning the lack of instructors, equipment, and building facilities, and the proposals for an annual call-up were shelved.[67] Nevertheless, Templer managed to solve partially the manpower problem by reorganizing and arming the Home Guard. The original system of voluntary unarmed Home Guards to protect resettled areas had been, as Ten Cheng-lock put it, "a half-hearted measure and a farce".[68] Early in 1952, Templer brought in a retired British Army major-general who was given the task of reorganizing the Home Guard, with the objective of creating a force of nearly a quarter of a million men trained to defend their villages against guerrilla attacks.[69] He accepted the argument, long advanced by leaders of the Chinese community, that the Home Guard units should be armed. Indeed, In May 1952 he directed that the Kinta Valley Home Guard should be formed and issued with arms. This unit operated in one of the worst areas for communist activity and many expressed their fear that all the arms would be lost to the guerrillas. Templer's policy was vindicated, however, for in all of Malaya, only a few weapons were lost by Home Guards. Moreover, the Chinese community were impressed that Templer placed such confidence in them. This policy also meant that thousands of Security Force personnel were released for other assignments.[70]

Third, Templer as a former Director of Military Intelligence, recognized the importance of intelligence in a guerrilla war. He gave the improvement of the intelligence organizations top priority. The second in command in Britain's M.I.5. was seconded for one year's term of duty and given the job of planning the reorganization and expansion of the Special Branch. Mr. Guy C. Madoc was appointed Head of Special Branch with the task of providing both general information on M.C.P. strategy and specific information on which the Security Forces could base operations against the guerrillas. Funds allotted to intelligence activities were increased and general facilities were improved. Madoc also ensured that intelligence information was speedily and efficiently circulated to those who could use it best.[71] The intelligence gathering and disseminating abilities of the Administration thus improved considerably during the two and one half years Templer was High Commissioner.

As a result of the introduction of these policies, troops were deployed with great efficiency. In the jungle the fight against the guerrillas was aided by better information, better tactics, including the use of smaller units staying longer in the jungle, and more Security Forces. The advent of the S.55 helicopter allowed troops to be transported between their base and the area of operations quickly and without the long, tiring, approach marches.[72] They also enabled casualties to be speedily evacuated--a great morale booster. Of equal importance were the benefits these policies produced for operations in the area of the New Villages. These operations were based on food-denial plans originally put forward by Briggs. While their potential was appreciated, during the first few months in which these plans formed the basis of operations, they had achieved little success. The information which formed the starting point for the operations was insufficient and operations were conducted on too small a scale. However, as more Security Forces were released from their former static defence duties by Home Guards, and as the efficiency of the Special Branch increased, more and more large-scale food-denial operations were mounted. These operations forced guerrillas into ambushes in attempts to get food, produced an increase in the surrender rate, caused the M.C.P. to rely on couriers and food collectors who could be persuaded by the Security Forces to betray the guerrillas, and generally created havoc within the communist ranks. Indeed, food-control operations became the Government's most potent weapon against the M.C.P. guerrillas.[73]

Two further policies which produced both controversy and results for Templer were first, the exercise of the powers of mass detention and second, the granting of rewards for information or actions leading to a guerrilla's elimination. Both were the extension of policies introduced by Gurney. Templer used the Emergency Regulation 17D which gave him the power of mass detention and deportation less often than Gurney but with greater publicity.[74] Within two months of arriving in Malaya, Templer had to deal with an incident near a town with a particularly bad record for cooperation with the guerrillas. Fourteen men including the Assistant District Officer for the area were ambushed and killed. Templer descended on the town, Tanjong Malim, imposed a twenty-two hour curfew and reduced rice rations drastically. This had been done before, though perhaps not in such a dramatic fashion. What had not been done before was the circulation of questionnaires on which residents were invited to write what they knew of the communists. These questionnaires were then collected in a special box. This box was to be opened only by Templer. A number of suspects were later arrested and the curfew lifted. Despite criticisms of this policy (mainly from Britain[75]) it probably did as much good as harm. Templer showed himself to be determined, the Question Box scheme was used in other recalcitrant villages with some success, and the incident rate around Tanjong Malim was reduced.[76] The Emergency Regulation 17D was abolished by Templer in 1953 after he felt the need for such severe measures had become redundant.[77]

Templer's reward policy was remarkable mainly for the immense size of the rewards themselves. For top officials the reward quadrupled so that Chin Peng was worth $250,000 alive and half that amount dead. The State and Regional Committee secretaries had a price of $120,000 on their heads if captured alive. There was a corresponding increase in the rewards paid for each category of communist guerrilla. Leaflets and newsletters announced the new system of rewards.[78] While the morality of this policy may be questioned, it certainly indicated that the Government meant business and encouraged the flow of information about guerrilla activities.

During Templer's two and a half years in office, his security policies met with general approval. This was in large measure a consequence of the reduction both in the number of incidents initiated by the guerrillas and in the number of civilians and Security Force personnel killed. Every community group was favourably affected by the decrease in the intensity with which the M.C.P. guerrillas waged the "shooting" war. The rural Chinese, although not totally happy with the resettlement programme, were relieved that the New Villages were less often the target for M.C.P. attacks. The Malays, who formed a large majority of the Special Constables responsible for static defence, had their morale boosted by the dramatic drop in the number of regular Police and Special Constables killed. The Chinese and Indian mine and plantation workers and European and Chinese managers could take comfort from the considerable drop in the number of attacks on rubber estates and mines. And top Security Forces officials could be satisfied that they had gained the upper hand for the crucial balance of weapons lost and recovered moved from a deficit in 1951 to a substantial credit in the following year.[79] All these signs indicated that the Government's forces were taking the initiative and would come out as the winners. The general population, unaware of the October 1951 M.C.P. directive ordering reductions in the use of terrorism, quite naturally attributed the changing circumstances to the vigorous actions of the one new and highly visible ingredient in the situation--Templer. He was able to give further proof of the success of his policies when in September 1953 he declared 221 square miles of Malacca a "White Area".[80] This meant that all Emergency regulations were lifted in that area and it was, in effect, a reward for good behavior. In other areas where guerrillas no longer operated Templer relaxed controls on the working of mines, quarries, and timber concessions. By the time he left Malaya there were "White Areas" containing over 1,336,000 people in all parts of the Federation.[81] The lifting of controls on the movement and distribution of food boosted morale and firmly placed those affected on the Government's side. Templer, then, was able to capitalize on the turn of events brought about by the security policies of Gurney and Briggs and the M.C.P. October 1951 directive. By pressing home his advantage through the security policies he pursued, Templer gained the respect of many in Malaya--a respect that enabled him to elicit the help of a significant section of the population in fighting the guerrillas.

Policies Concerning Participation in Political Decision-making

The distribution of decision-making powers is crucial to the way in which a unit is governed. Thus the policies of a leader concerning the retention, interpretation, or change of laws and conventions which determine the ability of individuals or groups to participate in the decision-making process are of considerable significance. This is particularly so for those who wish to have a role in determining the unit's goals and allocating the unit's valued, scarce resources. In most political units there is a constitution that sets out the basic framework for the distribution of decision-making powers. In the case of the Federation of Malaya, during the period under review, the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, served as the basis for determining decision-making powers.

Gurney's initial attitude towards the Federation of Malaya Agreement and thus to changes in the regulations concerning who could participate in the decision-making processes in the Federation was stated clearly in his first address to the Federal Legislative Council. He said: "I can find no desire in any quarter to amend the Federation Agreement in any respect, and I am quite clear that our efforts should now be directed to working it as it stands in the interest of the people."[82] This assessment, however, was incorrect. There were groups who sought to have the Agreement amended. First, many politically active non-Malays who had welcomed the Malayan Union and later opposed the introduction of the Federation Agreement expressed their dissatisfaction with the new Constitution which, it was claimed, "sacrifices the legitimate rights and interests of the non-Malay communities.[83] The disagreements with the Federation Agreement expressed by elite non-Malay groups had not simply disappeared with its promulgation. Second, while the Federation Agreement expressly specified that "as soon as circumstances and local conditions will permit, legislation should be introduced for the election of members to the several legislatures",[84] fears were expressed by those in political organizations that progress would be slow. Third, a secession movement gathered strength in Penang and began to demand that the island Settlement be released from the Federation Agreement.[85] Hence, there were a number of groups that flatly disagreed with Gurney when he said that there was no desire to amend the Federation Agreement: a clash of opinions that did not inspire great confidence in the new High Commissioner.

During his first two years as High Commissioner, Gurney maintained a status quo stance with regard to the distribution of decision-making powers. However, during the last year he was in office he did initiate some changes. First, in 1951, he introduced the "Member" system. This change brought various groups and departments under the supervision of individual members of the Legislative Council and was fairly well received as a first, though small, step towards ministerial responsibility. Second, Gurney, accepting the spirit of the Federation Agreement, set in motion a chain of events that led to the introduction of municipal elections. A Select Committee on municipalities was set up and its recommendation, which was brought down in June 1950, called for a Local Authorities Election Bill.[86] Later that same month the Government made it known that it had accepted the recommendations and legislation would be drawn up.[87] The necessary legislation was introduced and the first municipal elections took place towards the end of 1951.

Third, Gurney, prompted by the work of the Communities Liaison Committee (C.L.C.), began to consider revisions of those sections of the Federation Agreement dealing with citizenship. Citizenship was an important factor in the decision-making process for not only was it a prerequisite in such matters as appointment to the Federal Legislative Council but it also became (as many realized at the time the Federation of Malaya Agreement was proclaimed) a necessary requirement for the right to vote in municipal, State and Federal elections. The citizenship issue had been a contentious one during the heated debates that preceded the replacement of the Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya Agreement. The non-Malays complained bitterly about the restrictions which discriminated against non-Malays born in Malaya. Only Malay Muslim subjects of the Ruler of a State, aborigines born in a State, and all British subjects born in Penang and Malacca were automatically by law, citizens of the Federation. A non-Malay born in a Malay State could acquire citizenship status only if he was born a British subject and his father was born in a State or was a Federal citizen. Citizenship by application involved rigorous complicated requirements, including proof of birth or residence over a number of years in the Federation and reasonable knowledge of the Malay or English language.[88] The proposals for State and thus Federal citizenship regulations put forward by the Communities Liaison Committee in April 1950, were the result of long discussions and compromises between a few leaders of each major racial community in the Federation. The more liberal regulations suggested by the C.L.C. were attacked by both Malays and non-Malays. Some Malays wanted even tighter controls on criteria for citizenship, while many non-Malays argued for the principle of _jus soli_ (citizenship of a country as a right for those born in that country).[90] Many further discussions based on the C.L.C. proposals took place with Gurney and his Government sounding out various authorities such as the Rulers and the State Governments.[91] Eventually, the Government drafted a Bill which went as far as they thought Malay opinion would allow towards the C.L.C. recommendations. However, the Bill itself prompted considerable criticism, particularly from the M.C.A., and Gurney felt he was unable to press for it to be placed immediately on the statute books.[92] Thus, while there was considerable discussion, there was little action with regard to changes in the citizenship laws.

While Gurney laid some of the groundwork, it was left to Templer to make most of the actual changes in the Government of Malaya's governmental process policies. The inevitability of the Federation of Malaya achieving independence and the necessity of assisting the people of Malaya towards their goal was impressed on Templer by the Directive given to him by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Templer, therefore, began to seek agreement among the various communities and leaders so that what he considered to be the prerequisites for independence could be acquired.

Templer saw to it that the Federation Agreement was amended to allow more residents of the Federation to become citizens. The committee which Gurney had set up in July 1951 was able, after long consultations with representatives of State Councils, to place its Report on the table of the Legislative Council on the 19 March 1952, just a few weeks after Templer arrived in Malaya. In May 1952, the new Citizenship Bill based on the Committee's recommendations was debated and passed by the Federal Legislative Council. On 15 September 1952, after each State had passed its own Nationality Laws, both the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance and the State Nationality Laws came into effect.[93] The complex new laws went part way to satisfying the demands of the non-Malays. Of particular importance was the introduction of what the Attorney-General termed the "delayed jus soli".[94] This referred to the criteria for citizenship by which anyone born in the Federation who had a parent who was born in the Federation automatically became a subject of the Sultan of the State in which he was born and consequently, a citizen of the Federation. The criteria for citizenship by application were also modified with respect to the residency requirements, although unlike the 1948 stipulations, an applicant was required to renounce the exercise of any other citizenship (other than citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies) and take an oath of allegiance.[95] Despite some criticisms of the legislation which mainly centred around the problem of State nationality creating disunity, and the legal problems of those who could not gain citizenship, it was generally well received.[95] The Malays accepted the necessity of encouraging the loyalty of all residents in Malaya, while the Chinese viewed the amendments to the Federation Agreement as a step towards their goal of the adoption of the principle of jus soli. As a result of the new laws 2,727,000 Malaysians (Malays and Aborigines); 1,157,000 Chinese; and 222,000 Indians and Pakistanis automatically became State Nationals and citizens.[97] But the importance of this newly acquired status seems to have been slow to percolate through to the beneficiaries, for Templer noted in November 1953 that "among all those people who recently attended a Civics Course in Penang for new villagers of Province Wellesley, not one knew whether or not he was a Federal Citizen."[98]

Templer extended the number of elected bodies and gave them greater responsibility. At the outset of his tenure in office he stated: "I believe it right to ensure that truly responsible local government at the rural community and Municipal Council levels is firmly established and as quickly as possible."[99] Both the Local Authorities Election Ordinance and the Local Councils Ordinance were passed within a year of Templer's arrival and the appropriate election machinery established. Templer also accepted that elected bodies were of little value unless given responsibility and he made sure that they had not only the powers to govern themselves in relation to their local affairs but also the powers to raise money through taxation.[100] The result of Templer's policy was that by the middle of 1954 there were 23 Town Councils, each with a majority of elected members and 209 fully elected Local Councils. Moreover every State and Settlement had drawn up plans for elections to their respective State Councils.[101] Generally these developments were welcomed by all races and by both the politically ambitious and the ordinary rural and urban people.

But one policy concerning elections did cause a great deal of controversy. The Malay leaders of the U.M.N.O. and the Chinese leaders of the M.C.A. began during late 1952 and early 1953 a campaign to persuade Templer that a Federal election should be held in 1954. U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. leaders had little to lose and much to gain by advocating this policy. Their representation in the Federal Legislative Council was much less than their main opponents, the Independence of Malaya Party, and thus their formal influence on policy was limited. Further, the success of the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. combination in Municipal and later State elections was thought of as a good indication of its probable success in a Federal election. U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. aspirations seemed to tie in with, and to some extent stimulate the rising swell of nationalist feeling; a promising situation for party leaders seeking constitutional reforms and electoral office. Templer recognized the electoral success of the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. alliance by offering Colonel H.S. Lee of the M.C.A. the portfolio of "Member for Railways and Ports" and Dr. Ismail of the U.M.N.O. the portfolio of "Member for Lands, Mines and Communication." Both accepted these posts though with a great deal of reluctance.[102] But Templer was reluctant to alter the electoral programme he had initially planned which called for Federal elections in 1956 or 1957.[103] However, he did see the merit of a full discussion of the question of Federal elections, and in 1953 he set up a Legislative Council Committee to examine the problem. While the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. held conventions to press their claim for early Federal elections, Dato Onn and his supporters in the I.M.P. and later the Party Negara (formed by Onn after the I.M.P. had failed badly in elections) held conferences which counselled caution and a delay in the introduction of Federal elections. Dato Onn was anxious to avoid elections until he had a strong base from which to campaign.[104] The Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council reflected the two sets of opinions. The majority report favoured less than 50 per cent of elected seats and a "proper" (presumably 1956 or later) date for elections. The minority report of the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. members called for three-fifths elected majority and November 1954 as the date for elections.[105] The confrontation was not resolved when Templer finally left Malaya at the beginning of June 1954.

Templer recognized the necessity for more Malayans of all races to receive training as civil servants. As a first step towards this goal, he persuaded the Conference of Rulers that the Malayan Civil Service, previously open to only British and Malay applicants, would admit non-Malays who were Federal citizens and who had attained the necessary standards of education and character.[106] Templer proposed that one non-Malay for every four Malays be admitted into the Malayan Civil Service. While the non-Malays were dissatisfied with the ratio, it did appear that Templer had gone as far as he could in extracting concessions from the Rulers on this point. Both the Malays and non-Malays were critical of the criteria used for entrance into the Malayan Service and the lack of real progress in bringing Malayans into what was essentially a British controlled administration based on British values.[107] However, the issue did not really become a very contentious one, for while progress was slow, some advances were made.

Just as the Directive decreed he should, Templer moved Malaya steadily along the road to independence. But like the question of when Federal elections should be held, the speed with which independence was to be attained was a matter of considerable debate. There were fears among both the Malay and the Chinese communities that the other would predominate once the British left.[108] Despite assurances from the leaders of the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. group, these fears persisted during Templer's period in office. It was thought by many that because of the cleavages within the society, the British were needed to act as arbitrator and guide. Even the Pan Malayan Labour Party's Independence Programme did not call for independence until the early 1960s.[109] Templer, therefore, was able to steer a middle course. On the one hand he steadily increased the number of people able to participate in the decision-making process and extended the range of their powers; on the other hand he ensured that progress was measured and orderly. Hence, although Templer was sometimes criticised by non-Malays for failure to extend reforms of the Federation Agreement, and by Malays for extending reforms too far, in general he accumulated much good will through his actions. Even the problems created by the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. insistence on an elected majority in Federation elections did not mar Templer's relations with the parties' leaders. It was fully recognized by the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. leaders that opposing interests placed constraints on his policy decisions.

Templer thus encouraged debate over policies concerning participation in decision-making. But these policies really affected only the relatively small group of political activists. However, in maintaining the allegiance of this elite group to the principle of constitutional change, and in stimulating discussion so that a consensus concerning the problems of distributing decision-making could be achieved, Templer's policies can be considered a significant factor in the way this important group assessed him. It encouraged the Malayan political leaders to give him their support. Hence, by galvanizing political activity, something Gurney had intended to do but had not achieved at the time of his death, Templer furthered his ability to facilitate the solution of problems.

Economic Policies

Policies which have a direct impact on the economy of a unit are of concern to all for they govern to some extent the distribution of the unit's resources. Hence, the policies and actions of a leader which determine how a unit's economic affairs should be managed, including how the political organization he heads raises its revenue and dispenses its resources, are important elements in the political leadership process.

Economic policies in post World War Two Malaya were characterized by caution and conservatism. Like Britain's other colonial territories, Malaya's fiscal system was simplistic.[110] Great emphasis was placed on a balanced budget[111] and revenue was consistently underestimated. Indeed, "the estimated budget for each year usually projected a small deficit but actual budget performance never failed to turn in a deficit smaller than estimated or a whopping surplus."[112] The Colonial Office encouraged this tendency. Malaya's income from rubber and tin was an invaluable asset to a British Government with recurring balance of payments problems. In order to conserve this source of foreign currency, Whitehall officials urged the Malayan Government to be frugal, self-supporting, and to import British rather than American products.[113] This trend, coupled with an essentially laissez-faire tradition with regard to the direction of economic affairs, meant that while the High Commissioner was expected to involve himself in the distribution of resources within Malaya, he was not expected to do so to any great extent.

The exigencies of the post World War Two situation in Malaya, however, prompted increased activity on the part of both Gurney and Templer in the field of economic affairs. Gurney had a particularly difficult task. At a time when the fortunes of the mainstays of the Malayan economy, rubber and tin, were low he had to find enough resources to combat the communist offensive. In attempting to solve this problem Gurney came in for a good deal of criticism. First, he had to face the wrath of those who felt that the Income Tax Legislation introduced by his predecessor, Gent, was harsh and unfair. This criticism came from the largely European and Chinese business community and was continually voiced throughout Gurney's term in office.[114] Gurney, recognizing the need for increased revenue and the political desirability of showing that taxpayers in Malaya as well as the taxpayers in Britain were prepared to shoulder responsibility for prosecuting the Emergency, refrained from altering the Income Tax laws. Moreover, he could not afford the manpower needed to rationalize the tax structure, as desired by his critics. Second, Gurney received criticism for the new sliding scale rubber export duty he put forward. The original proposal for this tax was partly in response to a need to curb internal inflation caused by the Korean War Prices boom and partly a method of increasing revenue. The proposal, introduced late in 1950, came under a great deal of attack from the rubber industry and a revised version eventually ended up on the statute books.[115] Therefore, although Gurney continued the policy of his predecessors and developed the economic infrastructure of Malaya--the roads, railways, ports, and energy sources--for the benefit of industry and the business community in general, he failed to gain the wholehearted cooperation of businessmen because of their resentment over the new taxation arrangements.[116]

Just as Gurney was criticised for the way his Government acquired its revenue, so he was criticised for the way that revenue was spent. The major problem, of course, was that so much of the Government's revenue had to be devoted to counter-insurgency operations. As Gurney noted, "terrorism is the most expensive form of illness from which any community can suffer and becomes more so the longer it is permitted to drag on."[117] By the end of 1948, it was estimated that the Emergency cost the Government between $250,000 and $300,000 a day.[118] This drain on the Government's funds precluded the use of Government revenue for other programmes. In particular, the Malay leaders were vocal in their claim that the rural Malays had been neglected.[119] Indeed, Gurney, in an open letter to Dato Onn, admitted that the Emergency had diverted a lot of money which would otherwise have gone towards helping kampong development.[120] In an attempt to staunch this flow of criticism, Gurney created the Rural Industrial Development Authority (R.I.D.A.) and appointed Onn as chairman. But while Onn worked hard at his new post and money was ploughed into a number of rural development programmes, the general economic malaise of the Malays was not alleviated and R.I.D.A. only served to raise the expectations of the Malay community.[121] Thus, the Malays did not feel that Gurney's economic policies were directed towards solving their problems and this proved a minor but nonetheless important factor in the way the Malay community as a whole viewed the High Commissioner.

Increased revenue from the Korean War Prices boom did help Gurney, though only to a limited extent.[122] During the first year of the boom, 1950, Government expenditure actually went down but in the last year of his tenure, Gurney was able to increase expenditure in some important areas. However, much of the money went on increased Emergency operations costs, with the Police Department nearly doubling its expenditure.[123] The people who benefitted most from the increase in Government expenditure, the resettled rural Chinese who had begun to receive community services, were still recovering from the dislocation of their lives and were not fully appreciative of their new conditions. Hence, Gurney's economic policies, circumscribed by limited revenue in the first few years in office and by the demands of the Emergency throughout his tenure as High Commissioner, gained him few friends.

Templer, like Gurney, had to commit a large percentage of the Government's money to Emergency operations. However, Templer had the benefit of an expanded budget. Increased revenue from the Korean War boom allowed Templer to exceed the annual expenditure of his predecessor by well over $100 million. The surpluses accumulated in the Government coffers enabled Templer to sustain this rate of expenditure even after the boom was over and the revenue dropped.[124] Consequently, he was able to extend significantly a number of the programmes which had been begun by Gurney. Templer continued to develop the transport and power facilities which the business community required for industrial growth. The first section of the show-piece of Malaya's industry the power station at Connaught Bridge, was completed during the first year Templer was in Malaya.[125] He continued the social and community services initiated by Gurney and ensured that as far as possible these services were made available throughout the areas where resettlement and relocation took place. The Malays, whose economic plight was recognized in Templer's directive, were encouraged by the attention Templer gave to the development of the R.I.D.A. Templer himself chaired a Standing Committee which he set up specifically to see what measures could be taken "to improve the condition of life in the average Malay kampong."[126] In 1953, R.I.D.A. received nearly $8 million towards the betterment of the Malay economic lot.[127] This was not a sum equivalent to the money spent on the rural Chinese but it did demonstrate that Templer had not forgotten the kampong problem. The rural area, as a whole, benefitted from the funds Templer channelled into agricultural improvement schemes[128] and the rubber replanting programme.

Templer's policies concerning the collection of revenue produced both praise and criticism. He promised, upon his arrival in Malaya, that experienced investigators would be sent out from the United Kingdom to look into the evasion of income tax and that a group of Legislative Council members would be appointed to see that the income tax law was equitably administered.[129] These proposals drew considerable applause from the Legislative Council for they gave a clear indication that a grievance that had long been voiced by the economic elite in Malaya was to be confronted. But not all his proposals concerning revenue were appreciated. In particular, the Registration and Licensing of Business Bill was bitterly opposed by the Chinese business community.

The Bill was designed to raise fifty percent of the money for the Education Development Fund by taxing businesses in such a way as to require each partner to pay a licensing fee which was related to the overall capital assets of the business. The Chinese community argued that money for education should come out of general revenue and that the Bill discriminated against small businesses with a large number of partners. A Select Committee was set up to look into these objections, but only recommended some modifications. In 1953 the Bill was placed on the statute books. This legislation did generate some resentment towards the Government.

On the whole, however, the Korean War boom provided Templer with the resources to introduce and execute financial policies that benefitted a great many people. Thus, while some sections of the Chinese business community may have had serious reservations about the Business Ordinance and others were concerned about the necessity of delving into the surplus funds of previous years to overcome the large excess of expenditure over revenue,[131] Templer was able to create among the general population of Malaya a large measure of goodwill towards himself and the Malayan Government through his economic policies.

Social and Cultural Policies

Many of the everyday problems of an individual arise out of the social conditions within a unit. In that a leader is expected to facilitate the solving of problems experienced by individuals and groups within his unit, his policies or lack of policies concerning social conditions and social services are, therefore, of some importance to the way he is viewed by the members of the unit. Similarly, problems arising out of the provision or denial of cultural amenities can be expected to be the subject of a leader's pronouncements. Both the physical and intellectual well-being of individuals and groups, therefore, can be thought of as being of significance for the nature of the relationship between leader and led.

In Malaya the difficulties of dealing with the social and cultural problems of the people were magnified by the depth of the social and cultural cleavages. The diversity of Malayan society meant that it was difficult to satisfy one set of social and cultural grievances without generating another. Gurney, however, never really confronted this dilemma; the demands of the Emergency in terms of resources, manpower, and time meant that he gave relatively little thought to either social or cultural problems. Indeed, social and cultural needs were placed low on the order of priorities. In the first two years of Gurney's term in office, Federal funds were redirected from the social services into the security operations against the guerrillas.[132] The Draft Development Plan gave ample indication that Gurney and his Government did not consider that social services would be extended to meet the grievances of the general population.[133] These grievances included the lack of medical facilities in rural areas,[134] poor housing conditions particularly in the towns, and the vast number of children who were unable to gain any formal education.[135] In Gurney's final year in office, the boom revenue relieved the shortage of funds for the social services, but the manpower problem was still a limiting factor. Some social services were made available as the resettlement programme progressed, but they were slow to get properly established. Gurney responded to the criticisms of the education system which emanated from many quarters[136] by commissioning two reports, one on Malay education and one on Chinese education. The result was two distinctly communal documents. A further report, which was based on the material in these documents, was published by the Legislative Council in September 1951.[137] Gurney then set up a Special Committee of the Legislative Council to recommend legislation on education in Malaya. The task of finding an acceptable compromise on which the Government could act was left to this committee. With education being so vital to the perpetuation of a community's culture--some saw it as a factor in the competition for cultural domination --the need for slow and deliberate progress was clear. In the area of social and cultural policies, then, the combination of the restriction on money and manpower, the low priority given to social and cultural programmes, and the complexity of the problems meant that Gurney never really came to grips with the social and cultural grievances of the general population.

Templer, on the other hand, did confront many of the social and cultural problems voiced by Malayans and gained both admirers and critics in the process. He pressed ahead with long overdue social legislation and extended much needed social service facilities. Bills covering such things as paid holidays for employees and workmen's compensation were discussed and passed by the Legislative Council.[138] Medical facilities were provided in rural areas, in many for the first time, by mobile units.[139] School rooms were erected, and piped-water installed in a considerable number of the resettlement villages. A tuberculosis hospital was built in Kuala Lumpur and training facilities for nurses were expanded. While the quality of much of the facilities provided under the social services was often uneven--in many cases trained personnel were unavailable--any help was an improvement for the hundreds of thousands who had never experienced such services. It showed that the Government could operate in remote areas and lend a helping hand, not just harass innocent people. The Malayan elite were impressed by Templer's determination to counter bigoted social attitudes and to assess people not by the colour of their skin but by their contribution to the fight against communism. Templer's initiative in changing the all-white policy of a Kuala Lumpur club to a multi-racial membership policy was widely appreciated as indicative of his general attitude towards Malayans.

In confronting some of these social and cultural problems Templer did encounter some criticism. The Government's policy to raise money for some welfare programmes through lotteries was fiercely opposed by the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.). The legislation which established a government lottery also imposed a tax of 20 percent on profits from other lotteries. This was a blow to the M.C.A. whose welfare work was financed by a lottery. The M.C.A. vigorously opposed the tax, but when charges were voiced that the M.C.A. lottery profits were being used for political and not welfare purposes, the M.C.A. refused to account publicly for lottery profits. It was revealed that over $35,000 of the party's funds had been misappropriated. With this revelation, Dato Onn, the Minister of Home Affairs and leader of the Independence of Malaya Party, a bitter opponent of the M.C.A., moved to ban all lotteries by political parties. Although the M.C.A. tried to bargain with the Government by saying it would not be able to continue its own welfare work if the ban stayed, Templer was not prepared to rescind the decision.[140] Templer also received criticism from the M.C.A. over the Immigration Control Ordinance passed in November 1952. This legislation, which arose out of the majority report of a select committee, decreed that non-citizens born in the Federation who left Malaya for a short fixed period of time could not return to Malaya without the permission of the Controller of Immigration whose decision was final. The M.C.A. agreed with the minority report signed by the Chinese members of the committee that this was blatant discrimination against the Chinese community.[141] But again Templer refused to change the legislation and received a good deal of criticism for his decision.

However, education remained the most controversial issue. The special committee appointed in 1951 to recommend legislation introduced its report in 1952 after Templer's arrival. The major recommendations which were incorporated into the Education Ordinance, 1952 were that National Schools should be established for which no fees should be charged,[142] and that:

> The languages of instruction in these schools should be the official languages of the Federation and that facilities should also be provided for teaching Kuo Yu (the Chinese national language) and Tamil to those children whose parents so desire, where there are at least 15 pupils in any standard who wish to take advantage of such facilities.143

While the Special Committee's Report and the subsequent Ordinance were welcomed by many in the Malay and European communities who advocated that the education system should provide the vehicle for national integration, it was roundly condemned by a large majority of politically active Chinese. The main argument advanced by opponents of the Ordinance was that the policy amounted to an attempt to undermine Chinese culture by eliminating the use of Chinese as a medium of teaching. Tan Cheng-lock argued that "the mother tongue is the true vehicle of mother wit and is one with the air in which a man is born" and as such was "of prime importance".[144] The M.C.A. dispatched a series of detailed briefs to King's House, criticising the Ordinance and recommending drastic changes. Templer replied with equally detailed rebuttals, showing why he felt the policy was sound.[145] He was also heavily criticised in the Chinese press which reacted strongly to what it thought was an attack on a fundamental facet of Chinese life.[146] Although Templer was fully committed to the implementation of the Ordinance, he came up against two unsurmountable problems which meant that the National Schools programme had to be shelved. First, the increased public expenditure that the programme would require was considered too great in the light of the reduced revenue of 1953 and expected deficit of 1954; the post-Korean boom slump and the demands of balanced budget precluded increasing the funds spent on education.[147] Second, there was a chronic shortage of teachers. Despite efforts to improve the supply of trained personnel for the schools, such as opening a teacher training centre at Kirby near Liverpool in England, it proved difficult to keep pace with the required expansion of the education system. The National Schools Policy was thus abandoned to the chagrin of some and the joy of others. The policy and its subsequent withdrawal served only to generate a certain amount of antipathy toward Templer, both on the part of those who had opposed the scheme in the first place and on the part of those who resented the fact that it was abandoned.

Templer did, however, gain some kudos from other aspects of his education policy. He fully recognized that Chinese schools played a vital role in the dissemination of communism and implemented a scheme to overcome this.[148] Late in 1952, a new salary grant-in-aid scheme for teachers in Chinese schools was introduced. This raised the status of teachers, gave them more security and money and allowed the Government greater control over the hiring and firing of the people who had the greatest potential to encourage or at least condone the spread of communism among the Chinese youth. By 1954 every Chinese primary school which could qualify to do so had accepted the salary contribution provided for in the grant-in-aid scheme.[149] The striking of a committee to oversee the revision of Chinese school textbooks also proved to be a popular reform. In 1953, new textbooks with a more Malayan orientation were approved for use in the schools. Templer also played a significant part in the setting up of a museum in Kuala Lumpur, and regional museums in other parts of the country, notably Malacca.

Both Gurney and Templer were criticised for their social and cultural policies. Gurney came under attack for his lack of policies and inability to alleviate problems, while Templer was attacked for what some thought to be inappropriate policies. However, a number of Templer's policies and their implementation were well received and helped to create a favourable impression of the High Commissioner among the general public.

Personal Style

When making their assessment of a leader, members of a unit look not only to the pronouncements he makes and the results of the actions he initiates, but also to the way he, as an individual, conducts himself. The information that members of a unit assimilate about a leader's appearance, demeanor, and behaviour, therefore, play an important part in the leadership interaction process. Hence, the most important characteristics of a leader and the manner in which he conducts himself need to be analysed.

In many ways Gurney looked like the typical senior Colonial Service officer. A fairly tall, slight man with a neatly clipped grey moustache and round spectacles, he was always impeccably dressed. Despite the heat and humidity he invariably wore a suit, or jacket and a tie. On tours he usually sported a felt hat and a walking stick. Gurney obviously preferred attending to his administrative responsibilities to getting to know the general population of the Federation. He tended to be reserved and aloof in his public dealings with the Malayan people, his sartorial elegance accentuating the formality of his manner. On his visits and tours to the various parts of the Federation, he travelled in a Rolls Royce which flew the Union Jack and was escorted by police who travelled in personnel carriers or a converted truck. When he met people he spoke thoughtfully in a soft though firm voice. A stern, neat, and precise looking man, Gurney gave the impression of being accustomed to the exercise of authority.

Gurney's appearance and demeanor had both its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the fact that Gurney was easily recognizable as an experienced Colonial official stood him in good stead with many Europeans. These people were prepared to welcome Gurney as one who knew the problems of Colonial Government. As a well known

Johore planter noted just prior to Gurney's appointment, "the sooner they give us a High Commissioner with Colonial administrative (experience) the sooner this country will settle down to peace and tranquillity."[150] On the other hand, however, the very fact that Gurney exemplified the Colonial official meant that he looked just like the typical colonial depicted in communist propaganda cartoons: a fact that was not lost on many of those who held grievances against the Malayan Government. This difference in interpretation of the way Gurney conducted himself was also reflected in the attitudes of various groups to the safeguards he took in travelling around the country. The Europeans accepted that a Rolls Royce flying the flag was the traditional means of travel for the High Commissioner, and that a police escort was a suitable precautionary measure. The Chinese, on the other hand, tended to feel that the High Commissioner, as the Number One man in an insurgency plagued country, should travel by air or with a heavily armed escort. Certainly Chinese respect for Gurney was not enhanced by the use of a Rolls and a police truck rather than a cavalcade of armed vehicles.[151] In short, Gurney's mode of personal conduct emphasized the Colonial traditions. Many Europeans valued such conduct on the part of the High Commissioner, however, many among the other communities did not.

While Gurney was essentially a private individual, Templer relished his public role. He enjoyed meeting people and was quick to appreciate the advantages of making himself known and widely recognized. A wiry figure, Templer infused his actions with a seemingly boundless fund of nervous energy. He did everything with a military briskness. Indeed, his whole manner and appearance reflected his military training.

Moreover, he turned this to his advantage. Fully appreciating the implications of the fact that many, especially among the European community, had pressed Lyttleton to appoint a "supreme commander", Templer arrived in Kuala Lumpur for the official welcoming ceremony in his full dress general's uniform. Thereafter, although officially he held a civilian post, he wore his army uniform at most formal functions and on his many tours of Malaya. At public meetings he spoke with a "sharp, incisive voice" in a crisp, forthright manner, echoing the traditions of the parade ground. In private conversations he was equally direct and was not averse to lacing his language with invectives. While prior to his arrival warnings had been given that Templer was impatient and determined, and that he was liable to "blow up" if he came across "any inefficiency or dishonesty",[153] the clarity, precision and forcefulness with which he expressed himself was an almost total surprise. It was, however, effective. After Templer's first Legislative Council address, Dato Onn, the Member for Home Affairs and a leading Malayan politician, is reported to have stated that "what he (Templer) was really saying was: 'If anyone gets in my way he'll be trod on.'" Onn noted that this approach was "exactly what we need now."[154] Although Templer's verbal assaults and forcefulness did not necessarily endear him to everyone he came across, his forthright approach did earn him a great deal of praise, particularly from the European community and the Malayan elite.[155] Moreover, Templer proved not only to be a good talker but a good listener; a factor which proved to be important when he had to deal with the frustrations of those immediately affected either by guerrilla attacks or by inconveniences arising from the implementation of Government counter measures.

Templer quickly established that he took his task seriously. He set a hectic pace and expected others to work day and night. Lights were on in King's House well into the early hours of the morning.[156] He pointed out in a speech to a group of Europeans that the communists did not go to parties or take afternoons off to play golf. He emphasized the need for the European community to set an example by totally committing themselves to the defeat of the communists.[157] Templer showed that he both took the communists seriously[158] and had the military might to defeat them by going on tour in an armoured car or Churchill bullet proof car with an army escort. Templer's calvacade proved an impressive sight and was long remembered with awe by the members of the villages he visited.

Hence each leader by his own personal style of behaviour communicated something different to the various groups within the Federation. Gurney's mannerisms and appearance suggested that he was a highly competent if unspectacular colonial administrator, while Templer's more flamboyant approach gave the impression of energy and urgency. Gurney's conduct bespoke of the traditional colonial style of Government, which for some, was reassuring but which for others seemed somewhat out of place in the radically changing circumstances of the Emergency. But perhaps the most important aspect of Gurney's personal style was that he stayed out of the public view for much of the time he was in Malaya. The fact that he made relatively few public appearances meant that little information about him personally was available for assimilation by the general population. For a population that generally valued personal communication, this aspect of Gurney's conduct meant that he was not always thought of favourably.

Templer, on the other hand, was constantly meeting the public and making his presence known. His very conduct gave a sense of urgency to the Government that was quickly noticed and widely welcomed. Those people who had complained prior to his arrival that the Government's campaign did not seem to have been pressed to the limit were particularly appreciative of his activities. Moreover, by publicizing his military rank, he contributed to the impression that he would exert all possible force to defeat the Communists. Certainly, the fact that he was a top ranking military officer was generally crucial to the assessment made of him as a leader by many within the Chinese community. Indeed, Pye reports that most of the surrendered Chinese communists he interviewed

> . . . felt that generals played a decisive role at the highest level of politics and that no group could be effective without military power. They also seemed to assume that skill in military affairs and the ability to command large numbers of men were valid indications of skill in political affairs.159

Moreover, that Templer made a point of establishing personal communications was a factor that engaged people's attention and encouraged them to feel well disposed towards him. In short, Templer's personal conduct was more congruent with what the majority of people in Malaya expected of a leader, particularly in a time of crisis, than was Gurney's.

Summary

While Gurney failed to alleviate the problems of the people of Malaya, Templer in part succeeded. Gurney's assessment of the problems, his policy pronouncements, and the implementation of these policies did little to eradicate the grievances of the various groups within Malayan society. Indeed, some felt that their problems were exacerbated by the policies of Gurney and the Malayan Government. By contrast, during Templer's term in office, a number of the obstacles which hindered the attainment by various groups of either a desired political goal or the hoped for distribution of valued scarce resources were reduced or at least the initial steps were taken which indicated that these obstacles would be removed.

The exchange of information concerning policy matters between Gurney and the people of Malaya did little to enhance the High Commissioner's relationship with the members of the unit he led. The criticism of Gurney's assessment of the major problems evinced a lack of confidence in his judgment. This failure to deal effectively with the security problems recognized by many as the primary cause of concern to the majority of Malayans did not encourage optimism that Gurney would be of assistance in facilitating the removal of other problems. What was viewed as Gurney's attempt to slough off responsibility for the lack of success in the fight against the guerrillas, by saying that the Emergency could be ended if the people wanted it ended, was bitterly resented and cited as evidence of Gurney's misunderstanding of the whole problem.[160] Moreover, each racial community in Malaya felt they were adversely affected, not only by Gurney's inability to quell the terrorist activities of the communists, but also by his lack of success in dealing with other issues of concern. The Malays complained of the lack of progress in helping the rural *kampongs* economically; the Europeans were also dissatisfied with Gurney's economic policies, particularly his imposition of certain taxes; and spokesmen for the Chinese and Indian communities argued that the immigrant groups were "treated as aliens" and had become "political paupers" since the inception of the Federation Agreement.[161]

During Templer's two and one half years in office, progress was made towards the elimination of a number of problems facing Malayans. The threat to life and possessions posed by the communist guerrillas was considerably reduced. The frustrations of some of those who wished to become more directly involved in the decion-making structures of the country were partly assuaged. Consideration was given to the economic problems of rural communities and the social and cultural amenities improved. All sections of the population benefitted from these improvements. This is not to suggest that Templer was without critics, but rather that he made some important advances in diminishing some of the more immediate difficulties faced by the general population.

The differences between the communication concerning policy exchanged between Gurney and the people of Malaya, on the one hand, and that exchanged between Templer and the people of Malaya on the other is illuminating. Templer, unlike Gurney, was able to achieve a consensus that his assessment of the situation was reasonably accurate. This consensus included not only the major cause of the problems facing Malayans, but also the best method of combatting the cause. The relative success of Templer and the Malayan Government in tackling the primary task facing it and the energy and urgency that Templer injected in Government actions were major factors in the assessment people made of Templer as leader. For instance, while the Chinese leaders continually criticised him for such policies as the introduction of the Education Ordinance, the Immigration Control Ordinance, the Registration and Licensing of Business Ordinance, and the decision to withdraw permission for the M.C.A. to hold lotteries, he was still able to command their support and aid in many other matters. Templer did what he said he would do. Gurney proclaimed his intention to eliminate the communist threat and failed. Templer achieved a diminution of the threat--the goal he had publicly set for himself and the Malayan people. It was the sustained improvement in the Emergency situation over time that was crucial in the development of the relationship between Templer and the public.

Both by what he said and the way he said it Templer more than Gurney was able to communicate his intention of working towards giving the people of Malaya a better life. In one of his first major speeches, Templer noted:

> When I arrived to take up my duties as High Commissioner, I made it plain that it is a tenet of my faith that the Emergency cannot be overcome by military measures alone. The campaign must be fought on social, economic and political fronts as well. My task is to convince those who are still wavering or who feel that this trouble is no direct concern of theirs, and to bring over to our side those who, through fear or mistaken ideas have thrown in their lot with the enemy. It is up to us to persuade these people that there is another and far preferable way of life and system of beliefs than that expressed in the rule of force and the law of the jungle.[162]

The press statement that was issued after this speech to the Legislative Council looked more like an election manifesto than anything else.[163] The goals he had set for each problem area were succinctly set out. Templer made clear from the start his intention to win over the "hearts and minds" of the people. He had a clear vision of what he felt needed to be done and this he laid out so that it could be appreciated by the people of Malaya. By and large, Gurney's stated policies tended to emphasize the primacy of defeating the communist guerrillas, whereas Templer put great stress on improving the overall living conditions of Malayans and as the major consequence of this, eliminating the communist threat. Gurney's narrower conception of the problem created uncertainties in the minds of Malayans, while Templer's wider definition of the task facing his Government proved more readily acceptable.

It needs to be reaffirmed at this point, however, that those factors over which the High Commissioner had only limited control were important both in the development of policies and in their acceptance by the general population. The strategy adopted by the M.C.P. worked against Gurney by calling for the intensification of the terrorist campaign halfway through his tenure in office and worked for Templer, when the October 1951 directive calling for the more selective use of terror and reemphasizing political subversion greatly reduced the number of incidents initiated by the M.C.P. during 1952. The revenue received from the Korean War prices boom allowed Templer to develop the social services to a greater extent than his predecessor. Moreover, the organizational problems faced by Gurney hampered the execution of a number of his policies; an incumbrance that Templer did not have to endure to nearly the same degree.

A leader is expected to facilitate the successful completion of tasks and the solving of problems. In that the Colonial Government under Gurney was unable to bring the guerrillas under control and was criticised for the lack of progress in solving a number of problems of concern to the Malayan people, Gurney failed to properly perform the functions expected of a leader. In so far as during Templer's period in office progress was made in many of these matters it can be argued that Templer succeeded in fulfilling the expectations of many Malayans as to the role of a political leader. Hence, it has been demonstrated that information concerning problem-solving and the personal conduct of a leader are of fundamental importance to the development of the relationship between leader and led.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 6

[1] See Fagen, *Politics and Communication*, pp. 18-19.

[2] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B524.

[3] For an excellent discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this legalistic approach, see Lucian W. Pye, *Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism*, pp. 11-16.

[4] Letter from D.A. Eapp, *The Planter* 26(1950), p. 224. This letter was written in support of an editorial in *The Planter* 25 (November 1949) which deplored the persistent use of the word.

[5] This feeling was forcefully expressed in the "Memorandum submitted to the Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, by the M.C.A. delegation at an interview at King's House, Kuala Lumpur on 2 December 1951", p. 1, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 169(i).

[6] Letter from Tan Cheng-lock to Rt. Hon. Lord Listowel, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 24 July 1948, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 133. During the period, June-October 1948, of the 223 civilians murdered, 17 were Europeans; 25, Malays; 169, Chinese; and 12 of other races. See *The Economist*, 30 October 1948, p. 196. A meeting of experienced officials and ex-Communists came to the conclusion that "the present Communist effort is directed at organizing the people and gaining sympathizers, NOT at killing security forces and members of the planting and mining communities as a first objective." (emphasis in original) See "Notes on a meeting concerning propaganda held 1 March 1949," Pagden Papers, SP 7/9.

[7] See *China Press* editorial reproduced in *Malay Tribune*, 4 August 1948.

[8] *Annual Report*, 1950, p. 1.

[9] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B771. This speech was reprinted in, amongst other newspapers, the *Sunday Gazette*, 13 February 1949.

[10] Miller, *Menace in Malaya*, p. 92.

[11] One indication of the importance the Government assigned to the communist threat in the first two years may be ascertained from the fact that part of the *Annual Report* devoted to the Emergency was relegated to

an Appendix. See Annual Report, 1948, 1949. The next year (1950) the Emergency was discussed in the first chapter of the Annual Report.

[12] Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, p. 4.

[13] This was noted by a correspondent for The New York Times. See The New York Times, 27 August 1950, and 26 November 1950. Local newspaper editors also noted that the Government was reducing the information given to the press. The Government claimed this was for security reasons. See Straits Echo, 23 August 1950.

[14] See "Minutes of the 23rd Meeting of the Federal War Council, 2 October 1951," TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 170.

[15] See Annual Report, 1948 for the official assessment of the role of the Calcutta Conference. This problem is discussed in Rudner, "The Draft Development Plan," pp. 69-70.

[16] A rather bitter debate took place in the Federal Legislative Council over Britain's financial responsibilities to Malaya. See Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, pp. 78-84.

[17] The term "C.T." was not without its pitfalls for some people translated it as "Chinese Terrorists"; not something which pleased the Chinese community. See Goh Chee Yau to Rt.Hon. Malcolm MacDonald, 22 November 1951, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 175.

[18] See Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? pp. 86-87.

[19] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 8.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Malay Mail, 6 January 1953. Templer was complimented on the detail of his portrayal of the situation in the Legislative Council. See, for example, Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, pp. 213, 217.

[22] "Memorandum on the Cost of the Emergency by Tan Cheng-lock, 28 January 1954," TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/VIII/17a.

[23] For an interesting example see the editorial in Nanyang Sian Pau, 22 May 1953, translated in Singapore Daily Digest of Non-English Press, No. 115/53, p. 6.

[24] The state of emergency was originally declared under the pre-war B.M.A. (Essential Regulations) Proclamation. However, "as it was held to be undesirable that powers conferred on Government should rest on a military proclamation, an Emergency Regulations Bill, repealing the pre-war legislation in the various component parts of the Federation, was introduced and passed through all its stages at a meeting of Legislative Council on 5 July." Annual Report, 1948, p. 183. For the full list of Emergency Regulations, see Government of the Federation of Malaya Emergency Regulations Ordinance, amended version, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1953).

[25] Miller, Menace in Malaya, p. 89.

[26] After just over a year of the Emergency, the Government had rounded up over 15,000 people, nearly 10,000 of whom had to be sent to China, see Government of the Federation of Malaya, "Speech to the Legislative Council, 29 September 1949," in Communist Banditry in Malaya: Extracts from the Speeches of Sir Henry Gurney (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, n.d.).

[27] See the discussion of this problem in Newell, Treacherous River, p. 30-35.

[28] Gurney first made this comment to the Press Club in Kuala Lumpur in November 1948. He subsequently reiterated it during a broadcast on Federation Day, 1 February 1949. See Extracts from the Speeches of Sir Henry Gurney.

[29] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B525.

[30] See Tan Cheng-lock to Rt. Hon. Lord Listowel, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 24 July 1948, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 133, in which the President of the M.C.A. argues that the Chinese have been placed "between two millstones" and "between the devil and the deep sea". These themes recur with great regularity in the comments of leading Chinese politicians and writers who were concerned about the plight of the Chinese during the Emergency.

[31] A group of ex-Communists meeting with a Government official in 1949 noted that the Chinese squatters felt the British were more brutal than the Japanese because the Japanese had never burnt whole villages, arrested women and children, and destroyed their livelihood. See "Notes of a Meeting of 10 Ex-M.P.A.J.A. Communists," Pagden Papers, SP7/9.

[32] H.T. Pagden to the Deputy Commissioner C.I.D., 20 May 1949, Pagden Papers, SP7/1.

[33] Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), pp. 52-55.

[34] See Tan Chin-siang to Tan Cheng-lock, 18 May 1950, TCL Papers, (Singapore) TCL/XI/5.

[35] Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd Session, p. 605.

[36] The Straits Times, 15 April 1952.

[37] Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, p. 133.

[38] Unsolicited suggestions were also received from people outside the country who knew little of the situation. For example, one U.S. Army Officer who visited Malaya put forward the idea that the British deploy their troops in a line across the southern edge of the peninsula and then move north, sweeping everything before it! See Natural Rubber News, May 1952, p. S-3.

[39] See Chapter 5 for a fuller assessment of these committees.

[40] For a full description of the Briggs Plan, see The Government of the Federation of Malaya, The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1952), p. 5.

[41] See The Straits Times, 15 November 1950, for an account of the Malaya Scouts. This group was, as The Straits Times termed it, "the natural successor" to the Ferret Force which had been established early in the Emergency by people with World War Two experience of guerrilla fighting to demonstrate the value of small group operations. Assessments of the rate of success of the Green Howards Regiment shows that the number of guerrillas eliminated rose during the period September 1949 to August 1952 as the size of the patrol units decreased and the quality of intelligence information increased. See Clutterbuck, The Long Long War, p. 54; and J.B. Oldfield, The Green Howards in Malaya 1949-52 (Aldershot, Gale and Polden, 1953), p. 191.

[42] A note in the handwriting of Sir Henry Gurney found after his death, (typed version), TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 144.

[43] See Annual Report, 1951, p. 212. Well under 2,000 Chinese recruits were admitted to the Police Force under this programme. Single males 18 to 24 inclusive were eligible. The regulations came into force in February 1951.

[44] Straits Echo, 24 January 1951. Note that Mr. Brian Stewart, the Deputy Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Settlement Secretariat, Malacca, stated that Manpower Direction had been a "fiasco" which "lost public support" and created "anti-Chinese hostilities". Mr. Brian Stewart to Tan Cheng-lock, 2 January 1952, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 144(i).

[45] See Greene, "Malaya," p. 65. The Home Guard was formed in September 1950.

[46] For a discussion of the confusion in the use of the term "squatters", see Kernial Singh Sandhu, "The Saga of the Squatter in Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asian History 5 (March 1964), pp. 145-6. This study provides an excellent background to the squatter problem during the Emergency.

[47] Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, 1950, p. 8.

[48] Various Malay groups opposed spending money on resettling what they termed "aliens" and disliked the idea of giving Malay reservation land to non-Malays as a necessary part of some schemes. See Malayan Bulletin, No. 28.

[49] "The Squatter Problem in the Federation of Malaya in 1950," Papers Laid Before the Legislative Council, 3rd Session, 1950, pp. B89-109.

[50] In the first eleven months, an average of just under 8,000 people per month were moved in Johore alone, while during May 1951, when the resettlement programme was in top gear, over 8,500 people were moved in Selangor and over 23,000 in Perak. See Government of the Federation of Malaya, "Progress of Resettlement" (Kuala Lumpur: Office of the Director of Operations, June 1951), No. CS 10298/50, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 170.

[51] For the number resettled and the rate at which they were resettled see: Progress Report on the Development Plan, 1950-52, p. 61; Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 756; Kernial Singh Sandhu, "Emergency Resettlement in Malaya," Journal of Tropical Geography 18 (August 1964), p. 165; and Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor, pp. 27-28.

[52] Sandhu, "Emergency Resettlement," p. 174. For further details of this policy see Government of the Federation of Malaya, "Policy Memorandum on the Implementation of Directive No. 10 for the Regrouping of Labour" (Kuala Lumpur: Office of the Director of Operations, 28 February 1951) Appendix "A" to F.S.Y. 18/A/50, in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 170.

This memorandum noted that the scheme had to be completed in priority areas by 1 May 1951.

[53] See Lucian W. Pye, Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism, pp. 51-2.

[54] See speech by Templer Legislative Council Proceedings. 5th Session, p. 11.

[55] This is fully explored in Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic Factor, pp. 29-40.

[56] Government of the Federation of Malaya, "Emergency Statistics" (Kuala Lumpur: Psychological Warfare Section, Director of Emergency Operations Staff, 1 April 1961), 5306/HPW/274 See also Appendix, Table E.

[57] "Dare We Take Stock" by C.W.H., Taiping, Straits Echo, 10 November 1949.

[58] In April 1950, His Highness Tengku Abubaker Ibni Sultan Ibrahim argued in the Federal Legislative Council for the introduction of martial law; see Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, pp. 124-5. In March 1950 Mr. J.S. Ferguson, J.P. Chairman of the Central Perak Planting Association, called for martial law at the Annual General Meeting; see Straits Echo, 10 March 1950. In November 1950, the Selangor Planters urged the Government to declare martial law; see Straits Echo, 28 November 1950. An editorial in the issue of The Planter (December 1950) which was reproduced in a number of English language papers, demanded that martial law be established; see for example Straits Times, 21 January 1951.

[59] The Sunday Times (Malaya), 31 July 1960.

[60] Sandhu, "Emergency Resettlement in Malay," p. 165.

[61] Sandhu, "Saga," p. 167.

[62] Ibid. See the account of the construction in 1949 of a "fort" or police post to aid aborigines in Miller, Menace in Malaya, pp. 123-132; unfortunately, the benefits of this type of assistance to the aborigines was not fully realized by the Government until over three years later. See also Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, pp. 132-138.

[63] The fascinating story of the work of the two brothers, Pat and Richard Noone, among the aborigines of Malaya is told in Dennis Holman, Noone of the Ulu (London: Heineman, 1958); and Richard Noone, Rape of the Dream People (London: Hutchinson, 1972).

[64] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 29-30. Special Constables also received cash benefits and benefits in kind upon leaving the Force after a specified period.

[65] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 10.

[66] See Sir Gerald Templer to Tan Cheng-lock, 24 April 1952 TCL Papers (Malaysia), not catalogued.

[67] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 16. The Federation Regiment was manned by volunteers. By October 1953, there were 2407 Malays, 90 Indians, and 78 Chinese in the Regiment. See Singapore Standard, 21 October 1953.

[68] Straits Times, 9 February 1952.

[69] See Miller, Menace in Malaya, p. 220; and Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 462.

[70] Only 9 weapons were lost by the Kinta Valley Home Guard in the first two years of its existence. See High Commissioner's Press Conference, May 26 1954, D. Information, 5/54/193(HC). See also Annual Report, 1952, p. 14 for details of the Kinta Valley scheme. For some reflection by Leong Yew-koh on the setting up of the Kinta Valley Home Guard, see "Minutes of the 6th Annual Meeting of the M.C.A."(Singapore, 27 December 1953), LYK Papers, File 43.

[71] See Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, pp. 90-102.

[72] Annual Report, 1953, pp. 342-343.

[73] For a detailed account of the food-denial operations see Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 211-257.

[74] See Malay Mail, 30 July 1960; and Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 9.

[75] See Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? pp. 89-91.

[76] See Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, pp. 88-9. Templer has since been quoted in a newspaper article as saying "today, 14 years later, I am still convinced that the imposition of that most severe 23-hours-a-day (sic) curfew for 14 days was the turning point in the war against militant Communism in what was the Federation of Malaya." Sunday Mail

(Kuala Lumpur), 17 April 1966. Whether any of the arrests made in Tanjong Malim were the result of the Question Box scheme was never officially disclosed. The "incident rate" was calculated in terms of the number of communist attacks. Major and minor incidents were calculated according to the number of people killed.

[77] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 9.

[78] See Lin Lu Poh (New Path News), Issue No. 14, 30 September 1952 (English translation), TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 167(i); and Miller, Jungle War in Malaya, pp. 87-8. The old prices had been $60,000 for Chin Peng; $50,000 for a member of the Politburo; and $30,000 for Town, State and Regional Secretaries. See Straits Echo, 16 December 1950.

[79] Total incidents initiated by the communist guerrillas dropped from over 6,000 in 1951 to under 3,750 in 1952, and to just over 1,000 in 1953 and 1954, see Government of the Federation of Malaya," Emergency Statistics for the Federation of Malaya Since June 1948" (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information) D. Inf. 7/60/160 (Emerg), Appendix H. The number of Security Forces killed dropped from over 40 per month in the second half of 1951 to less than 7 per month in the first half of 1953, see Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on the Police Force, 1955 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, n.d.), p. 4. The number of Special Constables killed went from 192 in 1951 to 19 in 1953. Emergency Statistics, D.Inf. 7/60/160 (Emerg). Attacks on estates and mines dropped from 45 per month in 1951 to 13 per month July-October 1952; and the balance of weapons lost and recovered changed from -157 in 1951 to +390 July-October 1952. Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 459. See also Emergency statistics in Appendix, Table E. For an assessment of the relationship between M.C.P. guerrilla strength and Security Forces strength 1948-1954 see Appendix, Graph I.

[80] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 745. The declaration of "White Areas" was seen as a prelude to the ending of the Emergency. See Nanyang Siang Pau, 8 September 1953, in Singapore Daily Digest of Non-English Press, No. 201/53, p. 8.

[81] Sir Gerald Templer's Press Conference, 26 May 1954, Department of Information, 5/54/193(HC).

[82] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B524.

[83] "A Chinese View of Malaya," Tan Cheng-lock in Rees-Williams et al. Three Reports on the Malayan Problem, p. 18. The frustrations of those in the Indian community who were politically active are expressed in Jananayakam (a Kuala Lumpur Tamil daily). See especially 15 November 1948 edition, English translation in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 173.

[84] Government of Great Britain, The Federation of Malaya Order-in Council, 1948, Second Schedule, Preamble, p. 46. Cited and discussed in Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, pp. 54-5.

[85] For a detailed discussion of this movement see Mohd. Noordin Sopiee, "The Penang Secession Movement," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4 (March 1973): pp. 52-71.

[86] Straits Echo, 5 June 1950. This committee was set up in February 1950, see Straits Echo, 9 February 1950.

[87] Straits Echo, 15 June 1950. See also Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, p. 4.

[88] Of the just over 3 million who qualified automatically for Federal citizenship, only 350,000 were Chinese as opposed to 2,500,000 Malays and 225,000 Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese. Annual Report, 1950, p. 24. By the end of 1951 less than 290,000 Chinese had become citizens by application. Annual Report, 1952, p. 33. For detailed analyses of the citizenship regulations, see F.G. Carnell, "Malayan Citizenship Legislation," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 4th Series 1 (October 1952); pp. 504-18; J.M. Gullick, Malaya (London: Benn, 1964), p. 237-243; Simundjuntak, Malayan Federalism, pp. 175-182; and Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free?, passim.

[89] Straits Echo, 19 April 1950.

[90] For Malay opposition to the C.L.C. citizenship proposals, see "Apa Khabar," Straits Echo, 20 May 1950; and Singapore Tiger Standard, 28 July 1950.

[91] Reports of the closed Rulers Conference in August 1950 suggest that the Rulers rejected the initial Government proposals based on the C.L.C. recommendations. See Straits Echo, 16 September 1950. See The Straits Times, 11 January 1951 for a report on the Federation Government's consultations with State Governments.

[92] The discussions prompted by the Bill were initiated after Tan Cheng-lock drew up a memorandum which criticised the Government's proposals. Tan Cheng-lock had discussions with both Gurney and MacDonald, both of whom tried to dissuade him from opposing the Government's Bill to amend the citizenship sections of the Federation Agreement. See Sir Henry Gurney to Tan Cheng-lock, 14 April 1951, TCL Papers (Malaysia), not catalogued; Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to Tan Cheng-lock, 23 April 1951, TCL Papers (Malaysia), not catalogued; Tan Cheng-lock to T.H. Tan, 2 June 1951, TCL Papers (Singapore) TCL/V/121; and Sir George Maxwell

to Tan Cheng-lock, 16 May 1951, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 102. The whole matter of citizenship was placed in July 1951, in the hands of a committee which was to report to the High Commissioner.

[93] The rationale for the dual road to citizenship--State Nationality and the Federal law governing Malayans who were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies--was based on the argument that the sovereignty of the State Rulers and the British monarch, each of whom was a party to the Federation Agreement, should be respected.

[94] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 174.

[95] For details of the citizenship regulations introduced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, see Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? pp. 218-220.

[96] Mrs. B.H. Oon criticised State nationality as being divisive, see Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, pp. 167-170. Mr. Tan Siew-Sin expressed concern that those who were unable to obtain citizenship (1,466,000 according to the Annual Report, 1952, p. 32) and who were no longer under this Amendment British protected persons might be forced, whether they liked it or not, to look to Communist China for some form of international status--when travelling for instance. Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, pp. 170-73. The motion was, however, accepted by the Legislative Council nemine contradicente.

[97] These figures are for 30 June 1953. Only 203 direct citizenships and 38,334 citizenships through State Nationality were acquired by registration or naturalization up to 13 December 1953. See Annual Report, 1953, pp. 15-16.

[98] Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 10.

[99] Ibid., 5th Session, p. 12.

[100] See Ibid., 6th Session, c. 15. An important contribution to the assigning of financial responsibility to these elected bodies was made by The Government of the Federation of Malaya, The Establishment Organization and Supervision of Local Authorities in the Federation of Malaya by Mr. Harold Bedale (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1953). One Chinese newspaper noted that by October 1953 140 New Villages had established Local Councils which levied taxes and dealt with administrative problems. See China Press, 9 October 1953, translation in M.C.A. Press summary, release No. 361/53 in LYK Papers, File No. 18.

[101] Sir Gerald Templer's Press Conference, 26 May 1954, Department of Information, 5/54/193(HC).

[102] They accepted Templer's offer only after Tunku Abdul Rahman, the President of U.M.N.O. persuaded them against their judgment that they should. See Harry Miller, Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj First Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya (London: Harrap, 1959), pp. 125-128. The Tunku also seems to have had difficulty persuading his followers he was right to get Lee and Ismail to enter the Government. One of the arguments he used to placate them was that Templer had promised Federal elections by early 1955. This Templer had not done and the Tunku's actions prompted a severe rebuke from the High Commissioner. See Sir Gerald Templer to The Hon. Tunku Abdul Rahman, 30 October 1953, U.M.N.O. Files, UMNO/SG, No. 7/1953.

[103] See Ibid.

[104] Onn, as Member for Home Affairs, was responsible for the Lotteries Ordinance which prohibited political organizations from holding lotteries. This was aimed at the wealth the M.C.A. gained through lotteries and was an obvious attempt to weaken the opposition. Onn wished to contest the Federal elections under the best possible circumstances.

[105] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 7-8, and 23-4. Within the 46 man committee, the split between Onn and his I.M.P. supporters on the one hand, and the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. people on the other, was usually in the neighbourhood of 26-18 with a few absentees or abstentions. See "Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Federal Elections Committee," 21 January 1954, U.M.N.O. Files, UMNO/YDP 15/1954. For an account of the outcome of the confrontation, see Miller, Prince and Premier pp. 129-161. U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. correspondence on this matter may be found in LYK Papers, File No. 49.

[106] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 473.

[107] See Mustapha bin M. Yusof to Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra, 15 May 1953. The writer argues that "every effort should be made to wrest the administrative control of the country from the British." UMNO Files, UMNO/SG 35/53.

[108] See Tamil Murasu, 22 February 1953, translated in Singapore Daily Digest of Non-English Press, 23 February 1953, 41/53; and Dato Tan Cheng-lock to Sir George Maxwell, 10 April 1952, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/111/275.

[109] The Independence Programme was worked out in 1953 and envisaged the inclusion of Singapore in an independent Malaya, see UMNO Files, UMNO/SG, No. 35/1953.

[110] See Lee Soo-ann, "Fiscal Policy and Political Transition: The Case of Malaya, 1948-1960," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 5 (March 1974); pp. 106-7.

[111] For examples of the emphasis placed on the importance of balancing the budget, see the Legislative Council speeches of Sir Gerald Templer, the Financial Secretary, and a European member of the Council. Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, c. 749, c. 755, c. 823, and c. 828. See also the Draft Development Plan, p. 3.

[112] Lee Soo-ann, "Fiscal Policy," p. 106.

[113] See Andrew Shonfield, British Economic Policy Since the War (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1959), p. 136.

[114] For instances, see The Planter 24 (March 1948), p. 391; 26 (March 1950), p. 93; 26 (October 1950), p. 416; 27 (November 1951); 27 (December 1951).

[115] See The Economist, 9 December 1950, p. 1023. Examples of the attacks on Gurney's proposal may be found in The Planter 26 (September 1950), pp. 368-371; and in a letter from Sir George Maxwell to The Times, 15 November 1950. See Lim Chang Yah, "Export Taxes on Rubber in Malaya-A Survey of Post-War Development," The Malayan Economic Review, 3 (October 1960), pp. 46-58 for an analysis of rubber tax regulations. For an analysis of the Government's anti-inflation policies, see J.P. Meek, Malaya: A Study of Governmental Response to the Korean Boom.

[116] An editorial in The Planter 26 (October 1950), p. 416 noted: "While it is admitted that the Government must get money from somewhere, it is felt that to grant them any large sum is like giving money to a profligate drunkard. It disappears and nothing remains except the hangover."

[117] Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, p. B528.

[118] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Communist Banditry in Malaya: The Emergency June 1948-June 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, p. 8 and p. 13. See also Times of Malaya, 4 June 1949.

[119] See, for example, speeches in the Legislative Council. Legislative Council Proceedings, 3rd Session, pp. 118-9.

[120] Straits Echo, 22 May 1950.

[121] See Means, Malaysian Politics, fn. p. 130.

[122] For more details of the Korean War Prices boom, see Chapter 3 above.

[123] See Appendix, Table F.

[124] See Appendix, Table B.

[125] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 15.

[126] Ibid., 6th Session, cc. 17-18.

[127] Ibid.

[128] See Rudner, "The Draft Development Plan," p. 95.

[129] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 14.

[130] See Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? pp. 117-8.

[131] For revenue and expenditure during the Templer years see Appendix, Table B.

[132] The amount spent on Education and Health dropped significantly in 1949 and 1950 from the 1948 level. See Appendix, Table F.

[133] See Draft Development Plan, 1950, p. 3.

[134] Gurney noted in 1948 that medical facilities even in the towns were below the standards of 1938. Legislative Council Proceedings, 1st Session, B. 535.

[135] Mr. M.R. Holgate, the Director of Education, in a broadcast by Radio Malaya in the series "What Government Departments are Doing" broadcast 24 February 1950 that over 500,000 children of the primary age group were not attending school. Mr. Grifiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the British House of Commons on 3 November 1950 that "only half of the children in Malaya can go to school at the moment." Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series 480 (1950): c. 513.

[136] Teachers criticised the Government for not allowing them a fair hearing. *Straits Echo*, 18 April 1950. An editorial in the *Straits Echo*, 15 July 1949, noted the lack of security for Chinese teachers in schools where they had to apply each year to renew their appointments. Dato Onn criticised the Government on its education policy and received an open letter from Gurney refuting the criticism. *Straits Echo*, 22 May 1950.

[137] Government of the Federation of Malaya, *Central Advisory Committee on Education Report on the Barnes Report on Malay Education and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer 10 September 1951).

[138] See *Legislative Council Proceedings*, 5th Session, p. 464.

[139] See Ibid., p. 463.

[140] The lotteries question is discussed in Means, *Malaysian Politics*, pp. 137-139. The importance of the lotteries to the M.C.A. social welfare programme is noted in Tan Cheng-lock to Sir Gerald Templer, 15 May 1953, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/XIV/60.

[141] See memorandum in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Box 1, No. 65; and Purcell, *Malaya: Communist or Free*? pp. 116-117.

[142] Government of the Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Special Committee Appointed on the 20th Day of September, 1951 to Recommend Legislation to Cover all Aspects of Educational Policy for the Federation of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1952), p. 7. See also Government of the Federation of Malaya, *Education Ordinance* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1952), p. 11.

[143] *Report of the Special Committee to Recommend Legislation on Education Policy*, p. 5.

[144] Speech at the Conference of Chinese School Committees and Teachers held 19 April 1953, reprinted in *Singapore Standard*, 20 April 1953. See also TCL Papers (Malaysia), Box 1, No. 58.

[145] Briefs which elicited replies from Templer were sent by the M.C.A. in November 1952; April 1953; and September 1953. See Tan Cheng-lock to Sir Gerald Templer, 12 May 1953, TCL Papers (Malaysia), Chinese Education No. 4; and Minutes of the Meeting of the M.C.A. Special Committee on the Education Ordinance, 1952 held on 12 September 1953. TCL Papers (Malaysia), Chinese Education No. 2; see also "Memorandum on Chinese Education in the Federation of Malaya," 21 March 1954, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/XIII/25.

[146] For example, see Nanyang Sian Pan, editorial translated in Singapore Daily Digest, 20 October 1952, No. 40, p. 4; Sin Chew Jit Poh editorial translated in Singapore Daily Digest, 30 October 1952, No. 49, pp. 3-4; and Nanfang Evening Post editorial translated in Singapore Daily Digest, 27 July 1953, 167/53.

[147] See Rudner, "Draft Development Plan," pp. 88-89. Yet another Legislative committee was set up in November 1953 to consider the financial implications of the Government's education programme. See Mills, Malaya, pp. 104-6; and Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education, 1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, n.d.), p.35 and Annual Report on Education, 1954), p. 53.

[148] Mr. Francis Carnell wrote at the time that "there can be no doubt that the Chinese schools are the principal forcing house of communism in Malaya." "Report on a visit to Malaya from 20 August-20 September 1952 at the Invitation of the M.C.A." by Victor Purcell and Francis Carnell, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/VI/1. See also Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, pp. 175-177.

[149] Annual Report on Education, 1954, p. 212.

[150] Mr. G.W. Husband in a letter to The Straits Times, 29 June 1948.

[151] This is perhaps best reflected by the different reactions of the Europeans and Chinese to the news of Gurney's murder. The Europeans felt that Gurney had behaved with great courage in an unfortunate situation. His action in getting out of the car and walking to the side of the road to draw fire away from his wife was cited as evidence of his courage and devotion. Many Chinese, however, questioned the wisdom of a man who was head of the country and who had great powers, but allowed himself to get trapped on what was known to be a perilous road with an inadequate guard. Moreover, some Chinese felt that he should never have left his wife alone in the car.

[152] The Straits Times, 20 March 1952.

[153] See The Straits Times, 17 January 1952; and the observation of Captain Cyril Falls in a B.B.C. overseas broadcast over Radio Malaya, 22 January 1952.

[154] "War of the Running Dogs," Anglia Television, I.T.V. (U.K.), 9 July 1974.

[155] Northcote Parkinson has noted that Templer's directness was a great virtue and something "in which soldiers have left civil servants

far behind," Templer in Malaya, p. 17. See also The Straits Times, 20 February 1952 and The Sunday Times (Malaya), 30 May 1954.

[156] See The Straits Times, 8 February 1952, and 2 March 1952.

[157] The Sunday Times (Malaya), 13 April 1952.

[158] He took the communist threat seriously enough to have King's House encircled with a high wire fence soon after he arrived.

[159] Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, p. 188.

[160] See, for example, The Daily News, 14 June 1951.

[161] See Confidential Memorandum on Malaya, submitted to the Rt. Hon. J. Griffiths and the Hon.J. Strachey, 19 May 1950 by Dato Tan Cheng-lock TCL Papers (Malaysia), Box 1, No. 21.

[162] Legislative Council Proceedings, 5th Session, p. 8.

[163] See Press Statement issued by the Department of Information, 21 March 1952, D. Inf. 1/52/11.

CHAPTER 7

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

For a message to reach an audience it must go by way of a communication channel. Hence a channel of communication is the means by which symbols, signs and signals are transmitted from the source to the audience. The channel may be as simple as a face-to-face discussion or it may involve the technical complexities of mass communication.[1] The nature, number, diversity, efficiency and reliability of the communication channels as well as the frequency with which they are used are all crucial components of the communication network which surrounds a leader. This network determines the leader's ability to communicate with the members of a specific unit in order to facilitate "the change or resistance to change of the unit's goals, the attainment of these goals and/or the distribution of the unit's valued scarce resources and rewards". The network has a direct bearing on the leader's ability to gain information about problems and policy alternatives, to execute policies, and to appreciate the general reaction of the people to the activities of the organizations with which he is associated. It also has an impact on the way members of the unit receive information about the leader and his policies, their ability to inform that leader of their grievances and thus their general willingness to support him. In short, in order to understand fully how the communication process affects the leader/non-leader relationship, the channels by which the communication content is exchanged must be examined.

The means by which messages are transmitted between leader and non-leader may be either direct or through a succession of links in a chain of communication channels. The direct or "primary" channels of communication involve the leader in personal transferals of information. This category is important because immediate contact between individuals provides the greatest possibility for clearly and precisely stating views and modifying expectations and behaviour. The importance of the successive links in a chain of communication channels by which a message may be transmitted to a series of individuals or groups has been raised by Elihu Katz and his associates. Their research confirms the hypothesis that "ideas flow from radio and print to opinion leaders and from them to less active sections of the population."[2] This suggests the need to examine the various types of mass media as well as the flow of information from person to person within a formal setting, such as an organization and in any informal relations such as may be found at the village level in many societies. For the purposes of this study, then, the network of communication channels surrounding the two High Commissioners, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer, will be detailed and analysed in terms of the following major categories: "primary" direct interpersonal channels, mass media channels, and "secondary" interpersonal channels.

"PRIMARY" INTERPERSONAL CHANNELS

Templer and Gurney developed decidedly different networks of "primary" communication channels. Gurney's most frequently repeated personal contacts were determined by his administrative responsibilities. He was in constant touch with Government officials in order to deal with his many administrative chores. The Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary were his major Government aides. A small personal staff at the High Commissioner's residence, King's House, were concerned with minor routine matters. Fairly regular meetings between Gurney and Gray, the Commissioner of Police, were held to keep Gurney well apprised of the general security situation and to iron out problems of strategy.

Gurney met frequently with various committees and Councils. In administrative committees, he went over alternative policy proposals and the execution of existing policies with senior civil servants and members of the Government. He discussed policy matters regularly, usually about once a month, with the hereditary Rulers of the Malay States. The Federal Executive Council which Gurney, as High Commissioner chaired, met every fortnight, giving him the opportunity to put forward his policy proposals in the presence of about half a dozen community representatives chosen from the members of the Federal Legislative Council. He was thus able to solicit their opinions on both the current situation and alternative measures to rectify problems. Similarly, the Federal War Executive Council, established in 1950, served as a sounding board for proposals to deal with the Emergency. These meetings, held every three weeks, brought together Gurney and senior representatives of the various communities. The Legislative Council itself was a forum for face-to-face communication between Gurney and some eleven State and Settlement Council representatives and fifty community and interest group representatives. Gurney delivered a major speech each year, outlining the Government's plans and passed comments on debates from his position as chairman of the proceedings. He also listened to comments, criticisms, and suggestions put forward from the floor of the Council. Of equal importance to the formal aspect of these deliberations was the opportunity they offered for less formal discussions between the members and the High Commissioner.

As head of the Government, Gurney received deputations from groups representing economic or political interests. On his arrival in Malaya, Gurney solicited the views of various economic groups, including rubber and tin organizations, and met with their delegations in Kuala Lumpur.[3] Political organizations, such as U.M.N.O. and, after it was formed in 1949, the M.C.A., also sent representatives to press their case on controversial matters.[4] These meetings, while not frequent, were important initial links in the communication chains and were supplemented by exchanges of correspondence between Gurney and the leaders of these organizations. While these links were maintained throughout the period in which Gurney was in office, they seem to have become more frequent during the year 1951.[5]

At King's House, his official residence, Gurney entertained small groups of people from the general public. These groups usually consisted of school children and village elders. As well as personally meeting the High Commissioner, the visitors were given presents, provided with afternoon tea, and shown a film.[6] These visits to King's House by groups from the general public were only introduced after Gurney had been in Malaya for some time and were not too frequent.

Despite the burden of administrative chores Gurney was able to get away from his office and tour the country. His travels to the different States were often prompted by the need to preside at official ceremonies, such as the presenting of medals, awards or prizes to dignitaries, or members of the Security Forces. Tours were also occasioned by the official installation of a Ruler. Thus, these visits involved official receptions, banquets and formal meetings of the State Legislative Councils. There were usually a limited number of people at these ceremonies, thereby restricting the number of personal contacts the High Commissioner was able to make. The tours did, however, provide Gurney with an opportunity to see some plantations and mines and talk to the planters and mine managers. Official luncheons, to which leaders of economic and political organizations in the area were invited, provided further opportunities for personal interaction. He made occasional visits to villages and towns and was able to talk to community and village leaders about the problems that confronted them. On average, during his three years as High Commissioner, Gurney made between one and two tours per month and each lasted about two days.[7] Gurney supplemented these tours with speeches to various organizations. He gave a speech at the annual Press Club dinner, he spoke to Rotary Club gatherings, he addressed Scout parades, and attended dinners in honour of leading merchants, financiers, and businessmen of Malaya. However, all Gurney's activities in this respect were circumscribed by the problem of having to devote so much time to his administrative responsibilities.

Templer set out to establish personal contact with as many people as he could. Within a few days of his arrival, he addressed all Division One Government officers in Kuala Lumpur, spoke with the Government's senior officials, and discussed the security situation with top Police and Army personnel. Templer's two senior advisors were the Deputy High Commissioner, MacGillivray, who dealt with administrative, constitutional and political matters, and the Deputy Director of Operations, Lockhart, who dealt with security operations. He was in constant contact with both. Indeed, the official residences of the High Commissioner and his Deputy were next door to each other. Moreover, each morning, the operations sub-committee of the Federal War Council met. This group, consisting of the Commissioner of Police, the operations head of each of the three services, and senior Government officials, was chaired by the High Commissioner when he was in Kuala Lumpur.[8] This regularized face-to-face communication with those at the head of all three branches of Government—the Police, the Armed Forces, and the Civil Service--encouraged the reciprocal free flow of information about the problems raised by the Emergency situation.

Templer was not as involved as Gurney had been with administrative committees and the various Federal Councils. MacGillivray took Templer's place at the day-to-day committee meetings which smoothed out the problems of executing Government policies. The Federal War Council was abolished by Templer after he enlarged the Federal Executive Council, thus allowing him to concentrate on one set of meetings instead of two. He did not preside over the Federal Legislative Council as Gurney had done, although he did keep the Council better informed by giving more detailed speeches more frequently. He addressed the Legislative Council twice a year, going into every facet of Government policy and supplying the members with copious amounts of statistical data.

Because he was able to shift responsibility for a great deal of the more mundane administrative and political matters over to MacGillivray, Templer was able to maintain a great many personal contacts with people outside the Government. He perpetuated the regular meetings with the Rulers that Gurney had initiated. He established a good rapport through regular personal contact with individual leaders of the political parties[9] and met with delegations that they headed. Like Gurney, he supplemented these ties with detailed letters in replies to queries about policy matters which the political organizations raised. Representatives from various economic interest groups were also encouraged to call in on Templer and to put forward their views on the various economic and security problems that confronted them. A notable example of Templer's interest in constructive criticism was his reaction to a critic who had been particularly outspoken at a meeting of tin miners Templer attended. Having failed to silence the individual with sarcasm, Templer invited him to stay at King's House for a weekend, talked over the problems of the mines, and thereafter kept in regular contact.[10] Templer also saw delegations of Trade Union leaders to discuss labour problems and policies that affected the organization of labour. Templer continued the practice that Gurney had begun of inviting school children, people from the New Villages, and community elders to King's House. These visits became more frequent during Templer's period at King's House, particularly once the Civics Courses were fully organized. The Civics Courses, which usually lasted a few days, were designed to instruct various groups on the benefits of the British system of Government. Those held in Kuala Lumpur often included a visit to the High Commissioner's residence for tea and a pep talk.[11] Templer also let it be known that letters addressed to him would be opened by him personally and that when applicable, he would write replies.[12] Many took advantage of this direct channel of communication to the High Commissioner.

But it was on his tours that Templer was able to establish the majority of the personal contacts that he made with the people of the Federation. He made his intentions clear on his arrival:

> One of the first things I want to do—and I am sure it will be one of the pleasantest parts of my work here--is to get to know as many of the people of Malaya as I can--all kinds of people, not only those with whom I shall be in daily contact. I want to get to know people of all communities and classes so that I may better understand their thoughts and difficulties and hopes and so be better able to help them.[13]

Two weeks later Templer was able to say that he had "met almost all the Rulers of the Malay States, nearly all the Mentri-Mentri Besar, British Advisors and Resident Commissioners and many other leading figures in various walks of life."[14] By the beginning of June, he had visited every State in Malaya. Templer kept up this remarkable pace, visiting many remote areas and spending up to a week touring some regions. In the first twelve months in office, he made forty-five tours. During his twenty-eight months as High Commissioner, he completed 122 tours of kampongs, new villages, labour lines, mines, estates, and units of the security forces. Most of these tours lasted two or three days, and in all he spent a third of his time in Malaya away from his official residence, King's House. He made 246 round trips by air, covering 30,000 miles, and travelled 21,000 miles by road and railway.[15] Because Templer was both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, he went on two types of tours: official receptions with some pomp and ceremony --these were relatively few; and less formal and often unheralded inspections of security units and rural areas where he talked with the men on operational duty and the rural people who were the target of communist activities.[16] Indeed, Templer became famous for his surprise visits to schools, police posts, army units, shops and coffee houses. All officials and commanders were kept on their toes by the possibility of an appearance by the High Commissioner and he was able to see things as they usually were rather than after careful preparation prompted by a warning that His Excellency was on his way. Templer solicited comments wherever he went, allowing village committees to present their complaints and individuals to talk about their own personal problems. The press were invited to accompany him and record at first hand the "rockets" and congratulations he handed out where he felt they were justified. Like Gurney, Templer also made speeches at various functions such as Rotary Club or Chamber of Commerce dinners, and he actively supported a number of groups such as the Boy Scouts, and cultural institutions, such as the National and State Museums.

The differences in the pattern of primary channels of communication developed by Gurney and Templer were important in determining the number of people who were involved in the communication network which surrounded each leader. First, Gurney, because of the need to attend to other duties, could not devote as much time as Templer to meeting people personally. Second, Gurney's confinement to his offices by work for much of the time, meant he preferred to have people visit him at King's House; this limited the number of people who had the opportunity of seeing him. Third, Gurney, even when on tour, was preoccupied with official ceremonies and meetings, again restricting the number of people who had access to him. Templer, on the other hand, met or was seen by a great many more people from all communities and occupations.

MASS MEDIA CHANNELS

The mass media channels provide the opportunity for the speedy transmission of information to a high proportion of people in any large unit. This is particularly so if a leader has direct control over the means of communication. In the early years of the Emergency the Government paid little attention to psychological warfare[17] and the general need to keep the public informed of their policies. However, as the Emergency progressed the Information Services, as the Department which handled the dissemination of information was called, was given greater priority. Indeed, the changes that took place in the mass media channels from the time of Gurney's arrival in Malaya in 1948 to the departure of Templer in 1954 were particularly striking.

The Printed Word

Robert Michels has noted the importance of the press for any leader:

> The press constitutes a potent instrument for the conquest, the preservation and the consolidation of power on the part of the leaders. The press is the most suitable means of diffusing the fame of the individual leaders among the masses, for popularizing their names.[18]

But the impact of the printed word is not uniform across societies. In assessing its implications for the leadership process a number of factors must be taken into consideration.

Not least of these factors is the literacy rate. While the literacy rate in Malaya was fairly high compared to other countries in the region, in absolute terms less than four of every ten people could read and write in any language.[19] Lack of adequate educational facilities prior to the Second World War, the immigration of many illiterate labourers from China, India and the Malayan Archipelago, and the complete breakdown of the school system, particularly in the Chinese communities, during the Japanese Occupation, all contributed to the large percentage of illiterate residents of Malaya in the late 1940s. Yet, the aggregate literacy figures are perhaps misleading. Literacy was much higher among males, and literacy in the Chinese community, in general, was higher than the norm for the whole society.[20] Certain groups, such as the Chinese males and Europeans, and Eurasians (whose literacy rate was over 900 per thousand)[21] were, therefore, more accessible targets for the operators of printed forms of mass media.

The distribution of newspapers throughout the Federation of Malaya reflected these variations in literacy rates. Six different symbol systems were used in printing the fifty-one different papers which served the multiplicity of groups that inhabited the peninsula. But it was the English and Chinese language papers which had the highest circulations. In 1947, of the total circulation of 84,000 copies printed in the Federation and 75,000 copies printed in Singapore for distribution in Malaya, 44 percent were in Chinese and 37 percent in English; only 12 percent were in Indian and 7 percent in Malay.[22] As the literacy rate slowly rose, distribution techniques improved and people had more money to spend on acquiring news, the circulation steadily increased despite the decline in the actual number of publications. Perhaps the most important factor here, given problems experienced by the Chinese community in the Emergency, was that the Chinese language papers expanded their circulation the most.[23]

In assessing the extent of the communication net provided by newspapers, distribution and absolute circulation figures may be misleading if reading habits are not taken into account. While the English-language papers went to homes where they were read on the average by no more than two or three people--the English speaking Asian elite and the Europeans having the money for, and the traditional habit of, buying their own newspapers--each copy of the newspapers in the other languages was used much more extensively. Chinese newspapers were very much a part of the local Chinese coffee shops and were read by successive customers, some sections being read aloud for the benefit of those who were unable to read. Other meeting places, such as community halls in the New Villages, also provided communal copies of the various papers. Similarly, the Malays had a tradition of reading a newspaper aloud in their kampong, thus boosting its effective circulation. In some communities, copies would be passed on once they had been read, from house to house, again effectively increasing the number of people included in the chain of communication. Hence, although there were only 33 daily newspapers for every 1,000 inhabitants, the actual number of people who had access to news from the daily newspapers was much greater.[24] With the number of copies per thousand literate in English being over 320, it would seem that a good majority of all Europeans and probably a majority of the English-speaking Asian elite were exposed to news from a daily newspaper.[25] Furthermore, a high proportion of the literate Chinese and Indians, because of the nature of their traditional reading habits, received information directly from newspapers and some would hear it being read aloud. Likewise, many Malays, though not such a

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high percentage as in the Chinese and Indian communities, were recipients of information by means of the daily newspapers. Therefore, the importance of the daily press as a channel of communication is underlined both by the large numbers involved and by the fact that those who were literate and read the press were often held in high esteem within their community and acted as opinion leaders.

Yet the existence of a channel of communication does not necessarily mean that information about a particular subject is noted. More specifically, with regard to the press as a channel of communication, a number of factors may influence an individual's perception of the information conveyed. These factors include: the frequency with which a leader or a leader's acts are alluded to in the newspapers, the space allotted to the description or analysis of the leader's activities, and the "orientation of news content" or prominence given to such news items.[26] The difference in press coverage of the two High Commissioners, Gurney and Templer, was therefore important.

First, with regard to the frequency with which items about them were carried, a number of points can be made. Gurney's appearance in the papers was irregular. When the Legislature was sitting, his comments as presiding officer would be reported when they were of a substantive nature. However, the Federal Legislature only sat for a few months in the year. His official visits to ceremonial functions were usually reported, but these, as has been pointed out above, were infrequent. Moreover, the English-language press carried more stories on the High Commissioner than the vernacular press during the first few years of the Emergency because of the problem the Information Services branch of the Government had in finding people to translate press releases.[27] Templer was more consistently in the news. His tours were frequent and he invited journalists to accompany him and made sure that an Information Services photographer was on hand.[28] His speeches to clubs and organizations were also fairly numerous and were always reported. The reorganization of the Information Services and the increased money made available to that department ensured a full and efficient translation service that catered to the non-English language papers. Therefore, in terms of the frequency each was the subject of an item in the press Templer fared much better. For example, in the English-language daily, Straits Echo, over a two year period, Gurney's activities were described on average in only three issues per month, while Templer's activities were described in seven or eight issues per month.[29]

Second, just as Templer was the subject of more news stories printed in the dailies, so he was given more space. The space allotted was to some extent the function of the proximity of the story to the distribution area, and as Templer made more visits to all parts of the country, he therefore had a greater opportunity of being accorded a good deal of column inches in local papers. Even in the Kuala Lumpur dailies, such as the Malay Mail, Templer bettered the amount of space given over to descriptions of Gurney's usually ceremonial actions.

Finally, the prominence given each item which concerned the High Commissioners was not that dissimilar. For example, again in the Straits Echo, 55 percent of news items about Gurney were put on the front page, while 45 percent appeared on the inside pages.[30] Items about Templer were similarly distributed with a slightly higher percentage going on the first page. If these ratios are representative, and it seems likely that they are, Templer, thus, in absolute terms, was more frequently on the front page than Gurney.[31] Indeed, overall, Templer was given greater exposure both in terms of the number of times he was alluded to and the space and prominence the items concerning him were accorded.

There would seem to be two major reasons for these differences. First, the generally conservative information policy of Gurney's Government meant that little information was passed on to the news media and hence to the people. This did not encourage an extensive coverage by the press of either Government policies or the activities of the High Commissioner.[32] The lack of rapport between editors and the High Commissioner was manifest on the one side by Gurney's reluctance to participate in regular press conferences, and on the other side by the lack of interest in Government activities displayed by editors who were put off by the reluctance of officials to divulge all that was going on.[33] Interestingly enough, this restrictive policy was pursued by the Government despite official recognition that the press provided "the major channel for disseminating information to the public, particularly in the urban areas."[34] Templer, on the other hand, had fairly frequent meetings with editors and journalists. Despite the fact that he has said, since leaving Malaya, that he has always had "a personal antipathy for the Communications Media",[35] he enjoyed a good press coverage. His tours, during which journalists were able to "record his tongue-lashing a town or village or ordering on the spot electric lights or water to the pained surprise of the official responsible",[36] made good copy. Two very critical observers noted at the time: "The Templer regime continues to enjoy an excellent press and success against the bandits, which would have gone unreported in Sir Henry Gurney's time, are featured in many of the papers."[37] Second, an important factor favouring Templer was that because of the manner of Gurney's death, his successor as High Commissioner was more newsworthy. Much attention was paid to the ambush and murder of Gurney by the newspapers particularly in Britain and America, and the possibility of further attacks plus the difficulties confronting Templer, made his activities of primary importance in news circles. Moreover, the fact that he had personally been interviewed by such a legendary figure as Churchill, not to mention the fact that he was a general in a civil position, made him an intriguing personality. As Walter Gieber argues, "News is what newspapermen make it."[38] Hence, the relationship between the journalists and editors on the one side and the individual political leader on the other is an important factor in the means by which a leader communicates with the general public.

The weekly newspapers and periodical press also provide important channels of communication. These types of publications fulfilled a demand for feature stories and background information in a country where demand for up-to-the minute information was not strong.[39] The Federation publishing centres were responsible for most of the weeklies and periodicals in English and Malay, while the vast majority of those published in Chinese were produced in Singapore.[40] A striking aspect of the weekly and periodical press in the Federation was the number of Government-sponsored publications. While detailed circulation figures for all weeklies and periodicals distributed in Malaya are unavailable, rough figures for those sponsored by the Government show a gradual upward trend over the period 1948-1954. From the outset of the Emergency the Government Information Services Department put out fortnightly Malay and Tamil vernacular papers. The Government claimed that the Malay paper, with a circulation of 50,000 copies per issue reached all parts of the Federation while the Tamil paper with a circulation in 1949 of 35,000 copies per issue was widely read by Tamil labour.[41] Other papers were started with the Chinese monthly The Farmers' News being the most important.[42] In 1951, the total of all weekly and periodical publications printed by the Government exceeded 5 million copies.[43] An important addition to this battery of publications was a monthly paper The New Path News started in 1951 by two psychological warfare specialists, Lam Swee and C.C. Too. By the end of 1952 this influential paper had a monthly circulation of 70,000.[44] By 1953 about half a million copies of regular publications were being sent out each month by the Government:[45] a remarkable propaganda offensive.

Not only did the Government have a large share of the weeklies and periodicals published in the Federation, but it was able to use its not inconsiderable resources and influence to ensure wide distribution. Ginsburg and Roberts estimate that of the twenty-two periodicals, including weeklies, published in Malaya in 1953, thirteen were Government sponsored.[46] Distribution was facilitated by the cooperation of organizations such as the Malayan Chinese Association and trade unions. The schools were also a useful and extremely important means of disseminating the papers which were aimed at the younger sections of the rural population. Reading rooms and Information Centres which were built by the

Government in many rural kampongs and New Villages were also used as distribution points.[47] Moreover, the fact that the Government had full control over the contents of these newspapers meant that the activities of the High Commissioner and the policies of the Government could be given the greatest possible coverage. There was no direct press censorship in Malaya and although unofficial pressure was sometimes applied, either in the form of requests to stop pursuing a story or in the form of a denial of usually regular information on Emergency activities, editors were, on the whole, free to give the Government the space they saw fit.[48] Hence, in the Government publications, both Gurney and Templer were given more space, more frequently than in the privately published papers. But it was Templer who benefitted the most because he was more willing than Gurney to use the facilities of the Information Services to explain his policies and solicit support for the Government and because of the general growth in the circulation of Government papers during the period 1948-1954.

The press, an important channel for the flow of communication from the leader to the general public, may also act as a channel for information flowing in the opposite direction. The vital factor here is whether the letters to the editor, views expressed in editorials, and items of news which relate public sentiment reach the leader or whether he isolates himself from such opinions. In Malaya, Gurney was initially isolated from the opinions expressed in the vernacular press because of the language barrier; however, towards the end of his period in office, translations were provided of relevant items for the express purpose of keeping Government officials abreast of public opinion.

Thus, the *Daily Summary of the Vernacular Press*, the *Weekly News Summary*, and the *Fortnightly Press Digest of Editorial Opinion in the Malayan Press* linked Gurney, in the last few months before his murder, and Templer, during the whole of his period in office, with the press of all languages.[49] Any item that referred to a Government policy or a Government official found its way into the pages of one of these information sheets so that, as well as taking note of the views expressed, action could be taken if appropriate. Hence, numerous views, not just those expressed in the prestigous English-language papers and periodicals, such as the *Straits Times* and *The Planter*,[50] had a channel by which they reached the political leader, the High Commissioner.

Further forms of printed mass communication upon which the Government relied heavily for the dissemination of information were pamphlets and leaflets. The Government did not have a monopoly on this means of communication; the M.C.P. provided stiff competition. But after a rather inauspicious initial campaign, improvements were made until the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets became an important adjunct to the Government's counter-insurgency operations. Pamphlets on such subjects as trade union organization were prepared in the four languages and distributed;[51] however, because of a severe shortage of funds prior to 1951 the scope of these publicity campaigns was limited. Similarly, the distribution of leaflets, which were initially the chief medium employed for propaganda against those guerrillas in the jungle who could not be reached by more direct methods, as well as the more inaccessible rural kampongs and villages, was restricted. Moreover, the logistical problems of getting the leaflets into the jungle and into the hands of the general public were not surmounted until considerable experience had been accumulated. Leaflets caught in the forest canopy with few reaching the ground, the paper rapidly disintegrating with the hot sun and monsoon rains, and the accuracy of pilots dropping the material were all obstacles that frustrated the success of leaflet campaigns.[52] The 30 million leaflets produced in 1948 became 51 million by 1951 and, as more money and experienced personnel became available, leaflet campaigns were intensified.

From the first days of his time in Malaya, Templer recognized the importance of using the Information Services to establish contact with the general public. For example, directly after his arrival, a pamphlet was issued containing the directive given to Templer by the British Government and the message to the public which he had issued when he first arrived. On the front cover was a picture of Templer in his General's uniform. This pamphlet, which was published in English, Chinese, and Tamil, was widely distributed throughout the Federation.[53] The overall expansion of the leaflet campaigns, boosted by the increased revenue after 1950, was continued so that by early 1954, 2 million leaflets were being dropped every week.[54] A large number of the leaflets were surrender notes which were signed by Templer as Director of Operations and which guaranteed good treatment for the bearer once he left the jungle. It became apparent that these notes were reaching their target when 80 percent of those who surrendered early in 1954 said they had seen a surrender leaflet.[55] Hence, the intensification of the leaflet campaigns and the increased circulation of pamphlets which contained messages from Templer served to give a wider audience, including those ensconced in the depths of the jungle, an appreciation of who the leader of the Government was and what his policies were.

The dissemination of information about the leader by means of the printed word and the feedback that this channel of communication provides is an important dimension of the political leadership interaction process. The printed word, because it can be read, re-read, read aloud, and passed on, has a lasting value not found in other forms of the mass media. In Malaya, during the years under consideration, the reading habits of the residents made the printed word an extremely versatile channel of communication. Thus, despite the fact that less than half the population of the Federation was literate, the impact of the newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and leaflets was considerable. The consequences of this channel of communication for the two leaders, Gurney and Templer, were important. Of the two it was Templer who was able to reach the large audience. The reason for this was a combination of factors which included: the gradual rise in the literacy rate over the period 1948 to 1954; the general rise in newspaper, periodical, pamphlet, and leaflet circulation; the expansion of the Information Services as a result of the infusion of larger amounts of money into Government propaganda programmes after 1951; and the greater interest of editors in Templer as a public personality. The expansion of the mass circulation of the printed word in Malaya, therefore meant that Templer and his policies became more widely known than Gurney and his policies had been.

Broadcasting and Films

In a country with a large illiterate population, such as Malaya, radio broadcasting would seem to provide an important alternative source of information to the printed word. But in the initial years of the Emergency the expansion of broadcasting and the full exploitation of radio as a communication channel was limited by a number of organizational, technical and economic problems. The problems were only slowly resolved.

Of major concern to the Malayan Government was the fact that in 1948 the main offices, studios and transmitters were located in Singapore. Only relay facilities were maintained in the Federation. Hence, with each Government responsible for facilities within its boundaries, the Singapore government had greater control over programmes and programming.[56] Conscious of this imbalance, the Federation Government, once money from the Korean War boom revenue became available and technological advances produced the right equipment, started to attempt to rectify the situation. They did this by sending into all parts of the country newly trained staff in the Malay, Chinese and Indian sections of the Community Listening and Emergency Broadcasting Division.[57] More programmes were produced in Kuala Lumpur. By the end of 1952, broadcasts had been made from every State and Settlement in the Federation.[58] By 1953, there were studios, offices and transmitting stations in the Federation which gave the Federation Government greater control over the programming arrangements.[59]

Programming itself was initially limited by organizational and economic considerations. News, newstalks, and features which were the programmes carrying information about the High Commissioner, his activities, and Government policies in general were restricted by the lack of trained reporting staff and by the problems of translating and producing programmes in so many languages. Thus, while news of the Emergency took priority in all news bulletins--there were 11 per day in all languages--and the total time devoted to news broadcasts in 1949 amounted to over 900 hours,[60] there were complaints from people in the Federation about the scarcity of local news and the fact that it was given badly without the impact eye-witness accounts would have had.[61] So the conservative information policy of the initial years of the Emergency had its effect on radio news as well as newspaper reports.

A number of improvements in both the scope and relevance of programmes were gradually introduced. Mr. H. Carleton Greene, who was seconded from the B.B.C. to head the Emergency Information Services in September 1950, recognized the shortcomings of the existing policy towards Radio Malaya and was able, with the aid of the existing senior staff, to devise programmes with more propaganda value and to persuade the Government to give more background information so that news items could be put in context. His cause was aided both by the increased use of portable recording machinery, which meant that news items and interviews could be recorded in any part of Malaya, and by the increased funds made available by the Korean War boom revenue. Indeed, the money injected into broadcasting increased dramatically from $.4 million in 1949 to $5.1 million in 1952.[62] A big advance was the introduction of a third network. Until this time, there had been two networks: the Blue Network which broadcast almost entirely in English and the Red Network which broadcast in Malay, Tamil, several Chinese dialects, and a little English. The inauguration of the Green Network, which broadcast entirely in Chinese dialects, meant that more Chinese communities could hear the news, newstalks, and feature programmes in their own languages.[63] A second innovation which resulted in a more useful service for the rural population in all three vernacular languages was the establishment of the Community Listening Section of Radio Malaya. Started in 1951, the Community Listening Service provided broadcasts on such subjects as health, agriculture, infant welfare, language instruction, and civics, as well as various forms of entertainment.[64] These useful and popular programmes encouraged people to listen to the news programmes. The number of hours devoted to the news broadcasts rose steadily, from 900 hours during 1949 to 1,272 hours in 1952, and 1400 hours in 1953.[65] The percentage of all programmes devoted to news, newstalks, and feature programmes also rose during this period. Hence, programmes in which items of information about the policies of the Government and the activities of the High Commissioner were related, increased in number and in the languages used.

It was Templer, rather than Gurney, who benefitted from the developments in broadcasting made by Radio Malaya. Templer was able to use this media to explain his Government's position on issues and policy proposals to a far greater extent than had Gurney. Further, Templer's activities and Government policies were discussed at greater length in various types of programmes designed to acquaint the general public with the evils of communism and the benefits of the British system. Templer also gave more talks over the radio than Gurney had done. Gurney, handicapped by the initial problems which plagued broadcasting in the Federation did not have the opportunity to broadcast regularly over

Radio Malaya even if he had felt it was necessary.[66] Templer, on the other hand, had both the opportunity, with the expansion of facilities in Kuala Lumpur, and the inclination to use the radio to appeal to the people of Malaya to support his efforts.[67]

Yet the transmission of programmes does not mean they will be heard. The number of radios and the listening audience of each set is a crucial factor in assessing the importance of this channel of communication as a link between the leader and the population of the unit. It is a strange paradox that while broadcasting holds such potential for reaching a large number of the illiterate population of a society it is this very group who because they lack the funds to acquire a radio are often the last to benefit from this channel of communication. This was certainly the case in the first two or three years of the Emergency. It was not until the Korean War boom provided higher wages to labourers that they were able to buy small luxury items such as a radio. The Korean War boom enabled estate and mine owners, as well as the Government, to install radios in many rural settlements. In 1949, only 35,000 listeners' licenses were issued; by 1952, this figure had risen to 73,500 and reached 110,800 by 1953.[68] This gives a clear indication of the burgeoning listening audience. Similar advances were made in a number of schools, availing themselves of the Broadcasting Service. In 1948, only 265 schools had radio receivers. These numbers increased rapidly so that by 1952, 1156 schools and by the end of 1953, 1364 schools had radios.[69] Equally important was the donation by the Government of "community receivers." In 1949, only 32 radios were maintained by the Government.[70] During 1951, nearly 700 "community receivers" were installed in kampongs, and many small battery receivers were distributed to the New Villages. Moreover, by mid-1951, over 250 estates had installed receivers for the use of their labour force. By the end of 1952, over 1400 "community listening receivers" were in use in kampongs, New Villages, mines, and estates.[71] This, as was officially noted, meant that "radio reached into the rural areas and for the first time became an important medium of information, education and entertainment for the isolated population who hitherto had been largely outside its range."[72]

Malayans were--and probably still are--among the most avid filmgoers in the world. This form of mass communication, which was initially neglected by the Government, presented a great potential for disseminating information on the benefits of Government policy and the evils of communism. Attendance was very heavy whenever and wherever films were shown. In Kuala Lumpur, in 1948, there was a weekly attendance of about 100,000 persons, and this was in an urban area of only 176,000 population.[73] A newsreel, one or two shorts, and a feature film usually made up the programme. Both the newsreel and the shorts presented opportunities for the Government to put forward its policies and to show how it was dealing with the communist threat. Initially, however, because the Malayan Film unit, which was created in 1946 to act as the main vehicle for producing and distributing films about Malaya, was in its infancy, and because of the strict financial limitations imposed on film production, little advantage was taken of this communication channel.[74] Prior to 1951, some film footage suitable for newsreels was produced and spliced into American or British newsreels, but coverage of local stories was generally poor. Similarly, documentary short films were not produced in great quantities before 1951. Only 19 films were produced in the period 1947-49, 52 films in 1950, and 111 films in 1951. This was not many, considering the voracious appetite for film shows and the potential of the medium.[75] The decision to expand the Film Unit in order to increase production was taken in 1950 but because of the delay in the delivery of the necessary equipment, the fruits of this decision did not appear until 1952, after Templer had arrived.[76] In 1952, too, the Malayan Film Unit became part of the Films Division of the Department of Information Services, thus becoming directly responsible for translating the Government's information and publicity themes into films. As a result of these changes, the predominance of English-language films was countered by the increased use of dubbing in Malay, Chinese, and Tamil, and the production of a number of short entertainment films in vernacular languages.[77] Moreover, the distribution of a monthly film magazine, devoted to Malayan affairs, which had been produced in English and Malay since 1950 and in Chinese since 1951, as well as other documentary films were greatly increased.[78]

This expansion of distribution was connected to the rise in the number of commercial cinemas and mobile cinema vans. In 1947, in Malaya and Singapore combined, there were just over 100 cinemas.[79] By 1952, the figure for Malaya alone was 155 commercial cinemas, and this expansion continued. But just as important, perhaps more so for they reached people in the rural areas where the communists were most active and cooperation was most necessary, were the mobile cinema units. There were a few commercially operated mobile units, but the most important, from the point of view of Government propaganda, were those operated by the Information Services. But in the first two years of the Emergency, up to the beginning of 1951, there were only 16 units in operation.[81] In 1951, the necessity of expanding this service became apparent, and by 1952, 63 units were travelling around the rural areas of Malaya.[82] Further units were added in 1953 so that by the beginning of 1954, a total of 90 mobile film units were complementing Emergency operations by disseminating propaganda and entertainment.[83] With 90 units, more than one million people were being catered to each month.[84] This was a remarkable and significant step forward in mass communication, especially when combined with the fact that the Government had full control over the message of the film.

These mobile cinema units also doubled as public address units. Hence, not only could films be shown, always an irresistible attraction, but speeches could be made and demonstrations put on. But again, use of the public address units in the first years of the Emergency was not only limited but lacked trained and experienced personnel, and thus, propaganda value. One analyst noted at the time: "Propaganda by loud-speaker vans is utterly useless. This apparatus is referred to (by the rural Chinese population) as 'a bursting big gun', which means a loud but empty voice."[85] Not until propaganda techniques were perfected, such as getting surrendered communists to give public speeches, and combining talks with films on practical everyday problems to do with such matters as health, farming, and food control, did the mobile public address units really become of value in the anti-communist campaign. Programmes had to be tailored to the values of the population and not governed by abstract notions of democracy and presented by culture-bound Englishmen.

An intriguing extension of the public address unit concept was the "voice aircraft". As the Government's knowledge of which communist guerrillas operated where and details about the personal lives of each guerrilla became known, it became possible to broadcast messages from the air. Three Dakota aircraft and two Austers were assigned to the programme. Messages often directed towards just one individual could be heard up to one and a half miles away. A highlight of this operation was a message recorded in Mandarin by Templer himself, urging immediate surrender.[86]

The organizational, economic and technical changes that took place in the year before Gurney was murdered proved extremely beneficial to Templer. Added to these improvements were the advantages accruing from improvements in both radio broadcasting and film production and distribution made while Templer was in office. The expansion of radio broadcasting and the dramatic increase in the number of radio sets in the population, particularly the rural areas, was crucial to the development of relations between the High Commissioner and the general public. As Wilbur Schramm has noted, at the time when the small, relatively isolated rural communities are being opened up to the machinations of the wider world (and in the case of Malaya, at a time when the communist threat added to these systemic strains) the mass media and particularly the radio, which transcends literacy and transportation barriers, can confer great status on individuals who are repeatedly mentioned as national figures having the capability to control the lives of all.[87] Similarly, the dramatic growth in audiences that saw films and listened to the public address units was significant. Not only did this increase in film-watching give people an impression from the feature films of what life in non-communist countries was like--the sweet socializes as much as the medicine--but it also allowed a larger section of the population to see Gurney and Templer and be apprised of the Government's policies and activities. Moreover, the Government's direct control over radio broadcasting and the Government mobile cinema/public address units, and direct control, through censorship of commercial films, allowed the Government to manipulate this channel of communication as it saw fit.[88] On the whole, then, developments in broadcasting and the cinema worked to the greater advantage of Templer; Gurney was the initiator of many of the improvements from which Templer benefitted.

"SECONDARY" INTERPERSONAL CHANNELS

The dissemination of information by word-of-mouth is a crucial aspect of the pattern of communications in any society. This is particularly so in Afro-Asian societies where personal communications are highly valued.[89] Hence, the set of personal relations that link the elite, who normally have the closest contacts with a leader and the mass of the people at the village level is most important. If a leader is to be able to make his policies understood and accepted and if he is to be able to properly assess the mood and expectations of the mass of the people he must not only maintain his contacts with the members of the elite but also hope that these contacts are repeated down through the different levels of society. Should these links be interrupted a leader may find himself isolated from the very people he professes to lead.

The Colonial Government

Because the Colonial Government was the one organization in Malaya over which the High Commissioner had formal control it was of particular importance to them in terms of establishing the series of personal links between themselves and the general population of the Federation. However, the factors that affected the relationship between Gurney and the Administration in the early years of the Emergency[90] also inhibited the free flow of information. The administrative bottleneck that centred on the Chief Secretary's office restricted communication between the officials in Kuala Lumpur and those dealing directly with the people in the countryside. Similarly, the Police Force suffered from the lack of communication between the Headquarters, largely manned by non-Malaya trained and overworked personnel, and the field staff. The Malaya trained field officers could not initially make those at the centre aware of the gravity of the situation[91] and felt later that their advice concerning solutions to the problems posed by the communists was ignored. Factions and petty jealousies also hindered the exchange of information; each group wished to maintain the upper hand and therefore, did not allow others to know what they were doing. Moreover, Gurney himself, because he was ensconced in King's House and relatively isolated from the majority of his subordinates (particularly those in the areas outside the major urban centres), did not make a great contribution to the personal dissemination of information throughout the Government. Nor did senior officials, overloaded as they were with a backlog of work created by the shortage of trained manpower, have many opportunities to venture out of their offices to discuss problems either with subordinates or with the general public.

Not only was the chain of communication through the Government weak in the initial years of the Emergency, but also a number of factors combined to create a barrier between the various sections of the population and those members of the Government who had to deal with them. First, and most important, was the language problem. Although there were approximately two million Chinese in the Federation (over 38 percent of the total population) and although the M.C.P. guerrillas, over 90 percent of whom were Chinese, relied on the rural Chinese community for recruits, supplies, and information, there were very few Chinese speaking Government officials. One observer has estimated that those able to speak a Chinese dialect formed less than 10 percent of the Police Force and the civil service.[92] The language barrier was equally acute where the Indian community was concerned and only a little less so with regard to relations between Government officials and Malays. Police officers and civil servants recruited prior to the Emergency had a basic knowledge of Malay; however, those like the police officers and sergeants from the disbanded Palestine Force who had been recruited to meet the new commitments, had no Malay language training. A second factor was the general shortage of manpower, whether trained in a language or not. To compound this problem was the fact that the Japanese occupation had forced large numbers of Chinese to disperse and to farm small, scattered and often fairly inaccessible pieces of land. Hence, just at the time when a large number of people were needed to supervise and re-establish contacts with an important sector of the population, officials were in short supply. A third factor was that the Security Forces charged with routing out the communists did not provide contacts with the rural population that put the Government's policies in the best light. Their actions and dealings with many rural Chinese communities neither persuaded the inhabitants of the Government's intention to provide adequate security nor that the Government recognized the dilemma of their situation. Finally, the Government's administrative policy of abolishing the system of Protectors of Chinese Affairs fostered a sentiment within the Chinese community that the only regular personal contact with the Government had gone and there was therefore, no means of properly expressing their grievances and hopes.

The result of this barrier between the Government and the people of Malaya, particularly the Chinese people, was that Gurney's requests for support, his attempts to develop policies to aid the Chinese, and the general policies of the Government reached only limited sections of the population. Conversely, the numerous problems experienced by different communities and, in particular, the grievances related to the execution of Government policy, did not all come to the attention of the High Commissioner. Moreover, information about communist activity, vital if the Security Forces were to counter the guerrilla threat, was not passed on to the Government in any quantity.[93] Nor indeed, was such information that did reach officers in the field properly distributed throughout the Government because of poor communication links. While information was passed between Gurney and the general population, the Government hierarchy, during the first years of the Emergency, did not provide particularly efficient channels of communication.

Gradually, however, improvements were made. Within the Government, both horizontal and vertical channels of communications concerning the Emergency were more clearly delineated by the War Executive Council System that Briggs set up at the Federal, State and District levels. Much of the reticence to exchange information, which had resulted from the petty feuding that had characterized the Government, was eliminated with the wholesale change in senior personnel in the few months after Gurney's death. Added to this was the re-organization initiated by Lyttleton after his tour of Malaya and carried on by Templer when he arrived. This re-organization alleviated the administrative bottleneck in Kuala Lumpur and brought officers in the "field" into closer contact with the major administrative centres. Furthermore Templer, by touring outlying administrative and police posts, often accompanied by the responsible senior official for that area, kept lower levels of the Government hierarchy fully apprised of his policies and expectations.

Communications between Government personnel and the public also improved gradually. Chinese recruits were encouraged to join the administration and those who joined played an important role in the expansion of the Chinese Affairs Department. However, because of the problem of finding Chinese who were qualified in both English and Chinese, progress was slow and significant advances were not made until 1952. More Chinese recruits were also enrolled into the Police Force. In December 1950, over 40 Chinese recruits finished training and became full members of the Force; the first time Chinese men had entered the Police other than as officers or detectives.[94] A major improvement in relations came about through the series of Civic Courses sponsored by the Government. First held in Malacca in May 1952, they brought groups of people from all walks of life into direct contact with Government officials. Government policy was explained through the media of lectures, films, demonstrations, and tours, and members were encouraged to keep in touch with the Government organizers after their course was over.[95] The courses proved to be very popular, with over one hundred held by November 1953. Finally, Templer by example, encouragement, and edict fostered a greater willingness on the part of the civil servants and members of the Police Force to develop and maintain contacts with all sections of the population of the Federation. Not only did Templer take officials with him on his tours, but he told Heads of Departments and District Officers to increase the numbers of tours they made.[96] Further, the success of "Operation Service", which was specifically introduced to bring the Police and public together, was followed by similar campaigns in other Government Departments, all of which encouraged the development of communications between administrators and the general population.

An administrator or member of the Security Forces in the field can act as a link in the chain of communication between the leader and the non-leader only if he himself is linked to the leader and if he is able to communicate with the general public. During the early years of the Emergency, in fact during much of the time that Gurney was High Commissioner, public officials who were responsible for executing Government policy at the local level were often not kept properly informed by their superiors. In many cases they were unable to impart to or receive from members of the public information of any substance. The situation gradually improved in the months prior to Gurney's death, but Templer was undoubtedly the major beneficiary of the developments which enabled the administration to act as a fairly efficient channel of communication between the public and the High Commissioner.

Elected Committees and Councils

Prior to the Emergency, political institutions at the local level were essentially traditional in character. For Malays, the kampong was the basic unit and was linked to the central Administration of the country through the penhulu, the Malay official who administered a group of kampongs.[97] The Chinese political organizations were based on language or place-of-origin similarities.[98] On the whole, the central Colonial Government had little impact on the Chinese society in Malaya, and the headmen of the various Chinese communities governed as they saw fit.

The Emergency, and particularly the resettlement programme introduced in 1950, significantly changed the local political relationships. The outbreak of the Emergency induced some rural communities to set up village committees in an attempt to establish a liaison with the Government.[99] These groups were of limited success and were generally dismantled during the dislocation caused by resettlement. With resettlement, however, came the election of village committees. First started in Johore, they acted as the link between the local district administrator and the New Villagers. Despite some problems, such as putting several Chinese language groups, and therefore several headmen, in one resettlement area, the elected officials maintained the support of the people they represented. Gradually, the "parish pump" type of democracy was extended and legal provision was made for the establishment of Local Councils, Town Boards, Town Councils, and Municipalities with elected officials. By March 1953, fifty Local Councils had been established,[100] and by June 1954, there were 209 fully elected Local Councils and 23 Town Councils.[101]

The Village Committees worked well, but not all the Local Councils were a success. The development of these elected bodies was, to a large degree, dependent upon the attitude and cooperation of officials, and where the local administrators encouraged the growth of the democratic machinery, such as in Johore, the councils and committees flourished.[102] The successful electoral experiments provided Templer with an excellent means of communicating with people in the rural areas. Through the Civics Courses, which were specifically designed to make local leaders acquainted with Government personnel and policy, and Templer's many personal contacts in the field, elected officials gained information and impressions that they were able to pass on. Moreover, the fact that chairmen of Local Councils met periodically to confer amongst themselves and with officials meant that regular news of the Government, the High Commissioner, and their activities, reached these areas. And the benefits all accrued to Templer, for it was not until the New Villages were well established, and the legislation introduced authorizing local government that this channel of communication came into being.

Political Parties and Interest Groups

In the Federation of Malaya during the period under review, the High Commissioner, because he was an official of a Colonial regime rather than an indigenous politician, did not hold a position in a political party. This situation had one advantage in that Gurney and Templer could call simultaneously on a number of political organizations for support and not necessarily be bound by the constraints of partisan politics. But there were important disadvantages in that neither High Commissioner was in a position to manipulate the organizational machinery of a party as directly and, therefore, as easily as could a party leader. This lack of control meant that a party could neither be used to disseminate nor activated to solicit information, as Gurney and Templer might have wished. However, the hierarchical structure of the political parties and their consequent chain of interpersonal links which extended to many parts of the Federation provided such potential for the exchange of information between the two High Commissioners and the people of Malaya that the extent to which these channels were exploited by Gurney and Templer is instructive.

Only two political parties emerged from the first few years of the Emergency relatively unscathed. The Government's suspicion of any left wing or nationalist organization and the polarization of political activity that the declaration of the Emergency produced, meant that the activities of most political organizations except the United Malay Nationalist Organization (U.M.N.O.) and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) were severely curtailed.[103] The U.M.N.O., because it had been in close cooperation with the Government over the Federation Agreement and because it had no former ties with the communists, remained relatively unchanged by the declaration of the Emergency. The M.C.A., which was formed in February 1949 in Kuala Lumpur was the result of the recognition by a few Chinese businessmen of the need to form an organization which could represent Chinese interests, particularly business interests and attempt to re-establish closer links between the Chinese community as a whole and the Colonial Administration.

Crises of confidence continually plagued the poltical parties in Malaya during the first half dozen years of the Emergency. Each party had to simultaneously gain the confidence of the public they aspired to represent and of the Malayan Government. This confidence had not only to be gained, but also maintained if a party was to act as the link between the two. This was a difficult task, for as Lucian Pye has noted, it posed a dilemma:

> If any group appears to be too 'irrational' or too 'disruptive', then they lose any chance of having influence on the policy makers and in turn soon lose their support. On the other hand, if they conform to the rational standards of government and operate according to the administrative pattern of politics, they are likely to isolate themselves.[104]

For the political parties to be effective channels of communication, each link in the chain had to be securely connected to the next. The dilemma confronted by party leaders gives an indication of where the weaknesses were to be found.

Interpersonal contacts between the various party leaders and Gurney were irregular but not infrequent. Much, of course, depended upon the Government's acceptance of a party as a 'responsible' organization. In this regard, Dato Onn, President of the United Malays Nationalist Organization, was well respected by senior Government officials, as were a number of the high ranking U.M.N.O. members who had worked with the Government during the drawing up of the Federation Agreement. Similarly, leaders of the M.C.A. were accepted by Gurney and the Government, and views were exchanged at various meetings, particularly during the weeks when the Federal Legislative Council was in session. Other parties, however, were not accorded the same opportunities. The feeling of the Government was obviously that the parties which advocated radical solutions to the problems of Malaya were neither 'responsible' nor representative of a significant proportion of the population.[105] Senior members of U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. gained further cooperation from top level Government officials as a result of the deliberations of the Communities Liaison Committee. The meetings of this group, which included six Chinese representatives, six Malay representatives, and one representative from each of the Indian, Eurasian, Ceylonese and European communities, provided a forum for the discussion of public policy and were responsible for making recommendations on a number of divisive topics.[106] The result was, of course, increased contacts with top Government officials to discuss the proposals.

But the chain of interpersonal links that might have been established between Gurney and the Malayan people through the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. broke down at the link between the party leaders and the party membership. Onn and his associates came under a great deal of criticism for what many party members considered to be his attempts to sell Malayan Government policies to the U.M.N.O. rather than represent the U.M.N.O. interests in the decision-making circles of the Government.[107] As a consequence Onn resigned from the U.M.N.O. and although he was re-elected President and returned to the Organization for a short period he eventually severed all relations and on 16 September 1951 he founded the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (I.M.P.)[108] The major problem for the M.C.A. was more simple; they found that they could not attract members in the numbers that some, particularly within the Government, had hoped.[109] Clearly they could make no claims to be representative of the Chinese community as a whole. The M.C.A. found itself caught in a dilemma. In order to gain acceptance by the rural Chinese, the M.C.A. leaders had to demonstrate that they had influence with the Government and could extract concessions that would materially benefit Chinese communities. But the Association found that before wary Government officials would fully accept and trust M.C.A. leaders, proof that they represented a good proportion of the Chinese community had to be presented. The M.C.A. was, in the first few years of the Emergency, unable to do either with any great success.

The major boost to the development of all parties, however, came with the introduction of elections in late 1951. The initial municipal and state elections offered the prospect of gaining the political power necessary to make some substantial economic and political changes and thus acquire a larger following which would enable the party, or so it was hoped, to take over the reins of the Federal Government. The successive campaigns of each party were fuelled by this prospect. Indeed stimulated by electoral competition into greater activity, the various political organizations expanded the scope of their operations, became more rooted in the general population and established better ties with Government officials at all levels. The U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. formed an alliance to fight Dato Onn's I.M.P. and gained successes at municipal and state elections.[110] Spurred on by these successes M.C.A. members cultivated ties with rural villages, particularly the New Villages, and developed schemes for aiding villagers in their relations with the Government.[111] Similar efforts to maintain and extend contacts with the rural Malay communities were undertaken by U.M.N.O. members and officials. Tunku Abdul Rahman, who had succeeded Dato Onn as President, was particularly active in this respect.[112] Both U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. officials tended to seek out the local leaders and gain their support first. In this way the existing local social and political organizations could be incorporated into the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. structures. Moreover good and continued local leadership was ensured.

Other organizations which acted to some extent as interest groups were also useful as channels of communication. The various Chambers of Commerce groups, the groups associated with the production of Malaya's major commodities, such as the Incorporated Society of Planters, and some small communal groups, provided the High Commissioner with the opportunity of maintaining links, through their leaders, with a wide variety of people. This fact had been generally recognized by the Colonial Administration directly after the Second World War when a number of leaders of these organizations were appointed to the Federal Legislative Council. Thus, while the membership of these interest groups was relatively small, it can be argued that the High Commissioners were linked to the sections of the population that these groups represented throughout the period under discussion. As a consequence of this, both High Commissioners, Gurney and Templer, were able to disseminate information about the Government's policy and, perhaps just as important, solicit advice as to what measures should be adopted.

One group of organizations that might have been expected to act as a vehicle for the transmission of information to and from the High Commissioner was the Trade Unions. However, prompted by the extent of M.C.P. activity in the Malayan trade unions, the Government introduced amendments to the Trade Union Ordinance which severely restricted the types of unions legally permissible and allowed close supervision of union activity. These restrictions, which mainly centred on the eligibility of an organization to be registered as a trade union, and thus legally organize labour, were introduced just prior to the declaration of the Emergency.[113] The regulations substantially reduced the total membership in trade unions and allowed for only a slow development thereafter.[114] A large proportion of members, 69 percent in 1952 and 72 percent in 1953, were Indians and nearly half of the members were Government employees.[115] The lack of Malay and especially Chinese members, and the low percentage of the total work force that the membership represented were indicative of the fact that the Government did not feel that the risks they foresaw in the development of an extensive trade union movement were worth taking. Trade unions, therefore, were not used to mobilize the population behind Government policies to any great extent.

Both the political parties and the interest groups facilitated communications between the High Commissioners and the general public in Malaya. But the party system was slow to develop as a result, and Gurney was deprived of this important channel of communication to the people. Gurney was able to communicate with a limited section of the total population through the leaders of small interest and community groups; however, parties were not initially encouraged. Many civil servants were reluctant to accept that political parties could have a place in the fight against the communists. Yet, it was Gurney who drew up plans for the catalyst to the rise of the parties, the elections. That the competitive nature of the elections spurred party members on was readily accepted by leaders and the public alike. In particular, the fight between the I.M.P., Onn, and his supporters on the one hand, and the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. alliance, on the other hand, provided the incentive for both sides to expand the work of their respective organizations.[116] An important consequence of the fact that the parties were able to begin to mobilize support, and thus demonstrate that the people were willing to place their trust in the organizations,[117] was that mutual trust and respect between the parties and the Government grew. This mutual trust and cooperation was essential if the political parties were to develop. Leon Yew-koh has noted with regard to this problem:

> The M.C.A. is unable to give effective cooperation to the Government without the confidence and support of the Government. For without the confidence and support of the Government, it would be difficult, if not impossible for the M.C.A. to win the confidence and support of the people. M.C.A. is mere tinsel, a superficial showy organization without strength or substance. 118

All parties required the confidence of both the Government and the people to be successful. But neither could be gained without the other. The elections provided for the eventual acquisition by the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. alliance of both the confidence of a significant proportion of the population and the respect of many within the Colonial Government.

Therefore, as with other aspects of the conditions which aided Templer in his role as High Commissioner and political leader of Malaya, it was Gurney who laid the groundwork. And the timing was important. The political parties began to blossom at a time when the news of the October 1951 directive was beginning to percolate down through the hierarchy of the M.C.P. and communist units were beginning to emphasize the political offensive, rather than military activities. Hence, when the communists began their campaign of political subversion, they found that the political parties were providing people with a greater understanding of Government activities and also a way of expressing their grievances without resorting to illegal measures. The party hierarchies, although sometimes in conflict with the Government, fully accepted that, in contrast to the M.C.P., they should conduct their affairs within the existing laws.[119] The parties, by mobilizing support and operating within the constitutionally prescribed boundaries, weaned people away from the M.C.P. and brought them into the realm of the British Colonial Administration. Thus, while for Gurney the political parties were of limited consequence, for Templer they provided, at a critical stage in the Emergency, an important opportunity for him to exchange information with a steadily expanding proportion of the Malayan population.

Unorganized Interpersonal Contacts

The myriad of daily talk and discussions that go on throughout any society all act as communication channels. These communication channels, which are characteristically at the ends of the chains of communication that disseminate information down from the leader, can diffuse that information throughout every section of the population. This is particularly true of a predominantly rural technologically underdeveloped country such as Malaya during the period under study.[120]

In terms of the Government's, and especially the High Commissioner's, relations with the general public in Malaya during the Emergency, the importance of this set of communication channels in gaining support for the Government was noted by a few perceptive people. An editorial in The Straits Times argued that it was "that large section of the population which gets its news by word of mouth" that need to be convinced.[121] And an Interrogation Officer, H.T. Pagden, stressed that people, wherever they are, quickly hear of the Government's activities if it impinges on the lives of a relative.[122] Unfortunately, however, these assessments were not immediately accepted within the senior echelons of the Government, and the necessity of making full use of psychological warfare to take advantage of these sets of communication was only slowly appreciated. Moreover, it needs to be emphasized that because these channels of communication came at the end of the chain their full utilization by the Government and the High Commissioners was dependent, to a great extent, upon the efficiency of the other channels, such as the mass media, personal contact, and the political parties. Since many of these channels did not become significant as reliable, efficient, and frequent carriers of information until towards the end of Gurney's term in office, so the politically unstructured face-to-face channels were not readily available to the High Commissioner as means by which he might impart and receive information. Thus, while during the large proportion of Gurney's tenure, these channels carried news of certain Government actions divorced from any Government explanations, during Templer's years, the Government was able to gain access to these sets of channels of communication and both explain policy and hopes for the future and receive information about matters of general public concern.

SUMMARY

In this Chapter the basic argument has been that the nature of the relationship between an individual political leader and other individuals or groups depends, to a large degree on the means by which they communicate. The "instrumental" and "expressive" functions a leader may be required to perform by the people in his unit generally necessitate the maintenance of a diversity of reliable and efficient channels of communication. With regard to the nature of the patterns of communication channels which centred on the two High Commissioners, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer, a number of points need to be made.

First, a political leader does not necessarily have a monopoly on communication links with people in his unit. In Malaya during the early years of the Emergency, the Malayan Communist Party mounted an extensive propaganda campaign that in many rural areas eclipsed the rather tentative attempts by the Government to establish communications with the people. The M.C.P., by placing great emphasis on personal contact, followed up by posters and leaflets, mounted such a successful campaign that the analysis of the situation by Government officials acknowledged that the M.C.P. propaganda appeared to be centrally planned, well co-ordinated, and effectively disseminated.[123] The problem was, of course, compounded by the Government's conservative information policy,[124] the lack of contact between members of the Administration and the general public, and the lack of confidence placed in the Information Services personnel by senior Government officials.[125] Moreover, it took time for people to accept as credible those channels of communication, such as the press, radio, and leaflets, that the Government was able to introduce gradually. The M.C.P., on the other hand, had established its credibility through numerous personal contacts during the Japanese occupation, and therefore, had an added advantage. Thus, both in terms of political persuasion and attuning policies to the problems of sections of the population of Malaya, particularly the rural Chinese, the M.C.P., by maintaining better channels of communication, had the upper hand.

But the Government was able to slowly reverse the situation. The resettlement programme, which grouped a large proportion of the rural Chinese into defensible villages, allowed for a greater degree of physical separation of the M.C.P. from their base of support. More sophisticated military, police, and administrative action also placed greater pressure on the M.C.P., making it difficult for them to re-establish contacts once an area was re-settled. The result was a dislocation of the M.C.P. organizational framework for producing and dispensing propaganda, more limited personal contact with their supporters, and a general decline in the amount and reliability of the propaganda disseminated.[126] The Government, for its part, once the Korean War boom provided the revenue, was able to expand its facilities, especially the radio, mobile cinema, and leaflet operations, and extend its propaganda offensive into the "captive" audiences of the resettled rural areas. Moreover, the increased personal contact between the Administration's officials, and in particular, Templer himself, and the rural population, also contributed to the effort to extend the channels of communication between the Government and the people of Malaya. Hence, Government efforts to mobilize support in the early years of the Emergency were thwarted to a large extent by the activity of the M.C.P.; however, as the Government became more active in their propaganda effort, and the M.C.P. more concerned with survival rather than expansion, the Government began to exercise more control over the means by which the Malayan population received their information. Further, those channels of communication over which the Government had little or no direct control, such as the newspapers and political parties, but which supported the Government against the M.C.P., made a significant contribution to the effort to counter the lines of communication the M.C.P. had established between their High Command and the people of Malaya.

Second, the number and variety of people linked to the political leader by the communication channels as well as the direction and the flow of information are crucial to an analysis of the relationship between a leader and the members of his unit. During the first six years of the Malayan Emergency, both the number and type of people linked to the leaders, Gurney and later Templer, changed quite dramatically. Gurney exchanged information with the European community, some Malayan politicians and businessmen, and most of the more senior Government officials. These contacts proved extremely useful for explaining Government policy and soliciting valuable advice on numerous matters concerning the execution of counter-insurgency policies. Gurney, however, was not able to establish diverse, reliable, and efficient channels of communication that could be frequently used to both disseminate information to and solicit information from a wide cross-section of the Malayan population. And this was necessary in order to mobilize support for his Government. Templer, on the other hand, was able to establish links with virtually all sections of the population. He maintained those with the Europeans and Malayan elite, while developing others with the general population of Malaya. By encouraging administrators to meet the people, by expanding the propaganda campaign, and by his own personal contacts, he established new channels of communication with Malayans from all parts of the country. The growth of the political parties also benefitted his relations with the people, for they provided an extra means by which grievances could be aired.

It was the growth of these new channels which was significant. Not only did they provide a greater opportunity for Templer to explain his policies, and thus woo the support of the people, but they allowed those sections of the population with complaints to put them before their constitutional leader. Prior to the Emergency and during much of Gurney's period in office, there appeared to be no means by which the Government could be made aware of the demands of the ordinary person, particularly the beleaguered rural Chinese. The administration failed to communicate with many rural groups: the police were badly trained and too few in number, the political and communal groups that might have helped were either in their infancy or too divided to act effectively, and little personal contact with the High Commissioner was possible. With seemingly little likelihood of grievances being redressed by constitutional means, the M.C.P. appeared to a frustrated minority to be the best organization to turn to for help in solving their problems. During the Templer years, the parties, prompted by the prospect of electoral success, supplied a means of expressing hopes and desires, while the administration and the police became more receptive to the needs of the ordinary individual. Templer, himself, by his tours and talks with the village leaders and the rural people in general, created the favorable impression that he was listening to popular opinion, and by and large, answering their often mundane requests. As The Straits Times noted in an editorial, "it has been said that the real debt which this country owes to General Templer may be the re-introduction of personal contact with the people which has been so marked a characteristic of his regime." This is not to say that everyone became satisfied overnight, or that there were no grievances or frustrations. The point that needs to be stressed, rather, is that legal means for attempting to prompt Government action over some matter or other became available and thus the illegal means provided by the guerrilla activities of the M.C.P. became less and less appealing.

Third, the fact that many of the channels of communication are inter-related needs to be appreciated. In Malaya, the degree to which information percolated down through the population was not so much dependent upon the existence of channels of communication--there is always news circulating within a rural village--but upon the degree to which the various channels were tied in with one another. For instance, if a village leader exchanged information with an administrator who had links with the High Commissioner, then information was able to flow from those within that village right up to the highest political position in the land, and vice-versa. But if any one of those ties was broken, if the administrator either knew nothing of government policy and could not pass on information, or if he did not meet with the village leader, then the whole chain was broken. During the Gurney years, the chains of communication were broken more often than not. During the Templer years, these chains of communication became more reliable and efficient. A further consideration is the diversity and number of channels of information which surround a leader. The more people hear from differing sources a specific piece of information, the more they are liable to take it into consideration when making decisions about their actions. During the period under discussion, the channels of communication diversified considerably as the Emergency progressed. This was particularly true during the Templer years. Information was not only passed down through the administrative hierarchy and the political party structure, but was also received via the printed word, the radio, and public address vans, and even from direct contact with the High Commissioner himself. Furthermore, the circulation of information by word-of-mouth, prompted by these numerous sources, compounded the chances any one individual might have of hearing news of the leader and his activities.

In general, then, Templer fared better than Gurney in his links with the people of Malaya. Gurney, partly because he himself elected to deal with people from his office rather than meet people in the countryside, and partly because of factors outside his control, such as the demands on his time of administrative chores, the lack of money in the first two years, and the problems encountered by the parties in attempting to expand the scope of their operations, failed to establish the channels of communication which would have enabled him to fulfill the functions of his position. Thus he could not gain the support he needed to act as a focal point for a united country. Templer, by contrast, was able to establish lines of communication that enabled him to enlist support for the task of eliminating terrorism and, by being able to establish and maintain links throughout the country, both by means of his own work in the field and by the activities of others, such as those in the political parties, he was able to embody a large measure of unity.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 7

[1] See the discussion in Melvin L. De Fleur, Theories of Mass Communication (New York: David McKay, 1966), pp. 92-95.

[2] Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly 21 (Spring 1957), p. 61. The two-step flow of communication concept was later refined and the concept of a multi-step sequence was introduced. See E. Katz, "The Social Itinerary of Technical Change: Two Studies on the Diffusion of Innovation," Human Organization 20 (Summer 1961); pp. 70-82; E. Katz, M.L. Levin and H. Hamilton, "Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation," American Sociological Review 238 (Apr 1963), pp. 237-252; and E.M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1962).

[3] See, for example, "Notes of a Meeting Between His Excellency the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya and a Deputation of Members of the Incorporated Society of Planters, King's House, Wednesday, 26 October 1948. As Approved by His Excellency," The Planter 24 (November 1948), p. 655.

[4] See Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, p. 334.

[5] This closer cooperation is noted in an M.C.A. Memorandum to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, submitted during his tour of Malaya, late in 1951. TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 169(i).

[6] See The Straits Times, 27 May 1951.

[7] Author's calculations based on reports in the Straits Echo and Times of Malaya, Malay Mail, and The Straits Times. October 1948-October 1951.

[8] The operations sub-committees at all levels met every morning and were commonly referred to as "morning prayers".

[9] For example, Templer was most anxious that the M.C.A. leader Dato Tan Cheng-lock should be kept informed of the Government's policies. Templer noted in a letter to Tan Cheng-lock: "It seems to me that perhaps you may be feeling a little out of it now that you are no longer in the War Council since it has ceased to exist. At the same time I feel you should be kept informed of the general position as to what is in the minds of Government. If it would be of any use to you, I think it might be helpful if you took the opportunity of talking either with the Deputy High Commissioner or myself about every couple of months on

some occasion when you might be visiting Kuala Lumpur for your own purposes." See the High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer, to Tan Cheng-lock, 5 April 1952, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/V/269.

[10] Norman Cleavland, Bang, Bang in Ampang (San Pedro, California: Symcon, 1973), pp. 193-194.

[11] For example, 30 Chinese from a new village, ranging in age from 25 to 35, and nearly all labourers, visited King's House during a 5 day civics course in Kuala Lumpur; see Malay Mail, 27 November 1953.

[12] See "The notes of a meeting between an M.C.A. delegation and Government officials, including the High Commissioner, 21 April 1952," TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/III/274. Parkinson makes the assessment that Templer replied to thirty letters a week; see Parkinson, Templer in Malaya, p. ii.

[13] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Federal Government Press Statement, 7 February 1952 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information); also issued as Government of Singapore, Public Relations Press Statement (Singapore) No. FE.52/53.

[14] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Federal Government Press Statement; Speech of the High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer at his Installation (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information), 2/52/ 189 H.C.

[15] See Malay Mail, 23 January 1953, and Straits Times, 28 May 1954. The most hectic period was between January and July 1953, when Templer went on 43 tours; see The Straits Times, 13 January 1953.

[16] Templer usually concentrated on the rural areas, the arena for the fight against the communists. In contrast to Gurney, he tended to avoid the towns. See Geoffrey Geldard, "Kampongs Welcome Templer," The Straits Times, 29 April 1953.

[17] H.T. Pagden, an interrogation officer, noted in 1949 that the Government's "psychological warfare" programme was non-existent. He stated that "there appears to be, at least in some quarters, a complete lack of appreciation of the value of this necessary adjunct to our war effort." See T. Pagden to the Deputy Commissioner C.I.D., 20 May 1949 in Pagden Papers, SP 7/1. This assessment is confirmed in Government of the Federation of Malaya "Report on Emergency Information Services, September 1950-September 1951" by Mr. H. Carleton Greene to be found in TCL Papers (Malaysia) Item 135.

[18] Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1962).

[19] 1947 Census, p. 351.

[20] For instance, in the age group 30-34 years old, out of every thousand, 546 male Malays were literate, as opposed to only 90 females; 697 male Chinese were literate, as compared to 209 female Chinese; and 657 male Indians were literate, in comparison to 208 female Indians, see ibid., pp. 94, 372-378.

[21] Ibid., p. 351.

[22] U.N.E.S.C.O., Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio (Paris: U.N.E.S.C.O. 1948), 2; p. 158.

[23] See the figures for 1952 for the Federation of Malaya and Singapore in U.N.E.S.C.O., "The Daily Press, a Survey of the World Situation in 1952," Reports and Papers on Mass Communications, No. 7 (Paris: Department of Mass Communication, U.N.E.S.C.O. 1953), p. 9; the comparative change in circulation figures for the combined circulation of daily newspapers in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore between 1947 and 1952 is in Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, Table 25, p. 163. For a more detailed discussion of the distribution of newspapers in Malaya, see U.N.E.S.C.O., Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio, pp. 158-9; Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 166-7, and Appendix, Table H and Table I.

[24] U.N.E.S.C.O., Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio, p. 158.

[25] See Appendix, Table J.

[26] The delineation of the factors owes much to Bernard Voyenne, La Presse Dans la Societe Contemporaine (Paris: 1962), pp. 187ff. cited in Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle Introduction to the History of International Relations, trans. Mary Ilford (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 334-335.

[27] See Draft Development Plan, 1950, p. 34, which notes that while 85-95 percent of the 350 statements per month issued by the Government Press service "are used by the English-language press and about 60 percent by the Malay press, a far smaller proportion is used by the papers written in Chinese and Indian languages entirely on account of translation difficulties".

[28] See Malay Mail, 30 July 1960.

[29] Results from a survey conducted by the writer, using editions of the Straits Echo, January 1949-December 1950, and February 1952-January 1954.

[30] Results taken from a survey by the writer. See fn. 35.

[31] This is borne out by The Straits Times library files on Gurney and Templer. Half of the press cuttings in the Gurney file concern the High Commissioner's ambush and murder. Moreover, his total file is only half the size of the file on Templer.

[32] See Pye, Lessons from the Malayan Struggle Against Communism, pp. 33-38.

[33] Despite the fact that press conferences on the Emergency were held every three weeks and on the Federal Administration once a month, often at King's House, Gurney only very rarely was in attendance. He left the briefing of the press to senior officials of the Government and the Security Forces. See Annual Report 1948, p. 190; Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report of the Department of Public Relations, 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, n.d.), p. 4; and for an example of an important press conference at King's House not attended by Gurney see Straits Echo, 3 March 1951. At a Federal War Council Meeting just before he was murdered, Gurney noted the lack of interest of the Editors of leading newspapers in press conferences and said that they failed to send their best people, see Government of the Federation of Malaya," Federal War Council Meeting: Minutes," 2 October 1951 in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 170.

[34] Annual Report, 1948, p. 189.

[35] British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast, "I remember," 12 December 1970.

[36] Malay Mail, 30 July 1960.

[37] "Report on a visit to Malaya from 20 August-20 September 1952, at the invitation of the M.C.A. by Purcell and Carnell," TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/VI/1, p. 125.

[38] See Walter Grieber, "News is What Newspapermen Make It" in People, Society and Mass Communication, eds., Anthony Dexter and David Manning White (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1964), pp. 173-181. The screening function performed by editors in the communication channels

include newspapers is also analysed in David Manning White "The Gatekeepers: A Case Study in the Selection of News" in ibid., pp. 160-176.

[39] See Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 168-169.

[40] Ibid., pp. 169-171.

[41] See Annual Report, 1948, p. 112; and Annual Report, 1949, p.126.

[42] See Annual Report, 1950, p. 142; and Government of the Federation of Malaya, "Department of Public Relations," in What Government Departments Are Doing (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, n.d.) 1: p. 41. This latter publication is a booklet version of a series of radio broadcasts designed to inform people about the Government. The Director of Public Relations, Mr. J.N. McHugh, gave his talk on 12 May 1950.

[43] Annual Report, 1951, p. 180.

[44] Annual Report, 1952, p. 286: "Report on Emergency Information Services, September 1950-September 1951" by Greene; and for copies of the paper see TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 167(i) where it is claimed that in October 1952 the paper had a circulation of 110,000 copies. However, when C.C. Too resigned from his post with the Government, the paper experienced production problems.

[45] See Annual Report, 1953, p. 318; and Annual Report, 1954, p. 378.

[46] Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 171.

[47] About 10,000 persons used the 34 Information Centres and 12 Reading Rooms daily during 1948. This total increased as more centres and Reading Rooms were built. See Annual Report, 1948, p. 112.

[48] Examples of unofficial pressure include Gurney's call to The Straits Times to find out why they would not stop exploring the Batang Kali incident in December 1948. See The Straits Times, 3 February 1970. For Templer to use the phone to "enquire" about certain press reports was not unknown.

[49] Annual Report, 1952, p. 285; Annual Report, 1953, p. 312.

[50] The Planter was the official monthly publication of the Incorporated Society of Planters.

[51] Annual Report, 1948, p. 112.

[52] "Report on Emergency Information Services, September 1950-September 1951 by Mr. H. Carleton Greene," The Private Papers of Tan Cheng-lock, National Archives of Malaysia, No. 135. Graham Greene noted in his article, "Malaya" that leaflets had to be printed on waterproof paper.

[53] Government of the Federation of Malaya, A Message to the People of the Federation of Malaya From His Excellency Sir Gerald Templer, The High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, n.d.) No. 1062.

[54] Sir Gerald Templer's Press Conference, Department of Information 5/54/193(HC).

[55] See speech by the Secretary for Defence, Mr. Humphrey, Legislative Council Proceedings, 6th Session, p. 964.

[56] Ginsburg and Roberts, op. cit., pp. 176-185; Annual Report, 1949, p.128, Annual Report, 1950, p. 142.

[57] Annual Report, 1951, p. 182.

[58] Annual Report, 1952, p. 289.

[59] Annual Report, 1953, p. 322.

[60] Annual Report, 1949, p. 128.

[61] See, for example The Planter 24 (October 1948), pp. 598-599; The Planter 24 (December 1948), p. 665. These complaints were acknowledged and the fact that some effort had been made to remedy the situation was noted in "Report on Emergency Information Services, September 1950-September 1951" by Greene.

[62] See Audit on Accounts, 1949 and 1952.

[63] Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, pp. 176-179.

[64] Annual Report, 1952, p. 289. A list of the more serious programmes broadcast in 1950 may be found in J. Greenfall Williams, "Radio in Fundamental Education in Underdeveloped Areas" in Press, Film, and Radio in the World Today (Paris: U.N.E.S.C.O. 1950), pp. 56-57. The paucity of Chinese-language broadcasts is striking. The introduction of a wide variety of discussion and instructional programmes in the succeeding years is detailed in the Annual Reports, 1951, pp. 182-183; and Annual Report, 1952, pp. 290-291.

[65] Annual Report, 1949, p. 128. This averaged out to 30 news bulletins per day in all languages (English, Malay, Tamil and seven Chinese dialects). 390 newstalks were broadcast in 1953. Annual Report of Department of Broadcasting, 1953, p. 15.

[66] For example, Gurney gave only two talks on the radio in 1949 and none in 1950. By contrast, MacDonald, who was living in Johore Bahru, near Singapore, gave a number of radio talks, particularly in 1948 (at least five) and 1950 (at least five).

[67] Templer made over half a dozen radio broadcasts on such topics as the importance of volunteering for the Federation Regiments (July 1952) the meaning of "Operation Service" (January 1953), and the situation in Malaya on the eve of his departure (May 1954).

[68] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Monthly Statistics Bulletin, (1949-1953) (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, n.d.). About 50 percent of license holders were Chinese and 30 percent were Malays; see Appendix, Table K.

[69] Annual Report, 1949, p. 129; Annual Report, 1952, p. 290; Annual Report, 1953, p. 322.

[70] Annual Report of the Department of Public Relations, 1949, p.7.

[71] "Report on Emergency Information Services, September 1950-September 1951" by Greene. Annual Report, 1951, p. 182; Progress Report on the Development Plan, p. 53; Annual Report, 1952, p. 290.

[72] Annual Report, 1951, pp. 181-2.

[73] U.N.E.S.C.O., Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio, 2: p. 272; also cited in Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya,

[74] The financial restrictions are noted in Annual Report, 1949, p. 128.

[75] Ginsburg and Roberts, Malaya, p. 187.

[76] Annual Report, 1951, p. 183.

[77] Annual Report, 1952, p. 292.

[78] Annual Report, 1950, p. 144; Annual Report, 1951, p. 184.

[79] U.N.E.S.C.O., Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio, 2: p. 272.

[80] Annual Report, 1952, p. 292.

[81] Annual Report, 1951, p. 180.

[82] Government of the Federation of Malaya, Communist Terrorism in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1953), p. 39.

[83] Annual Report, 1953, p. 313.

[84] Ibid., p. 314.

[85] See the notes of a meeting held 1 March 1949 made by H.T.Pagden, at which ten ex-M.P.A.J.A. communists discussed the Government's propaganda effort. Pagden Papers, S.P. 7/9.

[86] The message which was also broadcast on Radio Malaya was, "This is General Templer speaking. To all armed members of the Malayan Communist Party. You needn't be afraid you can surrender. This is my personal pledge to you. You will not be ill-treated." See Annual Report on Broadcasting, 1954, p. 3.

[87] Wilbur Schramm, "Communication Development and the Development Process," in Communications and Political Development, ed., Pye, p. 53.

[88] The monitoring of broadcast scripts was rigid. For example, the Controller of Emergency Broadcasting, Mr. Alex Josey, had the recording of a talk on "Malayan Affairs" destroyed and the script of his broadcast altered by the orders of the Chief Secretary, Mr. M.V. del Tufo. The banned portions referred to the necessity of introducing "awful methods and harsh laws" to combat the communists. See Straits Echo, 8 May 1951.

[89] See Pye "Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in Non-Western Societies."

[90] See Chapter Five, above.

[91] The Straits Times, 23 June 1948, noted that "Six months ago junior police officers in out-stations in Perak were saying that there would be a big communist show-down about June and that if the communists had not been brought under control by then, the whole British regime in Malaya would be threatened."

[92] See Purcell, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* p. 38 and also his letter to *The Times*, 19 November 1951.

[93] For an account of the problems of gleaning information about communist activities from the general population, see Letter from T. Pagden to the Deputy Commissioner, C.I.D. 20 May 1949, Pagden Papers, SP 7/1.

[94] *Malaya Tribune*, 31 December 1950, and *Singapore Tiger Standard*, 30 December 1950.

[95] See speech by Templer in *Legislative Council Proceedings*, 6th Session, c. 758; *Annual Report*, 1952, p. 15; and Government of the Federation of Malaya "Circular on Courses for Villages" dated 18 February 1952 from Mr. K.J. Henderson, Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Malacca, in TCL Papers (Malaysia), Item 175.

[96] See *Legislative Council Proceedings*, 6th Session, c. 11.

[97] See Ginsburg and Roberts, *Malaya*, p. 223.

[98] Ibid., p. 273.

[99] See *Straits Echo*, 27 July 1950, and "Notes of a Meeting Held at King's House on 2 February 1952," TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/111/274a.

[100] See *Legislative Council Proceedings*, 6th Session, c. 13. Legislation conferring responsibility and authority on locally elected bodies was introduced in 1952.

[101] *High Commissioner's Press Conference Statement*, 26 May 1954, D. Inf. 5/54/193 (HC).

[102] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, *A General Survey of New Villages* by W.C.S. Corry (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, p. 41. Corry notes (p. 40) that Johore and Perak seem to have been the areas where Village Committees and Local Councils were most successful while "less than mediocre success" was achieved in Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang.

[103] While both the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. were initially formed as pressure groups they are referred to here as political parties because of their role once elections were introduced.

[104] Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, p. 353.

[105] These did not include various community associations, such as the Eurasian Association and the Ceylon Federation. These groups, which were interest groups, rather than organizations with political ambitions, were represented in the Federal Legislative Council.

[106] Initiated by the activities of the Commissioner-General, Malcolm MacDonald and Dato Onn, the original group of Malay and Chinese leaders was known as the Malay-Chinese Goodwill Committee. The name was changed when other community leaders were included in the deliberations. See *The Communities Liaison Committee and Post-War Communal Relations in Malaya: A Historical Sourcebook*, ed. M. Nordin Sopiee (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, n.d.); and Means, *Malaysian Politics*, pp. 122-124. For a critical discussion of the activities of the Communities Liaison Committee, see the *Indian Daily Mail*, 27, 28 and 29 September 1949. (This paper carried a series of articles on the subject, the ones on these dates being of particular interest.)

[107] See the criticisms levelled at him by the editors of *Utusan Melayu* as reported in *Straits Echo* 27 May 1950 and 23 May 1950.

[108] For an account of Dato Onn's political life during this period see Ishak bin Tardin "Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism 1946-1951," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1 (March 1960), pp. 56-88.

[109] The M.C.A. claimed 100,000 members by the end of 1949 and between 160,000 and 200,000 by 1951. See *Communist Banditry in Malaya June 1948-June 1951* pp. 17 and 28 and So Eng-lim, "Tan Cheng lock; His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 1 (March 1960), pp. 29-57.

[110] For an interesting discussion of the events leading up to the decision which brought U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. together, see R.K. Vasil, *Politics in Plural Society: A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in West Malaysia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), fn. 21, pp. 10-11, and pp. 56-57.

[111] See the M.C.A. "Minutes of a Meeting between the M.C.A. and Government Officials," 21 April 1952, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/111/274.

[112] For an account of the activities of Tunku Abdul Rahman during this period see Harry Miller, *Prince and Premier: A Biography of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, First Prime Minister of the Federation of Malay* (London: Harrap, 1959).

[113] For a discussion of the events leading up to the Government decision to introduce this legislation, see M.R. Stenson, *Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948* (London: Oxford

University Press, 1970), Chapter XI. For an analysis of trade unions in Malaya prior to and during the Emergency, see Charles Gamba, The Origins of Trade-Unionism in Malaya: A Study in Colonial Labour Unrest (Singapore: Donald More, 1962). A discussion of the trade unions in Malaya directly after the war and a first hand account of the communist infiltration of the movement as a whole may be found in Labour and Trade Union Organizations in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, report by S.S. Awberry and F.W. Dalley.

[114] Membership fell from 195,113 in 1947 to 42,288 in 1949. It gradually rose again reaching 114,349 in 1954. The one unusual change was in 1952 when membership increased for that one year only to 129,014. Government of the Federation of Malaya, Monthly Statistical Bulletin Of the Federation of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, January 1956), p. Y8.

[115] In 1952 only 15 percent were Chinese. This figure dropped to 12 percent in 1953. See Government of the Federation of Malaya, Annual Report of the Trade Union Registry (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, n.d.), 1952 p.4 and 1953 p. 5.

[116] Tan Cheng-lock stated in a speech in 1953 that "Opposition or competition will make Malayan politics all the better and healthier. We should strive all the harder to render the Alliance a strong and dynamic political force capable of winning its goal and accomplishing its historic mission in the teeth of all opposition which should stimulate and strengthen the Alliance," TCL Papers (Malaysia) Box 1 No. 63. Tunku Abdul Rahman noted in a letter to Col. H.S. Lee, 12 April 1953: "On the whole, I think that the doings of Bukit Gantang and his associates have given us and our supporters added zeal and enthusiasm in our struggle." U.M.N.O. Files, National Archives of Malaysia, UMNO/SG 35/1953.

[117] One Government official argued succinctly in 1950 that "(i) if members of M.C.A. trust the M.C.A. then (ii) Government can trust the M.C.A. (iii) if Government can trust the M.C.A. then (iv) the Emergency can be brought to a speedy end." The Government obviously required proof of public trust in the M.C.A. See A.W. Lacey, Chinese Affairs Office, Serembau, N.S. to Tan Cheng-lock, 23 October 1950, TCL Papers (Singapore), TCL/111/265.

[118] See Leong Yew-koh to Tan Cheng-lock, October 15 1951 TCL Papers (Singapore) TCL/XV/64a.

[119] Tunku Abdul Rahman, in a speech to the First National Convention, 23 August 1953, stated that "In the words of the Honourable Harold E.Hall at the parliamentary Conference in Canada, 'We have a common belief in adherence to the practice of ordered liberty, ordered liberty under a well conducted rule of law.'" U.M.N.O. Files, No. 7 UMNO/SG No. G12/1954.

[120] See Pye "Communication Patterns and the Problems of Representative Government in Non-Western Societies."

[121] Cited in H.T. Pagden to the Deputy Commissioner C.I.D. 20 May 1949, Pagden Papers SP 7/1.

[122] Ibid.

[123] See Government of the Federation of Malaya, Anatomy of Communist Propaganda, July 1949 to December 1949 (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Public Relations, December 1949). See also "Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Enemy Propaganda," Pagden Papers SP 7/9.

[124] The policy even elicited a rebuke from the predominantly European planting community, which noted in a Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Mr. Lyttleton, that the Government should cease "suppression of Emergency news", and that "the population has not forgotten how it was 'led up the garden path' by these means in 1941-42 and knows the true facts, disseminated via lorry drivers, etc., who travel daily to and from rural areas to central markets." See The Planter (December 1951), p. 516 (emphasis in the original).

[125] See "Report on Emergency Information Services," by Greene.

[126] See Anatomy of Communist Propaganda, 1950-1953, Federation of Malaya.

[127] The Straits Times 31 May 1954.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Individual political leadership is a complex concept. Essentially it may be said to centre on the relationship between a leader and the members of a specific unit and to involve the interaction of a number of variables. This exploratory study has focused on four variables that previous leadership studies have shown to be important--situation, expectation, organization, and communication--to determine the dynamics of leadership in a particular set of circumstances, the Malayan Emergency, and to bring about a better understanding of individual political leadership in general. With regard to both these goals, a number of concluding points may be made.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

Certainly the four variables examined in this study had a considerable impact on the nature of the relationships that each of the two High Commissioners, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer, was able to establish with the Malayan people. At the heart of these relationships, and thus of the leadership process itself, were the expectations of the various groups within the Federation. It should be re-emphasized at this point that an individual is a "leader" not by virtue of conferring the title of "leader" upon himself, but because the members of the unit accept him as such. That is to say, the unit's members must accept him as one whom they expect to facilitate "the change or resistance to change of the unit's goals, the attainment of these goals and/or the distribution of the unit's valued, scarce resources." Members' expectations were, therefore, important for they determined how many Malayans would accept each of the two High Commissioners as their political leader and the extent to which they would support him.

Malayan's expectations about political matters were rooted in their past experiences. The socializing process of all the major communal groups tended to foster the acceptance of an authoritarian set of hierarchical social relationships. More particularly, within the Malay, Indian and European communities it was expected that those who occupied the highest positions within Malayan society should ensure the integrity and welfare of the communities. Amongst the Malay and Indian elites and the large majority of the European community it was the High Commissioner, as the person who held the reins of power, who was expected to exercise his authority for the benefit of each community and the good of Malaya as a whole. This power, it was generally accepted, could be exercised in a relatively autocratic manner if the circumstances warranted and if it was necessary for the achievement of the common good. Within the Chinese community, however, the Government was viewed by the large majority as a vague and little known entity. The tendency was to expect other Chinese rather than British officials to solve their problems. All the communities shared common problems; as well, each community had unique problems that arose out of specific sets of circumstances. In some circumstances, such as the distribution of political power, the resolution of a set of problems voiced by one community could create further problems for another. Problems arose when the situation created barriers to the attainment of various goals concerning security, parti-

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cipation in decision-making, the distribution of wealth, and social and cultural amenities. They were the problems Gurney had to help eradicate in order to gain the support of the Malayan people.

A leader has basically two ways in which he can modify a person's expectations in order to gain his support. He can either live up to these expectations by changing the situation so that the difficulties in attaining a specific goal are diminished (if not eliminated) or he can change the person's expectations so they coincide with what he can achieve. Gurney had little success in either endeavor. He was unable to change the situation in any way that brought substantial benefits to the various groups within the Federation. The means by which Gurney could have changed the situation, the Administration and the Security Forces, were themselves plagued with problems that Gurney could not properly rectify. Lack of trained manpower, shortages of resources, personality clashes, poor tactics and coordination, and the resulting low morale meant that their effectiveness was impaired and that Gurney could not deploy these agents of the Government as he might have wished. Even the major changes that Gurney was able to initiate (such as the resettlement programme) did not, at least initially, produce a favourable modification of expectations. Gurney's misfortune was not only the relatively ineffective organizations at his disposal, but also adverse trends in the situation. These trends were important for they had a detrimental effect on the expectations of the people of Malaya. Just as certain experiences prior to Gurney's arrival had helped to form some expectations about political matters, so these expectations were modified by the ever changing situation. The escalation in M.C.P. terrorist attacks during the period, 1948 to 1951, the apparent growth in the strength of the communists in other parts of Asia, and the sluggish economy before the Korean War boom all exacerbated the problems of the Malayan people and did nothing to encourage them to support the Government. Moreover, situational trends served to compound the problems experienced by the Government organizations.

Gurney also found himself unable to persuade people either that it was not possible to achieve lasting solutions quickly or that they should not expect him to solve many of their problems without their help. His persuasive efforts were thwarted partly by his inability to reach many sections of the population and partly by the reluctance of those who did receive news of his policies and activities to agree with them. The demands made on him by administrative chores as well as his own lack of enthusiasm for developing wide ranging personal contacts restricted the number of channels by which he could inform people of his views, intentions, achievements, and need for their cooperation. Further, the undeveloped nature of the mass media, the communication difficulties within the Government, the problems of establishing links between Government officials and the public, and the lack of contact between the Malayan political elite and the general public all limited the channels by which people acquired news of the High Commissioner. Even those people who did have access to Gurney and his policies tended to disagree with both his assessment of the nature of the problems facing the country, particularly the problems created by the Emergency, and his proposed solutions. Moreover, his personal conduct was not thought by everyone to be appropriate to a crisis situation. He had not engendered a sense of urgency and activity that many thought was warranted by the communist threat. Neither had he been able to establish the personal relations that the people of Malaya valued so much. Perhaps of equal importance was the fact that many of the people with grievances, such as the rural Chinese, had few channels through which they could articulate their needs and aspirations to the Government. Indeed, many rural Chinese were forced to look to others for help, particularly the predominantly Chinese M.C.P. The M.C.P., in the first few years of the Emergency was able to maintain numerous communication channels with these people (mainly in the form of personal ties which were most highly valued). It thereby had a much better chance to structure the people's expectations and gain their support for the fight against the Government.

In short, Gurney was not able to fulfill fully either of the two functions normally associated with political leadership. The vast majority of the Malayan people did not accept that he had facilitated the completion of tasks associated with their problems, particularly with regard to what was generally considered the most pressing problem, the communist's terrorist activities. Nor was it felt that he had been able to maintain the cohesion and to encourage the integration of Malaya as a social unit. Indeed, those groups that particularly looked to the High Commissioner to inspire loyalty and group solidarity, the Government officials and the European community suffered from a severe lack of morale. Hence, Gurney could neither change the situation so as to reduce (if not fully solve) people's problems nor could he convince people to modify their expectations. He therefore had to forfeit their aid and support.

In contrast to Gurney, Templer was able both to live up to some of the more keenly felt expectations held by Malayans and to modify many others so that they coincided with what he could achieve. Even before Templer arrived in Malaya, some major trends in the situation had started to change in his favour. The Korean War boom provided increased funds for the Government and higher wages in the rubber estates and tin mines. Economic grievances were thereby reduced to some extent. The M.C.P. decision to divert some of its personnel and resources to political subversion meant that as word of the directive spread through the M.C.P. organization, fewer and fewer acts of indiscriminate terrorism were perpetrated. Moreover, the international politico-strategic situation had stabilized and the communists were generally thought to have been contained. These changes, therefore, created a situation in which people's expectations could be easily modified in the Government's favour.

It was Templer who was able to press home the advantages that the turn of events offered him. The change in top officials, the reorganization and retraining programmes that Templer introduced, and the sense of urgency that his personal conduct injected into the Government's activities all helped to make the Government bureaucracy and the Security Forces relatively efficient instruments for the execution of policies. Indeed, Templer succeeded in gaining a good deal of support for his policies. Many Malayans were persuaded that they could benefit from his approach to the resolution of their problems. His personal conduct gave many the impression he would succeed. In particular he got officials to appreciate the urgency of the situation. The centralization of all power in his hands and his often autocratic actions were considered by a large proportion of Malayans to be what the situation demanded. Moreover, the fact that soon after he arrived in Malaya M.C.P. guerrilla activities began to wane seemed to demonstrate his ability to get results. As a consequence of his achievements in combatting the guerrilla threat (which was for many, particularly within the rural population, their primary concern) Templer's ideas on other matters were more readily accepted. Templer's personal style and policies boosted a morale that he himself has stated was "in the gutter" when he first arrived in Malaya.[1] He became a focus for loyalty towards the Government's cause and instilled a sense of cohesion and worth not only into Government officials and the European community but also into the elite of Malaya and many sections of the Malayan society as a whole.

Templer was also able to restructure expectations. He did this by using all available channels of communication to explain fully the reasons for his policies, the benefits to be derived from them and the personal and communal hardships that could result from failure to comply with Government regulations. Templer took full advantage of the mass media which presented information about his activities and policies in a very favourable way. However, it was the large number of face-to-face contacts through which information about his activities and policies was passed on that proved to be particularly important. The numerous personal relations established by the High Commissioner himself with all sections of the society, the increased number of personal contacts made by members of the Security Forces and Government officials, and the personal relations developed through the party hierarchies all meant that a great deal of information about Templer and the Government reached people by word-of-mouth. It was the information transmitted through these channels that was received most favourably and had the greatest impact in modifying expectations. Moreover, the M.C.P. propaganda effort encountered a number of problems after 1951. These included the internal communication problems caused by Chin Peng's retreat to the Thai border in 1952-53 and the difficulties presented by low internal morale and the physical isolation of their previous supporters in the New Villages. M.C.P. difficulties enabled Templer to gain a distinct advantage over his predecessor in the competition to gain the attention of Malayans.

As a result of the favourable changes in the situation, and the efficient execution of policy, Templer was able to partially resolve, if not eradicate, some of the more serious problems that confronted Malayans. In particular, the reduction of M.C.P. guerrilla attacks was much appreciated by Malayans of all communities. It was in this way that Templer was able to meet some of the expectations of Malayans. Other expectations Templer was able to restructure so that the fact that they could not be met did not diminish the support given to the Government.

In the eyes of the members of a unit, a political leader is expected to accept responsibility for much of what happens during his tenure in office. Malayans were slow to appreciate Gurney's policies. However, it is noteworthy that it was Gurney who laid a great deal of the groundwork for much of Templer's success. Many of his policies, most notably the resettlement programme, were essentially aimed at long term results. Thus, although in the short term he failed to fulfill adequately the functions of leadership, in the long run he undoubtedly would have had greater success. The tide of events certainly did not run in his favour and his untimely death prevented him from reaping the fruits of his work. Templer, on the other hand, was accorded much of the credit for the results of Gurney's policies as well as the successes produced by his own endeavours. Templer, unlike Gurney, had time on his side. He was particularly fortunate in that the communist threat diminished virtually from the moment he arrived in the Federation. The October 1951 directive was made necessary by the accumulation of difficulties within the M.C.P. Terrorism produced antipathy and an uncooperative attitude towards the M.C.P. within the population.[2] The effectiveness of the resettlement programme and the more sophisticated policies the Security Forces were beginning to develop meant that by the end of 1951 (although it was not readily apparent, even to Gurney) the Government's policies were beginning to force the M.C.P. onto the defensive. Certainly it may be said that Templer owed much to Gurney.

However, if the assessment of the people of the unit, in this case the Malayan public, is to be central to the concept of political leadership (and it would seem from this study that this is a very fruitful approach to the analysis of individual political leadership) then Templer must be considered the more successful of the two High Commissioners. Gurney failed to gain the support and cooperation of a significant proportion of the population. During his term as High Commissioner, the Malayan Government, and by implication Gurney as head of the Government, were criticised for their seeming inability to come to grips with the problems of Malayans. By contrast Templer received both praise and a good deal of cooperation. Indeed he was able to elicit both within the first weeks of his arrival in Malaya and seemed to go from strength to strength until his departure in mid-1954. In this sense Malayans clearly considered that Templer provided exceptional leadership during a critical period in their history.[3]

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This concluding discussion has so far centred on the dynamics of leadership during a particular period in the Malayan Emergency. A number of general points need to be raised, however, with regard to the consequences of this study for possible future research into individual political leadership.

First, there is clearly a need for more research into the role of political expectations in the political leadership process. In order to understand the leadership process in any society, the relevant political expectations concerning such factors as what is considered to be in the political realm, general attitudes to political participation, and what is thought to be legitimate behaviour on the part of the leader, must be detailed and evaluated. In this regard empirical and theoretical work on both political socialization and political culture would seem to tie in with the concept of political leadership.[4] Expectations about these kinds of matters not only vary from society to society but also from group to group within a society. In any specific case, therefore, it should be kept in mind that a political leader must deal with a number of specific groups with differing sets of expectations which may include conflicting demands. For example, a Prime Minister holds a key position in the cabinet, in his parliamentary party, and in the society as a whole. He must either try to live up to all the varying and often conflicting expectations of all these groups or modify those expectations he cannot live up to. Neither of these tasks is particularly easy!

Second, research relating to existing theories involving aspects of communications to the concept of individual political leadership would be valuable. Linking the political leadership process with work done on the mass media and its effects,[5] public opinion and propaganda,[6] and policy decision-making[7] would seem to be particularly fruitful. Recent work on the series of patron-client relationships that examines the tiers of leadership from the village level to the political elite at the centre should also prove useful in developing a better understanding of the word-of-mouth transmission of information between leader and non-leader.[8] Moreover, the fact that communication is central to the concept of individual political leadership ties the activities of political leaders into theories of social innovation and political change.[9] Further in terms of the attainment of political goals, whether they involve social and political change or not, the pattern of communication surrounding a leader gives a good indication of whether that leader tends towards an autocratic or democratic style of leadership.[10] Indeed, it is in this context that the use of force by a political leader, essentially itself a form of communication, may be properly evaluated. Certainly the use of communication as a variable in delineating the concept of individual political leadership brings the study of political leaders into the mainstream of political analysis where its absence has for too long distorted social scientists' appreciation of political phenomena.

Third, the importance of an efficient and reliable organization to the relationship a leader is able to establish with members of a specific unit has been amply demonstrated. It would seem, therefore, that the role of a political leader in bureaucratic organizations, including such factors as his place in the organizational hierarchy and what powers he is invested with, must be fully examined. Theories of administrative behaviour--many of which allude to the importance of leadership--need to be assessed in the light of the functions of a political leader.[11] Indeed, in terms of the framework posited in this study it would be interesting to analyse Government departments and the leadership provided by cabinet ministers.

Fourth, the study has clearly shown both the complexity and the significance for the study of leadership of the situation in which any leader/non-leader relationship takes place. A leader may be able to control certain aspects of a situation. For instance, a leader may be able to persuade some people to carry out a particular policy which would encourage others to support that leader (there is often a snowballing of support effect working in these cases). Or a leader may himself be able to alter directly the situation through his own actions. But equally there are many factors that have an impact on the situation in which members of a unit find themselves and which are outside a leader's direct or even indirect control. The complexities involved here are numerous and many of the theories dealing with the impact of the international system on domestic politics or with the dynamics of political conflict and political change may be employed to complement an analysis of individual political leadership.[12]

One final point needs to be raised. Essentially this point revolves around the question: what weight should be given to each of the four variables in determining the nature of the leader/non-leader relationship? Or, to put it more precisely, how much can one individual control the situation and to what extent can he structure people's expectations? This, of course, depends on the circumstances. Expectations can only be changed relatively slowly and no leader can exclude factors outside his control from changing the situation and producing, in turn, changes in people's expectations. Moreover, it may not necessarily be a good ploy for an aspiring leader to change his professed beliefs and policies as people's expectations change: the one expectation that may remain constant may call for a leader who is consistent in his views. In any leader/non-leader relation it is the set of expectations held by the non-leader that is the key to assessing the ability of an individual to lead that unit.

In summary, therefore, it may be said that this research has achieved three objectives. First, it has ordered a good deal of previously unanalysed material on the first six years of the Malayan Emergency. Second, as befits an exploratory analysis, it has charted the major conceptual relationships involved in political leadership. Finally, this study has critically assessed the political leadership of two government leaders, Sir Henry Gurney and Sir Gerald Templer, in an insurgency situation.

FOOTNOTES CHAPTER 8

[1] "War of the Running Dogs," Anglia Television (U.K.), 9 July 1974.

[2] See Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

[3] See the many expressions of praise for Templer's leadership in *Legislative Council Proceedings* 6th Session, pp. 153-276 and 541. See the many newspaper articles which praised him, for example *The Straits Times* 1 January 1954; *Malay Mail* 30 July 1960; *Tamil Murasu* 4 January 1953; and *Warta Negara* 17 November 1953. Tan Cheng-lock noted in a speech at an Annual General Meeting of the M.C.A. that, "Sir Gerald is a true soldier-statesman who has fulfilled the needs and demands of the critical hour in Malaya." TCL Papers (Malaysia) Item 177.

[4] See, for example, *Socialization to Politics: A Reader*, ed. Jack Dennis (New York: John Wiley, 1973); and Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London: MacMillan, 1972).

[5] See, amongst others, Colin Seymour-Ure, *The Press, Politics and the Public: an Essay on the Role of the National Press in the British Political System* (London: Methuen, 1968); and Dan D. Nimmo, *Popular Images of Politics: A Taxonomy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

[6] See Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956); and Lindley Fraser, *Propaganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957); and Terence H. Qualter, *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[7] The importance of communication to decision-making is implicitly accepted in the collection of papers on this topic edited by Dusan Sidjanski, *Political Decision-Making Process: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., 1973).

[8] See, in particular, James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972), pp. 81-113; and John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970).

[9] See the path-breaking work of K.W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press, 1966). See also Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of Considerations," *Communications and Political Development*, ed. Pye.

[10] See the discussion in Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership, pp. 256 and 365-370.

[11] See the discussions on this subject in Michael J. Hill, The Sociology of Public Administration (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972); and P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

[12] With regard to the impact of the international system, see for example "Transnational Relations and World Politics," International Organization, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 25 (Summer 1971). Examples of theories dealing with the domestic political situation which would tie in with the leadership framework posited in this study include game theory; see Martin Shubik, "The Uses of Game Theory," in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

	RUBBER PRICES[1]			TIN PRICES[2]		
	Rubber Smoked Sheet No. 1					
	cents per lb Singapore	d per lb London	U.S. cents per lb. New York	M$ per pikul Singapore/Penang	per long ton London	U.S. cents per lb New York
1947	37.3	12	21.0	n.a.	427.6	77.94
1948	42.1	12	22.0	n.a.	551.5	99.25
1949	38.2	11	17.6	n.a.	605.8	99.32
1950	108.2	31	41.1	365.42	744.6	95.56
1951	169.5	49	59.1	526.58	1077.3	128.31
1952	96.1	28	38.6	480.08	964.5	121.33
1953	67.4	19	24.2	363.92	731.7	95.77
1954	67.3	20	23.6	353.59	719.4	91.81
1955	114.2	33	39.1	365.50	740.1	94.73
1956	96.8	28	34.2	387.03	787.7	101.26

[1] Source: Malaya Rubber Statistics Handbook 1956, Kuala Lumpur n.d., p. 53.

[2] Source; British Economic Survey of Colonial Territories, p. 26; International Tin Study Group Statistical Year Book, 1956, The Hague n.d. The Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya, Yip Yat Hoong, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, p. 396.

TABLE A

Government of Malaya Revenue and Expenditure[1] ($ million)

	Total Customs Revenue Collected Fed - State	Income Tax	Total Revenue Original Estimate	Total Revenue Actual	Total Expenditure Actual	Surplus or Deficit
1947	137.9	-	213.4	268.7	285.6	-16.9
1948	182.5	-	197.6	235.5	290.8	-55.3
1949	201.1	40.2*	261.1	345.2	347.3	- 2.1
1950	314.3	46.6	273.7	443.4	340.0	+103.4
1951	533.2	126.6	410.3	735.4	548.7	+186.7
1952	414.5	220.5	640.9	725.1	672.2	+ 52.9
1953	325.4	175.7	588.7	620.2	790.4	-170.2
1954	341.6	123.2	603.6	622.2	714.0	-91.8

* indicates 1948 tax collected

[1] Source: Audit on Accounts, 1947-54; Annual Reports, 1947-54; Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 1947-1954.

TABLE B

TABLE C

Wages and Cost of Living

	Base 100 in 1947			Cost of Living for Chinese	
	Rubber Wages[1] unskilled field workers	Government Wages[1] unskilled workers	Costs Food-stuff & Kerosene[2]	Total Weighted Index[2]	Real Wages[3] of unskilled rubber workers
1947	100	100	100	100	100
1948	123	100		87	141
1949	131	100	76	82	160
1950	147	114	86	88	167
1951	236	163	129	116	203
1952	202	163	135	120	168
1953	191	163	123	120	159
1954	n.a.	n.a.	109	116	n.a.

[1] Source: Annual Reports, 1947-1953, c.f. R. Ma Table 3, p. 38.

[2] Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletins, 1947-1954.

[3] Source: Computed from ratio of rubber field workers wages over cost of living for Chinese labourers. C. Purcell, Communist or Free? p. 148. The 1939 base of 100 would seem unsuited to post war analyses.

TABLE D

Rubber Prices and Profits[1]

			Cents per lb.		
	Average Rubber price RSS 1(cents)	All-in production costs	Price less all-in costs	Residual Costs	Company Profits (net)
1947	37.3	26.4	10.9	3.8	7.1
1948	42.2	29.1	13.1	6.5	6.6
1949	38.2	28.7	9.5	2.6	6.9
1950	108.2	38.2	70.0	32.8	37.2
1951	169.6	62.0	107.6	54.3	53.3
1952	96.1	63.4	32.7	9.1	23.6
1953	67.3	53.2	14.2	3.4	10.8
1954	114.2	49.1	18.2	0.8	17.4
1955	96.8	58.7	55.5	21.4	34.1

[1] Source: R. Ma, "Company Profits and Prices in the Rubber Industry in Malaya, 1947-58," The Malayan Economic Review 4 (October 1949), p. 44.

Emergency Statistics 1948 - 1954[1]

	1948	1949		1950		1951		1952		1953		1954	
	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II	I	II
TERRORISTS													
Killed	62.3	52.8	50.3	50.7	57.3	92.7	86.7	97.0	94.2	76.7	81.1	66.7	49.0
Captured	43.8	30.2	26.0	12.7	11.8	9.7	10.5	9.0	11.5	6.8	5.3	4.8	3.7
Surrendered	9.3	13.2	28.7	17.0	7.5	16.5	17.0	17.8	24.8	29.5	32.5	19.2	16.0
SECURITY FORCES													
Killed	24.8	17.7	20.5	33.8	31.7	43.5	40.5	29.2	14.7	6.7	8.7	7.0	7.5
Wounded	35.2	17.2	24.0	39.2	43.5	56.7	58.5	41.0	25.8	7.0	12.5	12.5	13.2
CIVILIANS													
Killed	52.5	22.3	33.3	52.7	55.0	46.8	42.0	40.5	16.7	6.2	8.0	9.0	7.2
Wounded	24.8	10.7	22.7	36.8	31.3	31.2	28.2	19.3	7.0	1.2	1.3	2.7	2.5
CONTACTS	NA	NA	NA	56.2	107.7	156.5	162.0	156.7	154.7	118.5	116.0	90.5	75.0

[1] Source: Annual Police Report 1955, p. 4

NA - not available

Statistics given are monthly averages.

TABLE E

TABLE F

Federal Expenditures[1]

	Education $ million	Medical & Health $ million	Public Works Extraordinary non-recurrent $ million	Police $ million	Allocation to States & Settlements. $ million	Defence, Police & Emergency[2] $ million
1948	6.6	8.1	4.3	32.0	82.8	n.a.
1949	2.7	6.9	11.8	69.0	81.7	82
1950	3.8	7.7	13.9	73.5	71.0	101
1951	6.9	13.1	34.3	138.4	99.6	217
1952	14.2	13.3	39.9	170.8	131.5	287
1953	12.4	14.3	51.9	171.8	150.4	296
1954	10.8	14.5	26.6	n.a.	155.7	n.a.

[1] Source: Audit on Accounts, 1948-1954.

[2] Source: Economic Report by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Malaya (Singapore: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1955), p. 140; Annual Report, 1948-1954.

TABLE G

State and Settlement Expenditure[1]

	Medical & Health $ million	Education $ million	Public Works $ million	Total Expenditure $ million
1950	17.1	26.2	29.7	135.4
1951	21.4	36.8	38.5	153.7
1952	30.3	58.0	56.2	217.3
1953	34.3	65.8	66.9	248.0
1954	34.9	70.4	58.4	251.0

[1] Source: Malaya Monthly Statistical Bulletin, July 1957.

TABLE H

NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA[1]

	Daily	Weekly	Fort-nightly	Monthly	Total
KUALA LUMPUR					
English	2	2	1	1	18
Chinese	2	3	-	-	
Indian	3	-	1	1	
Malay	1	-	1	-	
PENANG					
English	3	1	-	3	24
Chinese	3	1	1	-	
Indian	2	1	-	-	
Malay	1	3	1	4	
IPOH					
English	1	1	-	-	6
Chinese	1	-	-	-	
Indian	1	1	-	1	
MALACCA					
English	-	-	-	1	3
Chinese	-	1	-	-	
Indian	-	-	-	1	
TOTAL	20	14	5	12	51

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[1] Source: U.N.E.S.C.O. Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Radio, Film, (Paris: 1948).

TABLE I

DAILIES DISTRIBUTED IN THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA, 1948[1]

Place of Publication	Language	Approximate Circulation
KUALA LUMPUR:		
Malay Mail	English	8,500
Malaya Tribune	"	2,600
Min Sheng Pao	Chinese	10,000
China Press	"	6,000
Janaṇayakam	Tamil	2,500
Tamil Nesan	"	1,400
Pardesi Khalsa Sewak	Punjabi	500
Majiis	Malay	3,000
PENANG:		
Straits Echo and Times of Malaya	English	11,100
Penang Gazette	"	2,100
Malaya Tribune	"	1,000
Sing Pin Jih Pao	Chinese	6,250
Kwong Wah Yit Poh	"	7,000
Modern Daily News	"	7,000
Dhesa Nesan	Tamil	2,000
Sevika	"	1,500
Warta Negara	Malay	3,000
IPOH:		
Malaya Tribune	English	3,000
Kin Kwok Daily News	Chinese	5,200
Muyarchi	Tamil	2,000
SINGAPORE:		
Straits Times	English	18,000
Malaya Tribune(of Singapore)	"	8,000
Morning Tribune	"	1,000
Union Times	"	2,900
Singapore Free Press	"	3,000
Indian Daily Mail	"	2,000
Nanyang Siang Pao	Chinese	18,000
Sin Chew Jit Poh	"	8,000
Chung Shing Jit Pao	"	2,000
Nan Chiau Jit Pao	"	3,000
Tamil Murasu	Tamil	4,000
Kerala Bandhu	Malayalam	1,000
Malaya Nanban	Tamil	3,000
Videsha Malayah	Malayalam	2,500
Utusan Melayu	Malay	2,500
Utusan Zaman	Romanised Malay	1,000

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[1] Source: U.N.E.S.C.O. Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Radio, Film, (Paris: 1948), Vol.II.

TABLE J

LITERACY AND DAILY NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION

	Literacy by Community[1]	Circulation Total No.	%[2]	Copies per 1,000 literate population
Chinese	677,500	69.960	44	103
Malay	595,000	11,130	7	19
Indian	200,000	19,080	12	95
English	182,000	58,830	37	323
Fed.of Malaya[3]	508,160	159,830	100	105

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[1] Source: A Report on the 1947 Census of Population by M.V. Del Tufo, Federation of Malaya, (Kuala Lumpur and London: 1949).

[2] Source: U.N.E.S.C.O. Report of the Commission on Technical Needs in Press, Film, Radio, (Paris: 1948).

[3] This is not the total of all communities, as some people were proficient in more than one language. This is the total of individuals literate in any language.

TABLE K

BROADCASTING: LISTENERS LICENSES[1]

Year[2]	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Europeans	Eurasians and others	Total
1949	17,292	7,275	6,893	2,311	1,293	35,064
1950	22,953	11,321	8,715	2,361	1,270	46,620
1951	30,613	17,549	10,483	2,254	1,389	62,279
1952	35,945	21,570	12,234	2,210	1,528	73,488
1953	48,834	34,853	18,057	3,807	5,285	110,835
1954	47,468	39,366	19,235	3,584	3,584	115,286
1955	53,693	48,791	23,454	3,285	3,285	135,347

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[1] Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Federation of Malaya.

[2] Figures are as of 30 April each year.

GRAPH I

Strength of Security Forces



GRAPH II

Strength of M.C.P. Guerrillas



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